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vTranslator’s Note
This book is an English translation of Gendai Nihon no “shakai no kokoro,” which 
was published in 2014 by Yuhikaku Publishing Co., Ltd. As that publication his-
tory implies, while the original Japanese version was intended for an educated 
audience it was not necessarily aimed at a scholarly audience. Accordingly, numer-
ous asides and turns of phrase in the original text that presumed a non-specialized 
Japanese readership were recast or eliminated from this translation, which pre-
sumes a more specialized global readership. Some are still present as written, how-
ever, and the reader’s indulgence is asked for in that regard.
 Several terms and neologisms appear in the work that are specific to the world 
of Japanese sociology. Foremost among them is shakai ishikiron (“social conscious-
ness studies”), which already has been rendered in various other ways in citations 
to the author’s work that have appeared in English prior to this translation’s publi-
cation. Every effort had been made when developing translations for these various 
terms to reconcile any existing English renderings of the relevant or related termi-
nology with the interpretations and wishes of the author. Furthermore, the author 
closely reviewed the entire translation.
 As is customary, Japanese (and as appropriate other Asian) names are presented 
in the surname-personal name order, while Western names appear in the personal 
name-surname order.
 Carl Freire 
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INTRODUCTION
Quantifying Social Mentality
A Crucial Thing Invisible to the Eye
“Japanese have come to treasure the bonds among people.” “No, the connections 
among people have been lost and everyone feels alone.” “Today’s young people 
have lost hope.” “No, young people in fact seem to be pretty satisfied with their 
daily lives.”
 How do people see the world around them, and what feelings do the things they 
see arouse?  In the broadest sense, the answers to these questions offer us a glimpse 
of what I call the “social mentality” (shakai no kokoro). Social mentality constitutes 
the software, so to speak, that controls how the social system works. The idea that 
such a social mentality exists and can be apprehended is attracting renewed inter-
est for its potential as a key to help us unlock the riddles of Japanese society today.
 In recent years, the Japanese media has markedly increased its use of psychoana-
lytic and clinical psychological interpretations to describe events and incidents in 
the world. Indeed, it has become more common for language (usually with nega-
tive connotations) related to mental states like utsu (“depression”), iyashi (“heal-
ing”), kireru (“losing it”), hekomu (“withdrawing”), ochikomu (“feeling down), and 
kokoro ga oreru (“heart breaks”) to be used throughout print and broadcast medi-
ums than ever before. Expressions that emphasize feelings and emotions like “the 
national sentiment,” “public perception,” “rumors,” and “the sentiment among 
the people concerned” often function as determinants of whether something is 
good or bad. The best example of such a phrase from the past decade might be 
“kūki o yomu”—literally, “to read the atmosphere,” or more idiomatically “to get 
the drift.”
 This tendency is visible when it comes to government policy as well. The cri-
teria used for judging various policy approaches are not such objective facts as 
“employment,” “wages,” “welfare,” “family,” “community,” “education,” and “pun-
ishment,” but rather the kinds of feelings people have about them. The rationales 
offered tend to such statements as “We want to create a society where everyone 
feels happy, rather than one where every member of the society achieves an afflu-
ent standard of living,” “The way the public thinks about gender needs to be 
changed to achieve equal employment opportunity between the sexes,” and “It is 
more important to pursue decision-making processes that everyone can agree to 
rather than to target urgent changes in policy.” For this reason, political scientists, 
labor economists, pedagogists, and the like all have begun to  use social mental-
ity—in the form of such concepts as “hope” (kibō), “despair” (zetsubō), “happi-
ness” (kōfuku), “anxiety” (fuan), and “empathy” (kyōkan)—as the key concept that 
underpins their various theories.
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 Sociologists have described this as the “psychologization” of contemporary soci-
ety. This trend rapidly grew in conjunction with a shift of emphasis in people’s lives 
toward things deemed to be socially desirable—that is, from the accumulation of 
material wealth to spiritual richness or improved quality of life. As shall be shown, 
this development is simply another indicator of a global change from the era of so-
called modernity to that of reflexive (saikiteki) modernity (second modernity). In 
the Japanese context, this gradual but definite shift corresponds almost perfectly 
with the transition from the Shōwa (1925–1989) to the Heisei eras (1989– )—
broadly speaking, to the years around the turn of the 20th century.
 In more technical language, social mentality is social consciousness (shakai 
ishiki; I will discuss the translation issues involved in Chapter 1). One might 
expect the fact that the general public being so interested in this topic would pro-
vide a welcome tailwind to scholars who have made social consciousness studies 
(shakai ishikiron) their focus. Given that the field is in a position to bridge classic 
sociological theory and the current interest in social mentality among a non-spe-
cialist audience, one could easily be forgiven for expecting it to be “hot” right now.
 However, there is nothing to indicate that this is at all the case, for contempo-
rary social consciousness studies has not been able to satisfy what the general pub-
lic desires of it. There are several reasons why this is so. First, trying to analyze what 
is reflected in the mentality of a society rather than objective social conditions can 
be seen as a somewhat peculiar approach to getting at the facts. We can apprehend 
the general state of a society through any number of objective figures; consider 
what you can learn, for example, from economic indicators, the real growth rate of 
the GDP, labor participation ratios, employment rates, the job offer ratio, birth-
rates, age-based demographics, tertiary education attainment  rates, and so forth. 
In light of this, some will inevitably suspect that intellectuals are merely speaking 
in riddles because they are trying to convert those facts into that—i.e., a mental-
ity—which expressly cannot be seen.
 Moreover, while the way in which social mentality operates can be more or less 
understood, it is hard to discern its form and make it visible. Empirical sociolo-
gists (keiryō shakaigakusha) examine it by using yardsticks such as psychological 
measures. However, this activity is quite different from developing an overall por-
trait of the social consciousness—the enormous operating system, so to speak—
that governs modern society and makes it work. Even if we had several hundred 
such yardsticks, the number would still be inadequate to the task. Additionally, 
social consciousness is flexible and shifts with the trends of the times. If we do not 
establish the contours of the social mentality, the more we try to understand its 
dynamic character the less traction our explanations of it will have.
 That said, the “feel” of this uncertainty that faces us is not something that most 
non-specialists are likely to perceive.  In their view, social consciousness comprises 
a solid mass of opinions; it can be presented on a bar graph or pie chart in the form 
of “for/against” or “support/do not support” opinions, or else they anticipate that 
simple assertions of that sort will eventually be made. Nishiyama Tetsuo argues 
that when it comes to general scientific knowledge in reflexive modernity, “the 
more a scientist tries to do their work as a specialist in good faith, the more they 
will reach conclusions that leave behind some aspects they cannot foresee.  It is 
simply not possible for today’s specialists in the sciences to make clear avowals of 
the sort that laypersons expect” (Nishiyama 2013: 20–21).
 If you think about it, it should be easy to recognize that social mentality is not 
a concept that fits neatly into a box in the ways that, say, “neoliberalism” or “envi-
ronmentalist” do. The phenomena that social consciousness studies concerns 
itself with—status identification, authoritarianism, and general life satisfaction—
should best be seen as the intermediate terms that sociologists use for turning 
social survey data into persuasive theories rather than as descriptions of actual con-
ditions. What we truly seek to understand is social mentality as a living, breathing 
thing that can be learned about through the use of those intermediate terms.
 The fact is, however, that there is a vague sense of guilt among empirical sociolo-
gists in Japan, for over the course of the past two decades or so they have lost their 
sense of society’s social mentality. Even if they did not actually have a handle on it, 
through the late 1980s at the end of the Shōwa period (1925–1989) they none-
theless made frequent declarations to the public about what the actual state of 
social consciousness was. They bandied about certain phrases central to Shōwa-era 
critical discourse that people of a certain age will recall hearing, like “Nihonjinron” 
(theories of Japanese uniqueness), “sōchūryū genshō” (the mass-middle-class phe-
nomenon), and “hoshu-kakushin no seijiteki ideorogī tairitsu” (the standoff of polit-
ical ideologies between conservatism and liberalism).
 To get ahead of myself in presenting this book’s argument, I believe it was once 
possible to tell the tale of social mentality in clear terms like this by taking advan-
tage of two “auxiliary lines” that ran through modern Japanese society in the 20th 
century. One was the time axis of social development, which ran straight from 
traditional to modern society, while the other was the vertical axis of stratification 
status. With these two axes, we could generate a two-dimensional plane for appre-
hending the social consciousness. The power that these axes provided by stipulat-
ing something as being “new” or “old,” or “upper” or “lower,” made it possible 
to portray various aspects of society in understandable ways. This of course was 
applicable not only when it came to the mass middle class or someone’s attitude 
toward Japanese tradition, but also to opinions about science and technology pol-
icy, views on international relations, nationalism, and attitudes about the family 
and community.
 However, these two lines that had offered such potency in the 20th century 
are almost completely useless in today’s Japan. Many contemporary phenomena 
and issues—nuclear power and other energy issues, the state of the environment, 
ethnicity, trade liberalization, non-profit organization activities, grassroots civic 
movements, the welfare state regime, so-called “herbivore” young men, and young 
women seeking to become full-time housewives—do not lend themselves to such 
simple assessments as “That’s an old way of thinking” or “That is a bourgeois (or 
proletarian) value.” For that reason, we simply can no longer get a handle so eas-
ily on what the social mentality is now. If we do not understand the nature of the 
operating system that runs society, we cannot ascertain what lies ahead.
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Survey Data Analysis as Brake
“If you haven’t collected any objective data to support it, then no matter how 
you argue your point it will still be groundless, right?” Scholars working in fields 
that are (or see themselves as)  close to the natural sciences are likely to immedi-
ately draw such a conclusion in the event that such conditions are true. However, 
while social consciousness studies may be a social science, it is also tinged with the 
humanities, overlapping as it does with modern thought and cultural studies. As 
such, specialists in this field simply do not come to the same conclusion about an 
argument’s potential validity. That said, they also should not give up on finding 
quantitative data to confirm their arguments in favor of relying entirely on unfet-
tered pronouncements about social conditions. Being aware of trends in social 
survey data is indispensable for getting an undistorted view of the social mentality.
 The method used entails measuring what I call the gentle “gradients” that run 
through society. We do this by asking people throughout the country who are 
leading quite “ordinary” lives identical questions about their lifestyles and patterns 
of thinking, and then analyzing the results. This method provides a hard-to-match 
benefit in that it allows the researcher to move away from a worm’s-eye view of 
how individuals experience daily life and get a bird’s-eye perspective on society as a 
whole.
 That said, when putting it into practice, we also find this approach comes with 
a rigid constraint: the way in which the scholar can develop his or her argument 
is shackled by scientific “rules” such as those concerning statistical significance. 
Even just loosening those restraints would markedly expand the degree of freedom 
to talk about social mentality. Doing so can be tempting, and some studies of 
contemporary Japanese society in fact have relied on small observations and exag-
gerated speculations while paying little heed to quantitative data to make specific 
pronouncements about the state of society. There is a bracing incisiveness to these 
unrestrained stories; following the facile riddle-solving trajectory laid out therein 
does produce a certain degree of “oh, now I see” satisfaction. 
 However, it cannot be said that the grasp they have of the state of Japanese 
society today is an unerring one. The arguments they present tend to be a hodge-
podge with no small amount of armchair speculation based solely on the author’s 
sensitivities. Even those works that carefully adhere to the methods of fieldwork 
and studies of discourse analysis may make arguments that recklessly clash with 
the “feel” that we get from the large-scale survey data.
 More problematic is the fact that most of their readers do not bring the “lit-
eracy,” so to speak, needed to discriminate the truth or falseness of arguments. In 
today’s Japan, we frequently see people tapping (figuratively and literally) on the 
“Like” button without giving it much thought in response to statements about 
the shared present that critics—whose original purpose was to be mediators of 
culture—casually toss off without the underpinning of any particular proposition 
or theory. For example, until quite recently there was much talk of Japan hav-
ing become a “desperate country,” battered by anxiousness about the future and a 
sense of stagnation. However, it was not possible in the end to uncover any definite 
evidence in the social survey data—which get at actual conditions in the heart of 
society—showing Japanese society to be terrorized by risks and consumed with 
anxiety. 
 In the meantime, there was a change in political leadership, Tokyo was awarded 
the Summer Olympics, and the economy recovered slightly.  In response, the old 
discourse was pushed aside and a new one began to take root saying that bright 
portents were on the horizon. But the social mentality is not something that 
changes so simply “as expected” like that. The question of what is truly happening 
remains. Surely everyone would like to know the real story.
 Studies of contemporary society supported by survey data tend to be written 
in the form of a self-evident story; often, their findings are presented as suggest-
ing something that everyone already senses to be the case. Mita Munesuke, the 
trailblazer in social consciousness studies, once described the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative studies as follows: “In the case of the former you get 
analyses that say ‘this is definite, but it isn’t interesting;’ with the latter, you tend to 
get arguments that say ‘this is interesting, but it is not definite” (Mita 1979: 139). 
His turn of phrase squarely hits the mark.  It is difficult for the researcher to strike 
a balance between being “interesting” and being “definite.” However, precisely 
because the present age is a confused one, there is still some value to taking on this 
difficult challenge.
 From the discussion thus far, the reader may have developed the following 
understanding of the state of affairs amid which this book came into being: The 
degree to which people are coming to see social mentality as meaningful in Japan 
today is growing stronger in lockstep with a tremendous change in contemporary 
society. However, sociology grounded in objective survey data does not have the 
firm grasp on what that mentality is actually like as it did around the end of the 
Shōwa period. In the field’s attempts to get a handle on it, “unfettered” logic has 
tended to run rampant in a way that turns the lack of verification from quantita-
tive data against itself. As a result, the formal scholarly space once known as social 
consciousness studies is presenting itself to be something of an “unregulated com-
mons” in contemporary society studies.
 If this situation where impressionistic theories about social mentality continues 
to govern the course ahead, then metaphorically speaking the ship of Japanese 
society on which we are passengers is going to be steered solely by experience and 
gut reaction with no one checking the instrument panel. Social consciousness 
studies that are based on survey data analysis can establish the necessary “oppo-
sitional complementarity” (taikōteki sōhosei) (Shiobara 1994) to put forth sound 
arguments about the direction in which the social mentality is headed.
The Structure of This Book
This book is divided into three parts. In Part I, I reconstruct in my own fashion 
the doctrines and theoretical background of social consciousness and quantitative 
social consciousness studies. Surprisingly few efforts have been made in these fields 
to present their research frameworks in an organized fashion. I have organized my 
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thinking in the belief that the style of research should first be made plain so that 
the reader may better understand the points I am making. Given the somewhat 
specialized subject matter, the non-specialist reader who wants to know what my 
specific points are should begin from Chapter 3 by browsing through the figures 
presented in the first two chapters. They can then be referred back to as necessary 
to grasp the general sense of my arguments.
 Concrete case studies are at the heart of Parts II and III. Using status identifica-
tion as its core index, Part II traces what contemporary Japanese have perceived 
their places in society to be from the era of the mass middle class to the present. In 
Part III, developing my argument in the context of the current state of the conflict 
between tradition and modernity (referred to in this book as “traditionalism–mod-
ernism”1),  I provide a close reading of the uncertain direction today’s Japanese are 
taking in how they involve themselves with society (their social orientation). In the 
Epilogue, I link the quantitative social consciousness studies findings presented in 
this book to the theory of reflexive modernity (second modernity) to illuminate 
when contemporary Japanese society reached its peak as well as the issues that lay 
ahead.
NOTES
1 “Traditionalism–modernism” as I label it comprises a paired construct that informs 
the social consciousness of Japanese in the postwar period. Japanese during this period 
judge their own places and those of their peers based on where they were positioned on a 
spectrum with traditionalism at one end and modernism on the other.
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PART I
REBUILDING SOCIAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES
3CHAPTER 1 
Approaches to Apprehending  
Social Consciousness
Quantitative social consciousness studies (keiryō shakai isikiron) is a field of 
research that examines social mentality by analyzing data from large-scale social 
surveys. 1 That description might make it seem like it is a field devoted to mak-
ing rough guesses. Indeed, as is the case with many other specialized sociology 
terms, we are hard put to respond when someone calls that characterization into 
question. 
 Social consciousness studies (shakai ishikiron) itself may be a term that today 
has largely fallen off the radar screen, but it once described a discipline that had 
a certain degree of status in Japanese sociology. Its quantitative counterpart, on 
the other hand, is a comparatively new field that incorporates methods based on 
analyzing numerical data; its name, in fact, is a neologism of my own coinage 
(Kikkawa 1998).
 Because of this newness, very few works have discussed exactly where analyses 
of survey data on matters related to subjectivity fit into studies of contemporary 
Japanese society. Accordingly, if I am to dissect the social mentality of contempo-
rary Japan in a substantive way, I will first need to make plain the type of research I 
aim to carry out in this book. 
 Understandably, this book may be the first time that many non-specialist read-
ers will have heard such terms as “social consciousness,” “social consciousness stud-
ies,” and “quantitative social consciousness studies.” Granted, general information 
about definitions and methods does not contain any substantial information 
about the actual society involved. Some readers may prefer that I leave the history 
of this research discipline and my personal ideals for research unspoken and get 
into the heart of the study without any further ado. 
 However, I believe that we have lost track of the social mentality not just 
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because it has in reality taken on a new form, but also because there are defects in 
the framework we use to examine it. I most of all am accountable for explaining 
what I mean by “quantitative social consciousness studies.” In light of the forego-
ing, please bear with me as I first outline the history and characteristics of this field 
of research.
Positioning the Field within the Social Sciences
The social sciences today cover a broad spectrum of disciplines. At one extreme 
sit fields that use objective data to take in the overall shape of their subject matter; 
examples of this are economics with respect to the nature of industry and market 
forces, and demography with respect to population dynamics. At the other extreme 
are such fields as psychology that deal with residual human agency. Sociology sits 
in the center of these two extremes, and social consciousness studies is positioned 
within sociology at the edge closest to psychology. The neighborhood is a densely 
populated one containing mutually overlapping fields that explore psychology, 
consciousness, culture, and thought; these include such areas as social psychology, 
behavioral economics, sociology of culture, and modern thought (Figure 1-1).2 
Accordingly, I will begin by enumerating those characteristics of social conscious-
ness studies that set it apart from its neighbors.
 First, social psychology uses methods that are almost entirely the same as those 
of social consciousness studies (and its quantitative peer). Both collect data on 
individuals in order to develop in quantitative terms an overall picture of attitudes 
and opinions. In spirit and letter, too, there is a close resemblance between the 
pairings of “social + psychology” and “social + consciousness.” Moreover, from an 
outsider’s perspective the fact that the fields do not differentiate when it comes to 
deciding which mentality or attitude to focus on makes it appear they are treading 
similar paths.
 However, the two fields clearly diverge in how they are structured when it 
comes to how “society” is incorporated in their research. As its name indicates, 
social psychology falls within the framework of psychology. For that reason, it 
has research traditions that call for precisely measuring the subjectivity it seeks 
to explain. Additionally, the field is deeply interested in unravelling internal psy-
chological processes; specialists are repeatedly conducting experiments and inves-
tigations that have those processes as their issue of concern. Some of the general 
propositions about human behavior this field develops from even get rerouted to 
sociology where they provide useful “parts” for that field’s own efforts. The theories 
of conformity and obedience, cognitive dissonance, and relative deprivation come 
to mind. Furthermore, social consciousness studies itself got its start from adopt-
ing approaches to measurement and analyses that social psychology developed.
 However, orthodox social psychology is somewhat lacking in one respect from 
a social consciousness studies perspective: it does not take careful notice of the 
influence that contemporary Japanese society inherently has on the consciousness 
of its members.3 This fact is plainly evident from the nature of the data that social 
psychology handles. The social survey data that quantitative social consciousness 
studies use are collected in such a way as to generate in microcosm an accurate 
representation of society as a whole. The social attributes of its respondents are var-
ied, the data are distributed in unique ways compared to that from other socie ties, 
and there are strong connections within at unexpected points. It would show, for 
example, that there are more adult women who are junior college graduates than 
men of the same generation, the youth population of today is considerably smaller 
than the population of people in their 60s, the population of immigrants born 
overseas is small, there are few people who believe in religion, and the white-collar 
worker population is larger in major urban areas. From a sociology perspective, 
this complex intertwining of various social factors in and of itself comprises the 
Japanese reality; it is the inherent, essential quality to be read from the social sur-
vey data. 
 Social psychology, on the other hand, seeks to uncover universal tendencies in 
human behavior. For it, the intertwined factors that social survey data make plain 
are distortions and biases; they are inconvenient to the purpose of elucidating 
“real” psychological mechanisms. Accordingly, as often as not social psychology 
analyses are carried out based on data using research designs meant to narrow the 
scope of genders, ages, educational attainments, occupations, and so forth of the 
target population—for example, “female university students between 19 and 21 
years old in liberal arts departments at private university X.” Selecting respondents 
in this fashion makes it possible to have a “correct” sample design in the sense 
that biases and distortions are controlled for from the start. When it comes to 
the interests of quantitative social consciousness studies, however, the phenomena 
Demography
Social psychology,
Behavioral economics,
Sociology of culture 
etc.
Economics
Sociology
Social
consciousness
studies
Psychology
Figure 1-1    The Position of Social Consciousness Studies in Social Science
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that social psychology research take up are quite unrealistic—valid, for example, 
under the rare circumstance that only unmarried university graduate females are 
gathered together. 
 The divergence here reflects the different scholarly interests of the two fields. 
Quantitative social consciousness studies attempts to present an accurate and real 
portrait of the society concerned, while social psychology seeks to purely abstract 
the general workings of human behavior. If our only interest was examples of this 
sort, all we would be left with is an amusing story. However, given that our con-
cern is how to incorporate stratification structure—the central pillar of the social 
system—into our research, these differences cannot be set aside. The fact is, the key 
difference with social psychology is that quantitative social consciousness studies 
examines causal relationships. The field is interested in how much the social men-
tality might change if some screw, as it were, was adjusted to some degree under 
actual social conditions.
 Meanwhile, over the past decade and a half or so, fields such as behavioral eco-
nomics, social epidemiology, and public health have come to see the subjective 
factor of the individual as an important consideration in their empirical analy-
ses. There is a considerable degree of overlap here, too, with quantitative social 
consciousness studies. Behavioral economics, for example, has recently emerged 
as a subfield of economics. It uses findings from such adjacent human sciences 
as psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral genetics to unravel microeconomic 
phenomena that cannot be explained solely by the premises of rational choice. On 
that basis, it advances a variety of theoretical constructs about the actual mecha-
nisms that underpin the preferences and choices of homo economics—preferences 
and choices that from the perspective of economic rationalism should have been 
predictable but in fact are complicated due to the impact of subjective factors 
(Tomono 2006; Ōtake 2010; Yoda 2010).
 Social epidemiology and public health tease out the connections between socio-
economic status and illnesses or physical and mental disorders. Taking those links 
as primary causal factors, they focus on how individuals perceive their status in 
society (status identification) and on what the effects are of such positive emotions 
as satisfaction, happiness, and self-esteem (Kawakami, Kobayashi, and Hashimoto 
2006; Kondō 2010). Here, too, the issues are not socioeconomic wealth or pov-
erty themselves, but rather the way such subjective factors function as pivots that 
inflect causal relationships.
 However, these fields of applied social science, too, differ in their orientation 
from quantitative social consciousness studies. They view social consciousness 
(subjective factors) as an independent variable (predictor variable) that influences 
individual behavior and circumstances. Accordingly, the research proposition 
that interests them is the opposite of that which interests quantitative social con-
sciousness studies, and the causalities on which each focuses are completely oppo-
site—viz., “can social phenomena be explained through social consciousness” 
(behavioral economics, social epidemiology, public health) vs. “can social con-
sciousness be explained through social factors” (quantitative social consciousness 
studies). Naturally, this difference also demonstrates that many of the demands in 
adjacent fields of social science can be met with the findings of quantitative social 
consciousness studies.
General Concepts of Social Consciousness
Viewing sociology as a field, we see that it brings together a vast array of research 
findings that analyze the relationships between social attributes and subjectivity. 
These are generated through such individual disciplines as family sociology, the 
sociology of labor, urban sociology, political sociology, and welfare sociology. 
 The object of research for this field of scholarship is “the things of this world” 
that are familiar to everyone in day-to-day life. Sociology examines this in order 
to explain the truths hidden in that world, which differ from what the people who 
live in it can readily see. Social mentality, which despite its invisibility has great 
power, is almost always involved when we elucidate such hidden mechanisms.
 There are countless theories that seek to reveal these hidden truths; we can point 
to Max Weber’s spirit of capitalism, Émile Durkheim’s anomie, Robert Merton’s 
relative deprivation, and Erich Fromm’s mechanisms of escape. In this light, soci-
ology can be described simply as the social science that speculates on the nature 
of subjectivity. In fact, it probably would be hard for sociology to accomplish the 
tasks it sets for itself without any consideration of subjectivity. Consider studies 
of the family, for example. The legal sciences would focus on matters of civil law 
related to kinship, genetics and biology on gender and reproduction, microeco-
nomics on household finances and consumption, and pedagogics on childcare. In 
its attempts to integrate these mutually overlapping issues, for family sociology the 
indispensable key is the status of subjectivity as seen in love (intimate emotional 
connection) and role identity.
 Not all sociological research that deals with the nature of subjectivity can nec-
essarily be defined as social consciousness studies. Research on the role of con-
sciousness in political participation might also fall within the bailiwick of social 
consciousness studies, but fundamentally such endeavors come under the mantle 
of political sociology. Studies of gender role segregation, meanwhile, examine 
identity through the lenses of gender theory or family sociology; social conscious-
ness studies plays no role here, either. 
 Still, on further reflection the social mentality intrinsic to contemporary Japan 
does affect, for example, family structure, labor, minority-majority relations, reli-
gious activities, voting behavior, economic behavior, and public health. Research is 
needed that can ascertain this dynamic sociological phenomenon whose influence 
is felt universally by all social phenomena and members of that society. Hence, the 
intrinsic job of social consciousness studies—one that I have likened elsewhere 
to “measuring the magnetic field” of social consciousness (Kikkawa 1998)—is to 
supply evidence-based information about the elements that comprise the shared 
platform that underpins contemporary Japanese society.
 In this light, social consciousness can be seen as a term that covers a broad 
spectrum encompassing those concepts in sociology that deal with the “soul” or 
“mind.” Other terms that work in roughly the same way include “individuality” 
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(shutaisei), “subjectivity” (shukan), “psychology” (shinri), and “national character” 
(kokuminsei). In some cases, social consciousness might even be described as cul-
ture (bunka). “Social consciousness” itself is not often used as the operative term 
for research on its own. Rather, it is usually employed as a subordinate concept, 
and stands as a specialized term with a meaning that is a bit narrowly defined. A list 
of similar concepts might include ideology, social psychology, ethos, social char-
acter, mentality, values and value orientation, identity, types of conformity, and 
doctrines that reach the status of “isms,” a topic that will be the focus of the latter 
half of this book.
 The contexts in which these terms are used are rather predetermined in the 
sense that they are associated with certain theorists and their respective discourses: 
Max Weber and ethos, Karl Mannheim and ideology, David Riesman and types 
of conformity, Pierre Bourdieu and habitus, and so on. Thinking about which 
word or term to employ leads to making decisions about various modifying nouns 
or adjectives that can be applied to suit the usage, i.e., the ideology of patriarchy, 
authoritarian personality, the Protestant ethic, conventional values, educational 
credentialism, attitude toward gender role segregation, a sense of injustice, degree 
of life satisfaction, and so forth. Pairing the wrong terms will quickly produce a 
combination that lacks meaning. In Japanese, for example, we can talk about sat-
isfaction using such terms as manzokudo (“degree of satisfaction”) or manzokukan 
(“sense of satisfaction”), but forming expressions like manzokushugi (“satisfaction-
ism”) or manzoku ideorogī (“the ideology of satisfaction”) represent mismatches.
 I do not have the space here to run through in detail the dictionary meanings 
of scholarly concepts or how the various theories developed. Indeed, this book’s 
readers are not likely to need to know how to use these specialized terms in most 
real-world situations. What we simply need to bear in mind is that the researcher 
focusing on social consciousness in a given study will describe in terms of values, 
feelings, or identity as a result of having made a strategic selection of the appropri-
ate concepts, theories, and terms.
 The various modifying nouns or adjectives discussed here—as represented in 
Japanese by such suffixes as -ishiki, -shin, -kan, -sei, and -taido—are neutral in the 
meanings they lend. Hence, there is no limit to the contexts in which they can 
be used and so are often employed when dealing with survey data. Borrowing an 
expression coined by Yasuda Saburō, those terms that express the attitudes toward 
social phenomena can collectively be referred to as “social attitudes” (shakaiteki 
taido) (Yasuda 1973). All the items pegged as dependent variables (explained vari-
ables) in actual quantitative analyses—e.g., status identification, authoritarianism, 
environmentalism, self-esteem, religious devotion, and anxiety—comprise social 
attitudes. Such modifying terms as -shugi (“doctrine” or “-ism”) and -shikōsei (“ori-
entation”) are used to refer when speaking of broader concepts that take one or 
more of these attitudes under their umbrella.
 Summarizing the cluster of terms used in social consciousness studies, these 
can be categorized based on one of three criteria. First, there are comprehensive 
higher-order concepts such as social consciousness, individuality, subjectivity, psy-
chology, national character, and culture that indicate the entire object domain. 
Next, we have theoretical concepts such as ideology and ethos that have back-
grounds associated with doctrines. Finally, there are concrete operational concepts 
of a lower order (see Figure 1-2). The comprehensive higher-order concepts are 
equivalent terms of the sort that other disciplines also use when they focus on 
social consciousness. Theoretical concepts assign distinctive meanings to those 
higher-order concepts and define the contexts in which they are used. When it 
comes to undertaking analytical operations, we use social attitudes that are neutral 
in their import.
 Some practical examples will illustrate this last point. Let’s say we have a uni-
versity student who in his or her senior thesis intends to focus on “the nature 
of subjectivity among residents of Shōnan” (the specific location is unimport-
ant—for example, it could be “of students from X university”). At this point, the 
student will have to think about whether to speak of this as a “Shōnan-like atti-
tude,” “Shōnan consciousness,” or even more broadly “Shōnan-ism” or “Shōnan-
oriented.” Whatever the case, neutrality can be maintained in the context of doing 
research so long as the student uses such language as “-sei” (“-nature”), -shikō 
(“-oriented”), -shugi (“-ism”), -taido (“attitude”), or -ishiki (“-consciousness”). 
On the other hand, such language as “Shōnan ideology,” “Shōnan identity,” or 
“Shōnan-type ethos” changes the nuance completely. Accordingly, the best strat-
egy when attempting to interpret social consciousness quantitatively is to use 
terminology of this sort that has theoretical connotations. Since its findings are 
expected to be positioned in sociology, social consciousness studies frequently 
wields such theoretical concepts in its argumentation. In contrast, social psychol-
ogy frequently goes no further than using operational concepts with neutral mean-
ings. This point, too, makes apparent the differences between the two disciplines.
 Another issue to think about has to do with the identification of such intrapsy-
chological processes as rational choices, value judgements, feelings and emotions, 
Comprehensive higher order concepts
Social consciousness  
Individuality, subjectivity, psychology, national character, culture etc. 
Ideology, social psychology, ethos, social character, mind, value
Value orientation, identity, types of conformity
Social attitude 
X-ism, X-orientation, X-consciousness, X-mind,  feeling of X, 
tendency of X, X-attitude etc.
Theoretical concepts
Operational concepts
Figure 1-2    The Concepts of Social Consciousness
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cognition and evaluation, and mental abilities. In psychological disciplines, spe-
cialists are expected to give this matter rigorous thought. Quantitative social con-
sciousness studies, however, limits itself to assessing whether a given social attitude 
is based on feelings or on a rational choice due to whatever situation a given study 
then goes on to discuss. It rarely gets into developing an understanding of the phe-
nomena themselves.
 When it comes to queries related to consciousness in social surveys, the pri-
mary consideration is crafting questions that are as easy to answer as possible. 
Respondents are asked about their actual psychological states in their daily lives. 
However, it is difficult to control whether the answer is being obtained after hav-
ing gone through one or another intrapsychological process. Multiple factors may 
become intermingled. For that reason, making a priori judgments that one social 
attitude is 100% emotion while another is entirely a rational choice would not be 
appropriate.
 For example, the question of how much one is committed to traditional values 
is certainly the primary mechanism behind authoritarian attitude, but other inte-
gral components of that attitude include emotions and feelings such as destruc-
tiveness and aggressiveness, and furthermore intellectual ability is also involved 
(Adorno et al. 1950). To give another example, degree of satisfaction is one type of 
positive feeling that represents one state of an individual’s self-awareness, but it is 
built upon that person’s perception and assessment of the ways in which they are 
connected to their society. In some respects, it may also be governed by differences 
in national character. One might expect status identification to be a matter of 
someone perceiving and assessing their social status, but given that belonging to a 
group is involved, there are also emotional elements in play. We cannot guarantee 
that these elements will always intermingle in the same way at different points 
in time. Aspirations to higher education likewise cannot be understood solely as 
a rational choice regarding the rate of returns on an educational investment; we 
must also consider the effects of feelings and emotions, such as passion for a par-
ticular area of study and preferences regarding educational attainment. Power of 
understanding and mental faculties are unavoidably involved when it comes to 
how people recognize and evaluate political and governmental issues, scientific 
knowledge, and new technological information. For all these reasons, we must 
be circumspect about any desire to wholeheartedly specify one or another intra-
psychological process—e.g., an “x-like value” or “y-like feeling”—as being at play 
with respect to the nature of whatever social attitude is being studied. Careful 
interpretations are needed that are mindful of the possibility that several processes 
may be intermingled.
Stratification, Education, and the Formation of Social Consciousness
I will limit my handling of abstract discussions to the foregoing. To see how 
researchers actually go about quantitative social consciousness studies, I will 
draw on my work, Kaisō, kyōiku to shakai ishiki no keisei: Shakai ishikiron no jikai 
(Stratification, education, and the formation of social consciousness: The magnetic 
field of social consciousness studies) (Kikkawa 1998). It is one of the few scholarly 
works extant that explicitly presents itself as a study in this vein. 
 In it, I deal with a variety of social attitudes. They include authoritarian tradi-
tionalism, which I use to decipher the mass psychology of fascism; conformity to 
ascribed groups, which is a central topic in Nihonjinron (see Chapter 3); status 
identification, for dealing with the mass-middle-class phenomenon; general life 
satisfaction; self-esteem; anxiety and related matters of subjective well-being; and 
environmentalism and health maintenance awareness as concrete, “real world” 
issues. This is not an exhaustive list, but it covers a broad range of important topics 
related to social consciousness in contemporary Japan.
 The book investigates such stratification variables as educational attainment, 
occupation, and income, as well as age and gender. It treats them as factors that 
determine the nature of these social attitudes. I will speak in greater detail about 
this analytical framework in the next chapter with respect to the social con-
sciousness studies-type regression model; for now, I will say the focus of discus-
sion in a study such as this is on those social attributes that are shared among all 
respondents.
 As to my findings, some theoretical background is in order. Originally, when 
the social consciousness studies scholar wanted to predict a respondent’s patterns 
of thinking and could ask only one question, that scholar would inquire about the 
subject’s social class or work situation. This was due to the dogma that originated 
with Karl Marx regarding the relationship between class and hierarchy (social 
status) on the one hand and social consciousness on the other. However, when I 
analyzed data from large-scale social surveys carried out in the 1980s and 1990s 
an unexpected state of affairs became apparent: it was not possible to verify the 
existence in Japanese society of the definite causal relationship that Marx argued 
prevailed among class, hierarchy, and social consciousness. Indeed, some social 
attitudes that reflect emotions and feeling such as self-esteem were changing con-
stantly under the influence of occupational status. Only certain social attitudes 
were bound to occupation, however. Social identification, social orientation, and 
intellectual abilities may seem to trend in certain directions under its influence, 
but the real social factors that produce them are elsewhere.
 The real situation that became clear from my analysis of the survey data is of 
crucial significance, for it shows that social mentality does not change to any sig-
nificant degree no matter how much the figurative screws that adjust the social 
structure with respect to industry and the economy are loosened or tightened. 
 The question still remains, however, as to what is the true determinative factor 
that has the greatest influence on the social consciousness of the Japanese people. 
The answer that comes to mind is the significant role played by educational attain-
ment (school education) in Japanese society. Since this gets into the arguments I 
will be making later in this book, I will refrain from further discussion of the mat-
ter here.
 Given that my previous work focused on Japanese society in the 1990s, the 
social backdrop against which it was set is different from the one we face today. 
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that a slow but definite transition was 
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then taking place. Furthermore, that book was based on my doctoral dissertation, 
and so made no big-picture forecasts about the direction in which Japan’s social 
mentality was heading. Still, that work retains a certain significance in that—at 
a time when few attempts in the vein of social consciousness studies were being 
made—I turned to empirical research to work on refining some of the arguments 
about the field’s key concern, which is the status-relatedness dimension of social 
consciousness.
 After publishing that work, I went on to conduct research related to the theory 
of the “education society” (gakureki shakai-ron) (Kikkawa 2001, 2006, and 2009; 
Kikkawa and Nakamura 2012). For that reason, I am often viewed as an edu-
cational sociologist. However, my research interest in the Japanese model of an 
education society had been catalyzed by the fact that I had noticed—rather than 
consciously searched for—the importance of school education as a determinative 
factor in social consciousness. This made it necessary for me to investigate the logic 
of educational attainment, which is of such great significance to Japanese adults 
today. The foregoing is but one example of how I set up one of my own projects 
in quantitative social consciousness studies. The scope for how others may set up 
their own topics of course may be broader.
Social Consciousness Studies in the Postwar Period
With the general nature of this research in mind, I next want to trace the academic 
history of Japanese social consciousness studies. Unlike most sociological termi-
nology used in Japan, “social consciousness” and “social consciousness studies” are 
not words “imported” from the West. The term “shakai ishikiron” has in the past 
been translated as “sociological social psychology” or “public opinion studies,” but 
they do not capture all the roles that shakai ishikiron plays in Japanese sociology 
(Mita 1993).
 After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the nature of individuality and subjectiv-
ity among the Japanese people became a topic of national interest. The debate 
focused on the lag in the modernization and democratization in social conscious-
ness. Ōtsuka Hisao and Hidaka Rokurō respectively argued as follows:
Is it somehow possible for the people of Japan to throw out the base premodern 
ethos and hammer out the pattern for a modern, democratic human being? We 
believe this is the greatest issue today. (Ōtsuka 1948, reprint 1968: 15)
Democracy constitutes a regime that is properly constructed by the will and 
initiative of the people. For that reason, the people must be their own men and 
women. Today the one thing we most need is for the people to improve them-
selves and become humans who are independent and free. (ibid. 23–24)
At present [1954], the “conventional consciousness” (kyūishiki) is necessar-
ily losing its potency, but that of course does not mean that it automatically 
will collapse. The growth of a new consciousness to take on the “conventional 
consciousness,” and that very development itself, are indispensable conditions 
for making that collapse occur inevitably. (Hidaka 1960: 258) (emphasis in the 
original)
 Maruyama Masao, Kamishima Jirō, Kyōgoku Junichi, and Matsushita Keiichi 
were among those driving the debate over social consciousness at the base layers of 
postwar Japanese society. Using such concrete issues as the structure of the family 
and village community, politics, and labor as reference points, they framed the 
debate in the context of basically three phenomena: the rivalry between conven-
tional (Japanese tradition) and democratic (Western modernity) values; the sur-
vival of nationalism, the emperor system, and the patriarchal system at a grassroots 
level; and strongly rooted support for conservative political parties. Their argu-
ments pointed out the mismatch (cultural lag) between the social structure and 
social consciousness. Even if the hardware of the social system had been upgraded, 
it still could not perform the intrinsic functions of democracy with the software of 
social consciousness still in its prewar state.
 When we turn our attention to 21st century Japanese society, there are no lon-
ger many insights to be directly obtained from these postwar examples of social 
consciousness studies. Even so, we retain both their stance toward using the asso-
ciations between societal structure and social consciousness as hints for getting 
a bead on the broader currents of the times (e.g., modernization), and their key 
concern, which was to think about the nature of the subjective actors who sustain 
democracy. The direction I take in this book—investigating as it does the two key 
20th century concepts of tradition and modernity in social consciousness—like-
wise wades into the currents that flow from these debates.
 Since then, social consciousness studies took root and became a core discipline 
in Japanese sociology. The experience of defeat and its aftermath was replaced as its 
principal concern by that of modernization in the form of high-speed economic 
growth. Specialists in the 1960s pursued their research in a field in which two 
influential frameworks, Marxist class theory and mass society theory, crossed over. 
Establishing Contemporary Social Consciousness Studies
If we were to open an encyclopedia of Japanese sociology today, we would find 
that the definitions for “social consciousness” and “social consciousness studies” 
are almost completely the same. Both are based on the ideas set down in the 1960s 
and 1970s by Mita Munesuke and Miyajima Takashi. Later to become prominent 
figures in contemporary Japanese sociology, at the time the pair were still just spir-
ited young researchers. Nonetheless, they are the de facto founders of contemporary 
social consciousness studies.4
 They issued their first declarations as short pieces comprising parts of review 
articles and commentaries on sociology. These would eventually be woven into full 
length books: Mita’s Gendai shakai no shakai ishiki (Social consciousness in con-
temporary society) (1979) and Miyajima’s Gendai shakai ishiki-ron (Contemporary 
theories of social consciousness) (1983).5 These two books offer us an overall sense 
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of social consciousness studies that they so elegantly established as a core compo-
nent of sociology in Japan. In his work, Mita defined “social consciousness” and 
“social consciousness studies” as follows:
Social consciousness constitutes the mental processes and patterns by which 
various classes, hierarchies, peoples, generations, and other social groups are 
defined and formed by the existing conditions respective to each. It sustains 
those respective existing conditions, or acts as a force for changing them. Social 
consciousness studies is a field that conducts empirical and theoretical research 
on the structure and functions of social consciousness, as well as the processes of 
its formation, development, and sublation. (Mita 1979: 101)
 Mita had first developed that definition in 1968, and it has been frequently 
amended by he and others since its first appearance (e.g., Mita 1976, 1979, 1993; 
Miyajima 1983; Kikkawa 1998; Kim 2012). The following addition from Mita 
himself is a well-recognized supplement to his original definition.
Social consciousness studies is an attempt . . . to use the weapon of empirical 
science to root out the deeper structures of reality, where restrictivity and sub-
jectivity in humans as social beings—i.e., history’s inevitability and human free-
dom—dialectically interact. (Mita 1979: 102)
 To untangle the point of his argument, certain expressions here—“defined by 
existing conditions,” “sustain and change existing conditions,” “process of forma-
tion, development, and sublation,” and “the reality where restrictivity and sub-
jectivity dialectically interact”—are terms peculiar to the Marxist theory that 
demarcated an era. Accordingly, we need to go back further to recall a notable 
passage from Marx.
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of produc-
tion correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers 
of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and 
political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social con-
sciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general 
character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the con-
sciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their 
social existence that determines their consciousness. (Marx 1859)
 Taking up Marx’s argument, Mita put the emphasis on the close relationship 
between social consciousness and class status. In contemporary quantitative social 
consciousness studies, this is called the status-relatedness (kaisōsei) of social con-
sciousness. If we suppose a subjective-objective relationship between social status 
and status identity—i.e., people from upper social strata sense that they identify 
with society’s upper echelons, people from middle strata identify with the middle, 
and people from the lower strata with the lower—then we can probably see how 
this relationship makes sense. This investigation of status-relatedness in social con-
sciousness is the most important issue to be dealt with in this book.
 Next, taking Mita’s comment about using the weapon of empirical science as 
our guide, let us now consider the methods of social consciousness studies. Mita 
and Miyajima referred to a piece by Kido Kotarō entitled “Shakai ishiki no kōzō” 
(The structure of social consciousness) (Kido 1970; first published in Kido and 
Sugi 1954) as the template for actual social consciousness studies.6 
 Kido’s work is recognized as the first in Japanese sociology to have employed 
full-fledged survey data analysis. His aim was to see in what form Hidaka’s conven-
tional consciousness survived in what social classes in 1950s Japanese society. The 
analytical operation employed focused on two social attitudes: “the authoritarian 
attitude entwined with traditional values” and “the political and economic ideol-
ogy centered around the desire for socialist problem-solving.” As factors forming 
these attitudes, Kido studied the influence of occupational status primarily, fol-
lowed by educational attainment, age, and standards of living. In short, his study 
clearly focused on the two major points of debate in social consciousness studies: 
the nature of the constituent subjects of democracy and the status-relatedness of 
social consciousness.
 Unfortunately for Kido, his findings did not bear out his postulate. He had 
assumed that the “structure of social consciousness” would be one in which author-
itarians were ideologically conservative and anti-authoritarians (pro-democracy 
individuals) were oriented toward socialistic problem solving, and that these ten-
dencies were strongly determined by occupational status. However, he had to in 
all honesty admit that the survey data did not support his preconceptions. Still, in 
this his study had value in that it was also the first in Japanese sociology to alert its 
audience that the actual form of society does not correspond to crude hypothetical 
structures suggested by theory, and in fact is quite complex and hard to grasp.
 Be that as it may, what made Kido’s study superb lay in the fact that he did not 
stop with a simple survey report, but went on to skillfully fuse the results of his 
data analysis with his interests as a critic to present a lucid interpretation of condi-
tions in the postwar period. Furthermore, the procedures he used for his analysis 
led to the development of what I call in this book the social consciousness studies-
type regression model; they have become the primary tool for quantitative social 
consciousness studies. Even as analytical techniques have improved, the appeal of 
the manner in which he advanced his argument has not faded.
 At any rate, for Mita and Miyajima, the very fact of linking survey data analysis 
to actual sociological theory (the study of contemporary society) as Kido did was 
precisely an attempt to root out the deeper structures of reality with the weapon of 
empirical science. They had great hopes that it would set down the main course to 
be followed in social consciousness studies.
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Unexpectedly Idled
With its definitions and concepts in place, contemporary social consciousness 
studies as a field seemed ready to start building a store of empirical research for 
unraveling Japanese society. But instead, after the 1980s, the field entered a fallow 
period. When I was beginning my own work in the 1990s, numerous studies in all 
disciplines were taking up social mentality, but none were positioned as belonging 
to social consciousness studies. Consequently, for a beginner like I was, this schol-
arly discipline that had been at the core of contemporary sociology and heralded 
for its outstanding conceptual stipulations alone seemed more like a set of ruins 
where only a stout cornerstone or two remained.
 Quite surprisingly, the primary reason for this unexpected idleness was that 
the field’s owners themselves who had laid the groundwork had done very little 
research that could be described as social consciousness studies. Three reasons 
may be surmised for this. First, the remark about “digging into matters using the 
weapon of empirical science” simply created too high a hurdle for themselves to 
jump. As the wellspring from which contemporary social consciousness studies 
had emerged, Kido’s research was an outstanding example of the quantitative 
approach and could not be easily followed. Additionally, given the information 
technology environment of the time, we can infer that attempting to analyze data 
derived from theoretical and speculative inquiries about thought and culture 
rather than from empirical fields such as stratification studies or psychology would 
have been tremendously difficult.
 Second, the leading researchers paid their respects to academic role segmenta-
tion. Mita had been caught up in a theoretical debate over qualitative and quan-
titative methods of data analysis with Yasuda, who in the 1960s and 1970s was 
a leader in stratification studies (Satō 2011). The debate may not have been the 
kind that ends with a battle for supremacy, but the pair rarely interacted with one 
another in its aftermath.7 For Mita, his estrangement from Yasuda’s SSM Survey 
research group (to be discussed below) apparently had the effect of him keeping 
the indispensable key concepts of class and stratification at arm’s length in his own 
work.
 Third, the term “sociology of culture” had come into play in place of social 
consciousness studies. Sociology of culture was the term that Miyajima favored 
for a spell after the 1980s in reference to his own research. Around this time, 
he was gradually detaching himself from his investigations of social conscious-
ness. He instead shifted his focus toward rereading of Durkheim, the introduc-
tion of Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction to Japan, and introducing new 
European social movements and studies of immigrant ethnicity into Japanese 
society. Mita, meanwhile, having gone through the experiences described earlier, 
retreated to theoretical and intellectual studies and qualitative data analysis, as 
typified by his work Jikan no hikaku shakaigaku (A comparative sociology of time) 
(Mita 1981). His desire to separate himself from the very field he had established 
can be sensed from his use of the penname “Maki Yūsuke” around this time.
 Social consciousness studies developed at a time when the sociological 
perspectives of modernization, Marxist class, and mass-society theory that took 
center stage in the middle decades of the 20th century remained vital. However, 
sociology was caught up in a strong contemporary current in academia the goal of 
which was to disengage from the framework of (first) modern society. Moreover, 
the subjects that social consciousness studies addressed were consistently limited 
to those things that humans were “conscious” of, and its field of view was geared 
toward domestic opinion journalism.
 However, if we are to call such research “the sociology of culture,” then it is pos-
sible to expand the scope of what it analyzes to embrace those cultural phenomena 
described as practice (pratique) and latent inclination—for example, lifestyle and 
habitus. Furthermore, it should also be possible to take up transnational and global 
issues related to ethnicity and the public sphere without becoming preoccupied by 
affairs in a given nation-state. Sociology of culture certainly had aspects that were 
of greater utility when it came to taking in the new social phenomena that surfaced 
after the end of the Cold War and the forming of the European Union, as well as 
the new European theories for understanding them.8
 The point at which these two fields decidedly differed was in their methodolo-
gies. As I earlier remarked, social consciousness studies had great hopes for quan-
titative methods of analysis, while sociology of culture has no specific methods set 
down. Survey data analysis is the former field’s method for developing a picture 
of a society in its entirety through amassing information about each of its mem-
bers. The social mentality is thus apprehended as the summation of individual 
consciousness. With methodological individualism as its underlying precept, 
the analytic approach makes it possible to take actual measurements of the social 
mentality and opens the door to bringing on board approaches from experimen-
tal science, such as the concept of statistical significance, to thinking about the 
issues. There are considerable merits to this approach. However, the downside is 
that it cannot directly address externalities that are the societal aspects of social 
consciousness (social facts), such as Durkheim’s collective sentiment and collective 
consciousness.
 On that point, if we used a sociology of culture approach, we would be able to 
view society from the standpoint of methodological collectivism. We could also 
conduct research through listening and participant observation aimed at deeply 
knowing microsubjects, or through the textual analysis of newspaper articles and 
novels. This is because the non-quantitative, speculative approach offers the free-
dom to move back and forth between the micro and the macro.
 Another downside to survey data analysis is its limits in terms of legerity. 
Inputting data into a computer and analyzing the responses to attitude-related 
questions given by survey subjects at a certain point in time is a method akin to 
snapping and developing photos—it is not one that lends itself well to grasp-
ing conflicts among social groups or the dynamics of cultural reproduction. 
Researchers have tried to overcome these limitations in recent years by adopting 
panel-based surveys and other strategies, but the results are still at best like the 
experience of watching a video playing one frame at a time; they are not suit-
able for getting a bead on, say, cultural phenomena or the kinetic processes of 
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organizations and groups with their chameleon-like qualities. It should be noted, 
parenthetically, that sociology of culture is not without its own inconveniences in 
this regard.
 Does an approach informed by methodological individualism capture more 
exhaustive evidence? Do researchers get a more agile understanding of social facts 
once they are freed from the shackles of method? Both quantitative social con-
sciousness studies and sociology of culture have their strengths and weaknesses. 
However, looking back at Japanese sociology over the past quarter century, it is 
apparent that survey data analysis has certainly not become a mainstream method 
(Tarōmaru, Sakaguchi, and Miyata 2009). Studies bringing speculative or qualita-
tive approaches to bear on modern society as it continues to expand across both 
spatial and conceptual borders have long been ascendant. The path that Mita and 
Miyajima—leaders in Japanese sociology over those years—took in their own 
research careers can be said to have lent weight to this trend.
 True, with its unrestricted approach the development of sociology of culture 
did serve to make the analytical character of social consciousness studies more 
explicit. But the point I wish to emphasize here is that the halting progress of social 
consciousness studies as an analytical discipline was a proximate cause for our hav-
ing lost track of the social mentality of contemporary Japanese.
Stratification Consciousness Studies
The foregoing tale certainly does not mean that no work was done in quantita-
tive social consciousness studies after the 1980s. Even during this period, empiri-
cal research on the principal concerns in social consciousness studies continued 
without interruption. In fact, the general public even took notice of them to a 
considerable degree. However, these were not regarded as social consciousness 
studies. The reason was simple. The flow of quantitative studies that Kido’s work 
had sparked was absorbed after the 1960s into the stratification studies of Odaka 
Kunio, and of Yasuda and his collaborators. Their findings accumulated under the 
label “stratification consciousness” (kaisō ishiki). Thus, if we ignore this pedigree, 
we overlook an important vein in quantitative social consciousness studies.
 I will begin with a quick sketch of stratification studies. Individual attributes 
such as whether a person’s occupational status is high or low, whether they are a 
college, junior college, or high school graduate, and how many millions of yen they 
earn per year comprise indicators of stratification status (stratification variables) or 
social status (social attribute variables). They are intimate details that are written 
down repeatedly in things like resumes and application forms. Stratification stud-
ies is a field that focuses on these concrete mechanisms in the social structure. 
Occupational status of course is regarded as central here, but it mutually overlaps 
with and is tied to such other factors as financial power, educational attainment, 
social background, and social clout. The complex of social statuses in modern 
industrial society is called the stratification structure; to think about its nature 
is connected to thinking about inequalities and other such factors in the society 
concerned.
 The class structure may be an objectively apparent fact, but there are many 
things that we cannot understand about the particular combinations of statuses 
that everyone has within it without asking them directly. Those conditions can be 
apprehended through large-scale surveys on stratification. Japan’s first proper social 
stratification survey was carried out in 1955 and in 10-year intervals ever since, up 
to a 60-year track record. It is called the National Survey of Social Stratification 
and Social Mobility (SSM Survey). The project is a treasure trove for Japanese soci-
ology because of the number of generations and eras it covers. Analyzing its data 
has been a driving force for empirical sociology in Japan.
 The core objectives of the survey have been to investigate the relationship 
between social attitudes and status, and to understand how “literate” people are 
when it comes to stratification structure (i.e., what understandings they have 
about social stratification). That is what stratification consciousness studies does. 
 It is understood that the differences in the ways people view and think about 
their society are produced by their current social status and the life experiences 
they have had. The survey teased out from among various factors the hard-to-
uncouple relationship between what sociology calls stratification variables—
occupation, educational attainment, and economic power—and the ways people 
think. Like social consciousness studies, stratification consciousness studies focus 
on the relationship between this pair of factors. 
 The main body of stratification studies comprises thorough examinations of the 
relationships among social status-related variables such as social mobility, inequal-
ity of educational opportunity, and job history. Accordingly, stratification con-
sciousness studies are a derivative discipline that applies those findings to social 
consciousness studies. Incidentally, while one might have expected stratification 
consciousness studies to occupy a somewhat peripheral position in the parent field, 
the broad public interest in the mass-middle-class phenomenon (to be discussed 
later) in the 1970s and 1980s gave it an enormous presence there. Occasionally, 
even the main body of stratification studies attracted abundant social interest. 
This is why works that once might have fallen under social consciousness studies 
instead, in a sense, parasitically attached themselves to stratification studies.9
 This, in turn, is why stratification consciousness studies remains little more than 
an umbrella under which a mishmash of survey findings have been collected with-
out a properly developed theoretical framework in place. To give a concrete exam-
ple, in this field “stratification consciousness in the narrow sense” refers to how 
someone views the status to which they belong, while “stratification consciousness 
in the broad sense” refers to research that examines stratum differences for specific 
values and ideologies. The “narrow sense” and “broad sense,” though, are little 
more than the roughest of distinctions; it is not possible to discern which issues to 
focus on in a logical way based on them.
 However, when reconsidered from the perspective of social consciousness stud-
ies, it is possible to easily draw out those items in that accumulated research that 
are useful. For example, if we give serious thought to the significance of social 
identification when dealing with the mass-middle-class phenomenon, we notice 
that the issue here is one that has been crucial since Marx—that of perceiving the 
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relationship between the individual and industrial society. This gives us some pur-
chase toward clarifying the relational processes of dis-embedding and re-embed-
ding that take place between the individual and society that are characteristic of 
reflexive modernity.
 On the other hand, among the cluster of social attitudes addressed under the 
rubric “stratification consciousness in the broad sense” are such items as authori-
tarianism and social activities central to social consciousness studies whose impor-
tance was ignored or not recognized, like bits of treasure casually tossed into heaps. 
These materials contain hidden potential and would be useful if they could be 
brought into social consciousness studies, where they might be employed bun-
dled around ideas like traditionalism–modernism or social orientation to rethink 
trends in them.
The Pedigree of Social Consciousness Studies
Readers can review the pedigree of social consciousness studies as laid out in this 
chapter through Table 1-1 and Figure 1-3. The field is one that investigates social 
mentality as a shared platform in present-day sociology. Research in this area began 
with thinking about the democratic human subject, which was the most impor-
tant issue for postwar Japan. Kido paved the road to applying survey data analysis 
to this study. Mita and Miyajima then put together the theoretical framework for 
contemporary social consciousness studies, in the process laying the cornerstones 
for a core component of Japanese sociology.
 The field subsequently experienced a fallow period during which few sub-
stantial research results were produced. During these years, sociology of cul-
ture—a non-quantitative approach with considerable latitude when it came to 
methodology—emerged as a concept that could establish a discipline to replace 
social consciousness studies.
 Next came stratification studies. Here, researchers operating in the wakes of 
Odaka and Yasuda continued to make observations of hierarchies in social con-
sciousness in the name of stratification consciousness studies. They generated an 
abundance of data that has not adequately examined but likely contains hidden 
assets for social consciousness studies, including data related to the mass-middle-
class phenomenon.
 The faint outlines of quantitative social consciousness studies may now be start-
ing to come into view. There are numerous debates regarding the social mentality 
Postwar social consciousness 
studies
Contemporary social
consciousness studies
Sociology of culture
Quantitative social 
consciousness studies
Stratification
consciousness
studies
Figure 1-3    The Pedigree of Social Consciousness Studies
Contemporary social consciousness 
studies Sociology of culture Stratification consciousness studies Quantitative social consciousness studies
Exponent Mita Munesuke, Miyajima Takashi Miyajima Takashi Odaka Kunio, Yasuda Saburo Kikkawa Tōru
Time period Established in the 1960sIdled after the 1980s Emerged after the 1980s
Being practiced from the 1960s to present 
time
Being practiced form 1998 to present 
time
Primary concern Dialectical process of the formation and transformation of social consciousness
Broad cultural phenomena (habits and 
practice)
Status-relatedness of social consciousness 
(stratification consciousness in the  
narrow/broad sense)
Status identification and social 
orientation
Approach Quantitative method as expected ideal Non-quantitative method Quantitative method Quantitative method
Traits
Succession from the postwar social 
consciousness studies
Based on theoretical backgrounds in 
the 20th century
Domestic concerns
Lack of practical research
New tendency of post modernization, 
coping with transgressive tasks
Interpretation of the western theory
Open-ended, but diffused issues
‘Mass middle class’’ as the central issue 
Lack of the identification to be social 
consciousness studies  
Dependence to stratification studies
Integration of the branched pedigree  
contemporary sociology in the 21th 
century
Table 1-1    Characteristics of the Trends of Social Consciousness Studies
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of the Japanese people that have been left unresolved; examples include the post-
war reception of democracy, Nihonjinron, and the mass-middle-class phenomenon 
in the years of high-speed economic growth. Still, though we might be temped to 
simply argue over whatever new phenomena may arise, it is incumbent upon us 
to cut the debate and see also how the problems of the present are connected to 
these old unresolved issues without letting them vanish into the mists of the past. 
I believe there is an opportunity to make a breakthrough here via frontal assault. 
The revival of social consciousness studies rooted in a 21st century perspective will 
help us to see the utility of looking at the past in order to see the present.
NOTES
1 Numerous terms exist to express sociological research driven by calculations and 
analyses of numerical data, including empirical sociology, experiential sociology, quan-
titative sociology, and mathematical sociology. These also overlap to a degree with the 
terms for methodologies such as social statistics and survey data analysis. Among these, 
empirical sociology and experiential sociology were used to refer to bundles of method-
ologies and approaches so large they included all sociology that was neither theory nor 
theoretical research. In Japanese sociology today, however, it has become most common 
to refer to sociology that uses survey data analysis as its method as quantitative sociology.
 Quantitative sociology is frequently confused with mathematical sociology. 
Mathematical sociology refers to sociological research that similarly invokes mathemat-
ics, but that field’s aim is to conduct sociological research that constructs general prop-
ositions (axioms) based on deductive thinking. One could say it is a refined form of 
theoretical sociology.
2 I will discuss public opinion research—an area that overlaps considerably with social 
consciousness studies—in greater detail in Chapter 2.
3 Kitayama Shinobu and other scholars of cultural psychology in North America 
refined and further developed the ideas of Nihonjinron and studied the effects culture 
has on personality. These developments in social psychology contain possibilities that 
produce changes in future approaches to quantitative social consciousness studies 
(Kitayama 1998).
4 The research of Hidaka Rokurō, Takahashi Akira, and Tsujimura Akira from the 
1950s and 1960s can also be seen as a starting point work on social psychology (socio-
logical social psychology) that provided a prototype for social consciousness studies. The 
focus I have set for my arguments laid out here is on the post-1960s period. Reference 
could also be made to Kim Myungsoo, who has developed a take on social consciousness 
from a different perspective (Kim 2012).
5 In this book, for the reader’s convenience, I have as much as possible referred to and 
cited Mita and Miyajima’s remarks in these two books.
6 Kido Kotarō was the son of noted psychologist Kido Bantarō and a psychologist from 
the generation between Hidaka and Mita. He died in a mountain accident at the young 
age of 30, but left behind a variety of manuscripts focusing mainly on practical studies. 
His research posthumously attracted praise, and his name was given to an incentive 
award for young sociologists (the Kido Kotarō Prize). Its recipients include a roster of 
sociologists from a generation or two ahead of me who were my mentors, including such 
scholars as Shiobara Tsutomu, Inoue Shun, Yamaguchi Setsuo, and Kōtō Yōsuke.
7 Japanese sociology is generally not viewed as having schools à la the Chicago School 
or the Annales School. However, when it comes to the perspectives used in social 
consciousness studies, there are hints of such in the talk of a “Hongō School” and a 
“Komaba School” regarding qualitative vs. quantitative methodologies. This arises from 
the contrast between how Odaka and Yasuda at the University of Tokyo’s Hongō cam-
pus (Department of Sociology, Faculty of Letters) handled social consciousness, and 
how Mita at the university’s Komaba campus (Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, College 
of Arts and Sciences) did.
 Looking back, we can see that just as Tominaga Ken’ichi’s stratification research group 
had begun using the SSM 1975 Survey to chart out the middle strata during the high-
speed economic growth years, Mita was using the contrasting approach of closely ana-
lyzing the sentiments of a death-row convict to sketch the shape of Japanese society in 
his article, “Manazashi no jigoku (The hell of gazes)” (Mita 1979; an earlier magazine 
article version appeared in 1973, and the study was eventually published in book form in 
2008). In recent years, Seiyama Kazuo and Satō Kenji have offered their respective views 
on mixing qualitative and quantitative methods (Seiyama 2004; Satō 2011). However, 
the fact that scholars believe that such sorting is required for these methodologies speaks 
to how they are isolated from one another. Be that as it may, we can see that the discon-
nect between stratum consciousness studies and sociology of culture—two fields that at 
root might properly be seen as social consciousness studies—developed based on this 
history.
8 Sociology of culture is a particularly broad term that can subsume any sort of topic if 
we take it to mean sociological research that deals with culture. In fact, there has been 
very little discussion that actively seeks to define what “sociology of culture” means. 
This evasion of a fixed definition is due to the peculiarities that “culture” as a technical 
term possesses. Today, the rise of such fields as subculture and youth culture studies has 
expanded further the list of sociological disciplines that discuss culture. Accordingly, 
while there is something to “sociology of culture,” generally speaking we can see that 
once the research focus is narrowed there is more to social consciousness studies.
9 The isolation that developed between Mita’s and Yasuda’s work is related to this as 
well.
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CHAPTER 2
The Conduct of  
Quantitative Social Consciousness Studies
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the path followed by quantitative social con-
sciousness studies in contemporary Japan. In this chapter, I would like to present 
a number of rules or codes of conduct, so to speak, that I have set down for myself 
for when I attempt to decipher the social mentality using survey data analysis. 
This, too, will also serve as an indicator of the direction to be taken by this book.
The Social Structure Sets Social Consciousness in Motion
The first thing to remember is that quantitative social consciousness studies com-
prises a field whose aim is to unravel the influence that the social structure (the 
mechanisms of society) has on social consciousness (the social mentality).1 Figure 
2-1 provides an overview of social consciousness studies. Here we see that social 
structure and social consciousness mutually influence one another. This recipro-
cal relationship gradually changes shape from era to era. Mita’s talk of “the deeper 
structure of reality where restrictivity and subjectivity dialectically interact” 
suggests the process by which these two elements cycle back and forth as they 
transform.
 The component elements of the social structure are arrayed on the left of the fig-
ure. Some constitute unchanging conditions in Japanese society, while others vary 
with the times. Whichever the case, these elements influence social consciousness. 
Among these elements—which might easily be described as the “hardware” of 
society—is one that has the greatest effect: stratification status (stratification vari-
ables). Whether we are talking of theoretical concepts or experience, its impact is 
indisputable. We should recall here as noted earlier that the social strata comprise 
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unfairness reveals,2 when one gets carried away with theoretical speculations and 
actually impose them on this framework, you wind up surprisingly frequently 
with social consciousness of “ideological” sorts that do not function well. Here, 
bear in mind that in contrast quantitative social consciousness studies was able to 
use survey data analysis to correct such unrefined theories that preceded it (Kido 
1970; Kikkawa 1998).
 As the arched arrows on the top and bottom of the figure show, the relation-
ship between social structure and social consciousness comprises a circular system. 
However, for the purpose of developing theoretical models this is little more than 
a story. Substantiating this cycle of cause and effect through actual survey data 
analysis is difficult owing to methodological limitations. 
 When considering which causal system to emphasize, it is normally thought 
that social attributes explain (independent variables) and social attitudes are 
explained (dependent variables). Without an exceptionally strong hypothesis, the 
researcher cannot work with causal relationships that operate in the reverse direc-
tion (from right to left on the figure).3 This is not to say that social mentality by 
nature does not work in ways that change society’s mechanisms, but in this field 
the processes through which industry and economy have influenced the ways that 
people think are the issues that are seen as requiring unraveling. These ways of 
thinking correspond also to the causal system proposed by Marx, in which social 
existence defines social consciousness.
 This is not to say that social consciousness studies does not conduct research 
on intrapscyhological causal schema (i.e., using one social attitude to predict and 
explain others). However, the conditions for formulating such research projects 
so that they will be particularly meaningful are naturally difficult, for the rela-
tionships among social attitudes suggest associations like those between the values 
implied by a pair of statements like “people deeply interested in politics are more 
likely to sense injustice” on the one hand and “people with a neoliberal values 
approve of competition” on the other. Even if you could demonstrate that such 
intrapsychological processes actually exist, you would still be faced with questions 
like “what are the educational attainment, occupational background, income, and 
family background of persons who are deeply interested in politics?” and “what 
are the people who support neoliberal values like?” All that such pairings show is 
simply that two similar social attitudes are covariant. They do not get at how much 
one or another “screw” in the social structure has to be adjusted to change people’s 
senses of fairness or competitive sensibilities. Put another way, they do not get 
at the question of whether some change in the social structure (hardware) might 
change the nature of the social mentality (software).
 Descriptions of the mechanisms through which social attitudes control expres-
sive behavior, and explications of the processes through which deep-seated val-
ues influence surface opinions are limited in their significance to those instances 
in which causal relationships have been clearified by the researcher having given 
thought to the mediation that such functions provide. A rare example of such 
research is the work being done on authoritarianism that I will return to later (see 
Chapter 6), in which sadomasochistic tendencies comprise the medium being 
a structure that combines stratification variables such as educational attainment, 
occupational status, and economic power.
 The elements comprising social consciousness are on the right. Over the years, 
I have identified a variety of items as falling under this category, including status 
identification, conventionality (modernity), nationalism and ethnicity, gender 
culture, politics and policy, public-spiritedness and altruism, welfare, conceptions 
of nature and scientific technology, life politics, youth culture, and subculture. 
Some retain their form for a long time while others change their character, but all 
draw their power from the right side of the figure. The factors on the left are largely 
set in stone, but there is considerable latitude when it comes to the issues listed on 
the right. There are few limits in terms of definitions, with little to disallow one 
or another attitude as pertaining to social consciousness. Generally, the search for 
useful indicators is an ongoing process of trial-and-error.
 However, there is one existing condition that is necessary for quantitative social 
consciousness studies: the project must focus on a social attitude that is in a causal 
relationship deserving of analysis with one of the social attributes on the left (indi-
cated by the large arrow in the center of the figure). Above all, it must be in such a 
relationship with one or another of the stratification statuses. If this condition is 
not satisfied, then no matter how elegant the hypothetical proposition the study 
will be worth little more than a drawing on a page for the purposes of sociological 
theory. Conversely, if the social attitude being considered is strongly defined by the 
social structure, then whatever it may be it can become a source of information for 
understanding the social mentality of that era.
 Naturally, this is an extreme case scenario. However, as a review of the unhappy 
history of empirical research in Japan regarding class identification and feelings of 
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Figure 2-1    Overview of Social Consciousness Studies
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measure from multiple perspectives on data trends and current living conditions 
in Japanese society today and derive a reasonable logic from what they see. It is just 
such a self-conceit that prompted me to undertake this book, with its narrowed 
focus on social consciousness in Japan from the 1980s to the present.
 Next, I want to consider the scope of what social consciousness studies takes 
in. First, in my experience very few research undertakings in the field focusing 
on particular strata or groups expressly describe themselves as being a “social con-
sciousness study.” We see no “study of social consciousness in X  Ward of Y City” 
or “study of social consciousness at a major corporation Z.” This is because social 
consciousness studies is a term that normally had been seen as referring to a broad 
survey that took in the whole of society. When it comes to data analysis, as you 
gradually narrow the boundaries of subject (e.g., “parents with children” or “peo-
ple under 35 years of age”), your perspective will also gradually move away from 
that of social consciousness studies. You will likely notice that your work is taking 
on certain aspects of the research being done in other disciplines such as sociology 
of education or youth studies.
 For most people in Japan, hearing the “whole of society” will normally make 
them think that Japanese society is the topic of conversation. The fact that the sub-
ject population of a social survey is defined as being part of their society is likewise 
two sides of the same coin. If we are to think about the trends of an era, even as we 
refer to findings from previous studies, the scale of the portion of society on which 
we focus will inevitably grow to take in Japanese society in its entirety. The fact that 
this overlaps with the Japanese-speaking cultural sphere, or with a Japanese public 
sphere comprising its political world and mass media, is another reason for this.4 
Finally, recall that the spur for this book to begin with was the sense that our soci-
ety has lost track of what its own social mentality is and is groping to find the right 
way forward.
 However, this way of thinking—narrow your research interests to issues inter-
nal to a particular nation state—is showing signs of vulnerability as globalization 
progresses. In empirical sociology today, a growing number of researchers are seek-
ing to apply the latest analytical techniques to secondary analyses of data from 
social surveys that have been carried out on an international scale. Assuming you 
can just obtain the archival data, from the comfort of your own chair you can work 
on international comparative research projects of a vastly different scale that may 
cover from one to several dozen countries, say, using datasets that contain more 
than 100,000 respondents. Such studies seek to develop universal theories (propo-
sitions) grounded in a global perspective or draw comparisons among multiple 
societies. Naturally, it would not be realistic to pursue any discussions in such 
analyses that are predicated by understanding the atmosphere in every country 
covered. 
 On the other hand, it would also be hard to imagine conjoining social con-
sciousness studies—a field developed as a way to theorize about Japanese society—
with analyses of complex datasets based on the latest techniques. In light of all this, 
at the present stage the notion of “global social consciousness studies” lies beyond 
the realm of my imagination. Naturally, the question of how to think about this is 
used to shed light on the “black box” of the relationship between fascism on the 
one hand and stratification status and socioeconomic conditions on the other. 
Here, too, however, we must not forget that the primary issue of concern is unrav-
eling the associated processes of the social structure and social mentality and not 
clarifying intrapsychological mechanisms.
Observing Contemporary Japanese Society
My second rule for survey data analysis is to bear in mind that quantitative social 
consciousness studies is a field that examines Japanese society of the era contem-
porary to the one in which you are working. This is an unspoken understanding 
among researchers in this field when they are deciding which period to focus on 
and the scope of their analytical perspective. Naturally, in light of the fact that 
“social consciousness studies” is a scholarly term of Japanese coinage, such features 
were practically a given from the start.
 To be able to make predictions about what your analyses might find when it 
comes to a phenomena that cannot actually be seen like social consciousness, it 
is imperative for the researcher to have knowledge on par with being firsthand of 
the era in which the data being used was obtained as well as of that society’s atmo-
sphere. To borrow the words of C. Wright Mills, it means being able to use one’s 
sociological imagination (Mills 1959). For example, let’s say that I have obtained 
opinion-survey data related to nationalism in the 1960s from a certain East African 
society. If I analyze the data, I can perhaps come up with some kind of results. 
However, given my lack of firsthand experience with that society at that time, I 
would not be at all prepared to talk about what issues were important in the lives 
of those people who do have the relevant historical and cultural background and 
experienced life under whatever type of social system then existed. Accordingly, 
my analysis would be dependent on the data, and whatever results I obtain solely 
through that process cannot be understood as representing the social mentality. 
The sociologist needs to be able to exercise his or her sociological imagination with 
respect to the society in question, or else the results will be no different than what 
could be obtained from mechanically analyzing piles of experimental data, say, or 
corporate financial indicators.
 The point I am making here is that the researcher’s social being is constrained 
when they engage in purely objective analysis of survey data, as doing so allows 
then only a superficial glance of the society under study. What they should be 
doing instead is actively making the most of their own social being. In my case, 
I have lived in Japanese society and so to a certain extent I feel confident about 
proceeding with a study of its social consciousness. But I do not have something to 
say about other societies like those of India, Finland, or South Africa, for example; 
for similar reasons, I would find it difficult to focus on a different time period to 
conduct studies on, say, the social consciousness of ancient Rome or Edo-period 
Japan. To amplify this train of thought, the empirical sociologist has an obligation 
of a sort when it comes to analyzing data on his or her own society. Perhaps it is 
impudent to say so, but very few of our contemporaries are in a position to get a 
Rebuilding Social Consciousness Studies30 The Conduct of Quantitative Social Consciousness Studies 31
 That said, the framework built around traditionalism–modernism has been los-
ing its utility for some three decades. This development concurs with the flexing, 
as it were, that has developed in the viewpoint we bring to grasping such era-
defining tendencies as those generated in the transition from (first) modernity to 
reflexive modernity. The biggest issues before us are how to define the time axis in 
conceptual terms to replace traditionalism–modernism, and which social attitudes 
do we use to measure it. 
 However, at present we have no established indicators for discerning what 
tendencies may define future eras, and so we are currently groping in the dark. 
Accordingly, for the moment the task at hand is to carefully observe the conditions 
under which the framework of traditionalism–modernism that had once been an 
accepted fact is fading out.
 In Parts II and III of this book, I will elaborate on the status-relatedness and 
era-defining qualities of social consciousness to sort out the key concerns of social 
consciousness studies using identity and orientation as our touchstones. “Identity” 
here means the self-awareness that someone has, or evaluations they make about 
where they fit into society. Thinking that through, it means we are setting our 
focus on the way individuals are embedded in their society. In this book, status 
identification in particular provides the core indicator. “Orientation” means how 
the individual reaches out to and copes with society. Here the goal will be to inves-
tigate a wide range of issues—going beyond just social attitudes such as the tradi-
tionalism–modernism axis to take in topics like frequency of social activities—in 
order to grasp the vector that Japanese society will follow in the future.
Focusing on Society’s Middle Ranges
Next, I would like to discuss the characteristic traits peculiar to using survey data 
analysis to examine social mentality. Naturally, these are all tacitly understood 
among researchers actually working in the field, but I need to make them explicit 
so that no misunderstandings arise among non-specialist readers.
 The first trait to emphasize is that quantitative social consciousness studies dem-
onstrate their utility when coming to grips with social consciousness in the middle 
ranges of society. Trends that abide latently deep in the heart of society are fre-
quently referred to by such terms as “silent majority.” They are what’s meant by 
the “winds” that blow through an election campaign, and represent the true state 
of “business conditions” or “trends in personal spending” in economic activities. 
Transformations in social consciousness are given substance by trends in the cen-
tral stratum. The population of this stratum is large, and it has surprising power. 
The scale merits and bird’s-eye-view aspect of survey data analysis are put to best 
use when we try to grasp that latent dynamism.
 At heart, survey data analysis excels at getting a bead on those trends that 
develop around the mean (standard value) in which large numbers of people par-
ticipate. It is not well-suited to drawing a picture of those segments that are other-
than-typical in society; phenomena that emerge at edges of response distributions 
are not good candidates for analysis. In this sense, it resembles the large, heavy 
a matter to be sorted out through careful consideration and discussion.
The Horizons Set by Trends and Status-Relatedness
The third item I keep in mind is that quantitative social consciousness studies 
is a research discipline that examines the horizons of social consciousness. Those 
horizons are woven together, with the trends or tendencies that characterize an era 
(jidai sei) providing the warp and status-relatedness providing the woof. The actual 
method of survey data analysis used in this book entails comparing all survey data 
from each of the eras between 1985 and 2010 that has a bearing on the relation-
ship between social structure and social consciousness. This is laid out in Figure 
2-1. The survey data generates cross-sectional portraits of a particular principal 
structure, in other words, the hierarchical ordering of statuses in society. Using 
such multiple cross sections, we can get a sense of the time axis concerned from a 
broader perspective—more plainly speaking, we can see how conditions change 
over time.
 Furthermore, each data analysis I will undertake incorporates both era-defining 
trends and status-relatedness into the social structure that explains and the social 
consciousness being examined. Let us think here about the specific significance of 
“era-defining tendencies” and “status-relatedness” when they are installed in the 
concept of social consciousness.5 
 Status identification—meaning, how people view social status and where they 
position themselves in society—is central to addressing hierarchy in social con-
sciousness. Its “phenotype” has changed over the years. In the postwar period, it 
began with proletarian consciousness, reflecting a general identification with the 
lower working class. This was  followed by the “mass-middle-class consciousness,” 
“inequality consciousness” (kakusa ishiki), and now today one’s sense of poverty 
(hinkonkan). Whatever the era, it remains important to ask how people cope with 
the hierarchical structure of society. Status identity, too, is a social attitude that 
seems to exhibit “gradients” of social consciousness that reflect stratification status, 
and is recognized as providing a prototype or template for research in this area.
 When we get into the matter of era-defining tendencies in social consciousness, 
it becomes quickly apparent that conventionality and modernity are the issues 
central to debate. They comprise an axis that I will refer to as “traditionalism–mod-
ernism.” In the Japanese context, it would be appropriate to label the axis defined 
by this pair a “doctrine,” one that played a key role in 20th century modern society. 
In an era of unending social change, traditionalism–modernism provided a shared 
platform for every issue under the sun, including the family, politics, gender, and 
labor. For that reason, the feelings that people have of favoring or not favoring 
such old values rooted in Japanese tradition as “esteem both duty (giri) and feel-
ings (ninjyō)” or “keep the family going even if you have to adopt” have been 
monitored as primary indices of how the Japanese national character changes with 
the times. This axis with conventionality and modernity at each pole has provided 
a theoretical center for talking about individuality and culture in Western research 
as well.
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Japan Society of Family Sociology; the Institute of Statistical Mathematics’ long-
running Japanese National Character Survey; the Japanese Value Orientations 
surveys and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) cross-national surveys 
carried out by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute; the Cabinet 
Office’s ongoing Public Opinion Survey on the Life of the People series; and 
Osaka University of Commerce’s endeavor with its Japanese General Social Survey 
(JGSS). None of these are one-off (cross-sectional) surveys. All are conducted 
repeatedly at multiple points in time and contain numerous social attitude ques-
tions with an international comparative design.
 The subject populations of these Japanese social surveys generally are adult men 
and women from all around the country, with sample sizes that produce valid 
responses on the order of 1,000 to 15,000 cases. While there are some exceptions, 
stratified multistage random sampling is used as the standard object extraction 
approach. This is regarded as the optimal method for guaranteeing representative-
ness with respect to the sample population. In terms of survey mode, the standard 
technique used is that of face-to-face interviews, which provides a high degree 
of precision.7 In short, for their rigorousness of design, aptness of method, and 
history of continuity, we can say that the quality of Japanese social survey data is 
extremely high.8
 Accordingly, we can put our trust in that descriptive figure, “response percent,” 
as it appears in this high-quality data, since response percents were widely used as 
the primary output from surveys, before multivariate analysis was as widely prac-
ticed as it is today. I will refer to the method that was used to present survey data 
through this widely understood approach as “public opinion statistics.” A typical 
example from the Japanese context might be the final tallies released for the vari-
ous opinion surveys that the Cabinet Office conducts.
 In Japanese society, for better or worse, scholars and others have focused on 
percents such as these and tried to derive findings from them when attempting to 
grasp the actual state of social consciousness through numerics. The mass-mid-
dle-class society discourse that flourished in the 1970s and 1980s—where 90% 
of the nation’s people identified themselves as being part of that group—is the 
phenomenon that truly symbolizes this faith in percentages. Even today, when-
ever the totals from official public surveys are announced at press conferences, 
the mass media gives heavy coverage to the direct connections they make between 
those tallies and social conditions (“X percent of the populace is worried about 
Y !”). However, it should be made perfectly clear that public opinion statistics and 
quantitative social consciousness studies only seem to be alike.
 I do not mean to say that looking intensely at the response percents from vari-
ous opinion surveys is without value. But to correctly interpret the findings of 
quantitative social consciousness studies, it would probably be better for any inter-
ested parties to put some distance between themselves and whatever controversies 
may be stirred up based on response percents. The fact is, the final totals embodied 
in the percents may have been “fixed” at some point in the preparation process.
 For starters, bear in mind that the responses to attitude-related questions lack 
absolute points of reference. The options that are presented take such forms as 
equipment, like rollers and bulldozers, used for roadwork. While such equipment 
is able to efficiently and beautifully handle the job over a wide expanse, it is not 
effective for tighter spots.
 Of course, at an actual paving site, the construction crew does not go about its 
task using only heavy equipment. Those areas that require more detailed atten-
tion such as the side ditches and the spots around the manholes are finished off 
with manual labor performed by skilled workers. Likewise, in social consciousness 
studies, researchers get deeper takes on aberrant phenomena and singular cases 
or firmer grasps on the concrete realities of individual lives using an element of 
craftsmanship replete with the “humanity” of more qualitative research. Examples 
include observational methods emphasizing the firsthand perspectives of subject 
group members, using “clinical” approaches toward real-life examples, and devel-
oping interpretations of materials and texts.6
 For that reason, in those places where we can take advantage of the heavy 
machinery of survey data analysis, it would not be productive to dig things up by 
hand non-empirically, nor to run roughshod with attempts at survey data analysis 
on social phenomena that require delicate probing. If we understand matching 
subject with method in this way, we recognize that quantitative social conscious-
ness studies and its use of survey data analysis as method are indeed meant to get a 
handle on the middle stratum (in the broad sense of the word).
 During the mass-middle-class era, the middle stratum in Japanese society was 
the object of intense interest from many. The media and others enthusiastically 
reported various figures generated by survey data analyses. But by the 2000s when 
the talk was of an “unequal society” (kakusa shakai), while there was no lack of eye-
catching journalistic accounts and documentation about realities of life for both 
the upper and lower classes, the ways in which people in the middle thought and 
lived lost the capacity to attract interest. It was as though the stratum had slipped 
into a blind spot. To speak of the “middle class” is to bring up something that 
in other societies represents the foundations for growth and stability and is even 
incorporated in the policy programs of the heads of government. Most Japanese 
today, however, in fact don’t really know this. On reflection, it is for that very 
reason that there is the hidden potential to discover unexpected realities by using 
survey data analysis to get a bird’s eye view of the middle range of society.
Public Opinion Statistics and Quantitative Social Consciousness Studies
We turn next to consider the relationship between data and analytical method. 
Thanks to the valuable efforts of our predecessors, there is an abundance of large-
scale social survey data on Japanese society to serve as research materials for quan-
titative social consciousness studies. In this book, I will be analyzing mainly the 
data from the SSM longitudinal project from 1985 onward, as well as face-to-face 
interview data from a 2010 poll (the SSP-I 2010 Survey) that inherited the stratifi-
cation consciousness studies aspect of the SSM project.
 I will also take up various other surveys related to social attitudes. These include 
the National Family Research of Japan (NFRJ) Survey conducted regularly by the 
Rebuilding Social Consciousness Studies34 The Conduct of Quantitative Social Consciousness Studies 35
ago. There is no way for us to know what the reality of this “satisfied young genera-
tion” is if we do not investigate how that change is related to, among other things, 
the rise in per-person incomes following the decline in the number of people who 
comprise a household, the increase in white-collar young people in urban areas, 
and how the ratio of people who have completed tertiary education with higher 
levels of general life satisfaction increased compared to people who only graduated 
high school. It is not possible to develop an explanatory logic involving the social 
structure using percents alone by lightly massaging some of the facts that have 
come to the surface of society. Readers will immediately recognize this once they 
have read Chapter 4.
 On this point, the focus in quantitative social consciousness studies is assidu-
ously on the relations among variables (how consciousness and society are linked) 
rather than descriptive statistics for social attitudes. This is done in order to pro-
vide empirical proof of causal relationships—figuratively speaking, to determine 
whether turning some “adjusting screw” somewhere in Japanese society to some 
degree results in changes in the social mentality.
 This difference in where emphasis is put expresses itself most glaringly in the 
different lengths of time spans across which the waves of change in the social men-
tality are observed. Setting aside certain exceptions such as the Japanese National 
Character Survey, public opinion statistics produce reports that are detailed but 
covering only the latest trends. They consider comparatively short time frames, 
ranging from several months to perhaps three years. Dramatic improvements in 
recent years in the speed of data collection—for example, the evolution in tele-
phone surveys thanks to the advent of the random digit dialing (RDD) method—
has made it possible to issue the results of “flash opinion polls” almost the instant 
they are taken. Such developments permit us to know about the slightest fluctua-
tions in opinions about government policies, say, or views on business conditions. 
However, when it comes to why response distributions suddenly change when 
they do, the magnitude of causal effect can hardly be ascertained just by surmising 
it was a coincidence.
 Quantitative social consciousness studies are largely uninterested in those small 
fluctuations for which a cause cannot be specified. The field sets its sights instead 
entirely on major fluctuations that unfold over roughly a decade at a time. The 
time spans the field is interested in are several decades long, or that correspond to a 
generation that includes parents and their children. These periods are long enough 
for fluctuations in the social structure—the popularization of higher education, 
say, or increased fluidity in the job market, expanded participation by women in 
the workforce, or falling birthrates paired with an aging society—to cause ongoing 
changes in the nature of social consciousness.
 Figure 2-2 schematically depicts changes over time in social consciousness. 
Consider it an indicator of the interest people take in national politics. The posi-
tions people have regarding politics vary slightly based on such factors as who is 
in power and how they approach policy, scandals involving Cabinet members, 
and inappropriate statements that they may make. Cabinet support rate is the 
epitome of this. Taken practically on a monthly basis, this public opinion statistic 
“positive-negative,” “have-do not have,” or “support-do not support.” Consider 
general life satisfaction, for example. Do we have and exercise the ability to deter-
mine where the completely neutral, neither-satisfied-nor-dissatisfied, “absolute 
zero of the soul” is located in ourselves? This might bring to mind the Buddhist 
idea of “being free from all distracting thoughts,” but reading “cannot say either 
way” as a middle response for general life satisfaction as an expression that the 
respondent is in such a state of satori would be too much. We cannot assume that 
all survey respondents are assessing their respective situations based on an “abso-
lute zero of the soul” standard.
 The form of the questions may also vary. Some surveys may ask, “How satisfied 
are you with your life in general?” while others ask, “On the whole, how satisfy-
ing is your life at present?” Likewise, some surveys may use the 4-item format 
of “satisfied,” “somewhat satisfied,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” and “dissatisfied,” 
while others provide options based on a 5-item format of “extremely satisfied,” 
“satisfied,” “cannot say either way,” “dissatisfied,” and “extremely dissatisfied.” Still 
other surveys may use seven- or ten-item scales to cover the range from “satisfied” 
to “dissatisfied.”
 Furthermore, the distribution pattern of the responses will also depend on the 
survey design: what is the age range of the respondents; what survey mode was 
used—face-to-face interviews, the leave-and-pick-up and/or mail-in approach, or 
a telephone or Internet-based method; how precise was the sampling; and were 
there any of the leading inquiries or carry-over effects that produce biases in the 
responses?
 As should already be clear, we cannot get a reading on the ratio of absolute “pos-
itives” and “negatives” in the social mentality from the descriptive statistics (the 
percents) for the distributions that are publicly announced for such polls. Rather, 
all we are able to assert is the distribution of responses to question texts (to the 
wording used) presented to survey respondents as a “yardstick,” and the relative 
positions (deviation) of each respondent within that distribution. Accordingly, 
when the media reports that “x percent of Japanese feel dissatisfied with their 
lives,” we should tamp down our expectations when it comes to trying to discern 
the social mentality from those numbers.
 Naturally, in those cases where the same question is repeatedly asked in ongo-
ing surveys using the same research design, the researcher can show changes in 
response trends at different points in time. We can safely say that this is the strong 
point of having accumulated a mass of detailed data on Japanese society from 
social and public opinion surveys. However, these opinion statistics frequently do 
not come with sufficient information related to the social structure (stratification 
status, families, and so forth).9 That makes them insufficient to the task of know-
ing whether the vicissitudes in response trends are a product of, for example, a 
declining birth rate or the popularization of higher education or urbanization. 
In the long run, they provide only the roughest of narratives about a given era or 
generation.
 As an example, take the fact that general life satisfaction among young adults in 
their twenties today is high compared to members of the same cohort forty years 
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(OLS) regression analysis is the one most often employed by quantitative social 
consciousness studies. With newer analytical techniques being developed all the 
time, there are any number of limitations involved when continuing to rely on a 
simple, orthodox method that has already been in use for decades. But at least for 
this field, those limitations can be largely overcome owing to the peculiarities of 
the data being handled and the research interests involved.
 Quantitative social consciousness studies strive to untangle the relationships 
among multiple social attributes, and to measure the direct effects (their influ-
ence once the effects of other contributing factors have been excluded) these have 
on social attitudes.10 One could almost say the issues were defined in this way 
from the start with OLS regression analysis in mind. Moreover, the question of 
which independent variables (social attributes) this field should investigate was 
also largely predetermined. Generally speaking, social consciousness studies is 
not interested in highly personal life experiences that involve only one subset of 
a society’s members, like whether or not someone with a pet has a dog or a cat, 
or whether someone’s children attend public or private schools. Rather, the field 
is interested in social attributes, which govern the daily lives of all its potential 
research subjects. Centermost is the influence of stratification variables (occupa-
tion, economic power, education), followed by the inseparably connected factors 
of gender and birth-cohort differences. These comprise the most basic framework 
for forming social consciousness.
 In contrast, community, family, social involvements and relationships, ethnic-
ity, and similar factors are somewhat peripheral to the concerns of survey data 
analysis. Scholars in other societies direct attention to the effects of such other 
factors as church attendance and community participation, but the context of 
contemporary Japanese society, experience suggests that those factors do not have 
a strong enough influence to sway the state of social consciousness. This is due 
in part to the fact that the links between social structure and social mentality are 
weaker in Japan than in other societies. In any case, at the moment these items are 
not essential to our analytical framework.
 Given the above, the OLS regression analysis model most frequently used in 
this field is of the pattern shown in Figure 2-3. Controlling for the two demo-
graphic factors of gender and age as independent variables, we input the three 
stratification variables of education, occupational status, and economic power to 
observe direct causal effects (primary causes) on various social attitudes. This, in 
sum, is the procedure that forms the perennial analytical framework for quantita-
tive social consciousness studies: control in some fashion covariation between this 
and that factor, and look for the effects they have.
 The causal model that uses these five primary factors to ascertain the contribut-
ing factors that form social consciousness will be referred to below as the social con-
sciousness studies-type regression model.11 Kido (from Chapter 1) was the first to use 
this model to analyze social consciousness in Japanese society. I have followed his 
example of how to examine the social consciousness formative process using this 
model quite consistently in my own quantitative studies (Kikkawa 1998, 2000, 
2006, 2008, 2011). Hypotheses and propositions premised by use of this model 
constantly fluctuates. It is high when a Cabinet is inaugurated, but gradually drops 
until matters get to the point that the Cabinet resigns.
 The fluctuations in political attitudes that quantitative social consciousness 
studies gauge, on other hand, have longer wavelengths. Examples include how 
the so-called 1955 System (named for the year in which it coalesced) grounded in 
the ideological standoff between conservatives and progressives collapsed, how the 
populace’s distrust in politics rose, and how neoliberalism stated to gain the sup-
port of large numbers of people. All these developments were the results of major 
changes in the social structure of their respective eras. Those major changes would 
include, for example, declines in the sizes of the farming and self-employed strata, 
the increased concentration of the population in urban areas, the popularization 
of higher education, a generational change in the electorate, and changes in the 
geopolitical environment. Figure 2-2 shows how the minute changes observed in 
public opinion statistics are generated in the course of the major fluctuations that 
quantitative social consciousness studies observes. It is difficult to show on the 
figure, but long-term fluctuations express themselves not only through superficial 
changes in response percents but are also accompanied by a transformation in the 
social consciousness. It is explaining this latter fact that quantitative social con-
sciousness studies emphasizes.
Analytical Monographs
The next question is what kinds of analytical methods are appropriate for quan-
titative social consciousness studies. To put it simply, those methods need to 
be oriented to the goal of this field of research, which is to produce analytical 
monographs.
 Even for empirical sociology as a whole, the levels of analysis that different 
methods offer vary widely. The highly descriptive method of ordinary least squares 
Figure 2-2    Time Trend of Social Consciousness (Hypothetical Model)
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not be employing cutting-edge model-inferring techniques to gather stardust, so 
to speak, that glimmers only faintly with significance. Rather, I will rely on the 
simple but robust method of OLS regression analysis so that I can devote my ener-
gies toward sorting out the tendencies that appear in Japan’s high-quality social 
survey data.
 To put together a quantitative study that prioritizes getting a bead on the 
properties data show has been described as “sketching an analytical monograph” 
(keiryōteki monogurafu o egaku) (Kikkawa 2001; Ojima ed. 2001; Sugino 2012). In 
the context of anthropology or regional sociology, the term “monograph” usually 
refers to a written record based on fieldwork. The analytical monograph, however, 
refers to a study that is based on the analysis of measured materials (quantities). 
Such a study describes actual conditions in contemporary society by patiently sort-
ing through the information in social survey data. It is reliant on the quality of the 
survey data, and it aims to abstract theoretical essences from it.
 This is not necessarily the general procedure followed by empirical sociology. 
In that field, scholars most frequently employ the hypothesis-and-verification 
approach, emulating the pattern of the natural sciences. Empirical sociology and 
quantitative social consciousness studies may look the same from the outside, but 
the fact is analytical monographs seeking to derive theories inductively are on a 
parallel track to studies that rely on the deductive hypothesis-and-verification 
approach (Kikkawa 2003).
 Let’s say we adopted this latter approach. The goals of our data analysis would 
be fulfilled if we could confirm the existence of our proposition using the same 
“theory→operationalize→operational hypothesis→measure→test hypothesis” 
procedure of the natural sciences. This would be the case even if, for example, 
some subtle latent structure lay buried within some enormous error. In such a case, 
however, it would be hard to know what impact our proposition might actually 
have if implemented in Japanese society. In contrast, the analytical monograph 
emphasizes inductively deriving theories present in whatever propensities may be 
strongly evinced in the survey obtained (or that should be obtainable) in a way 
that produces an accurate microcosm of society.
“The Angels’ Share”
There are two more supplemental rationales for using OLS regression analysis. 
First, with this analytical method the social attitudes that operate as dependent 
variables must be continuous variates with few distortions. When analyzing the 
social structure, the dependent variables frequently are categorical variates. This 
enables using a method similar to OLS regression analysis, namely logistic regres-
sion analysis. However, given the lack of absolute points of reference, objectively 
valid thresholds of opinions, or naturally established yardsticks when it comes to 
social consciousness, there is no need to take the trouble to make categorical mea-
surements. For that reason, quantitative social consciousness studies frequently 
employs quantitative scales and factor score variables rather than the responses 
that were chosen themselves. Under these circumstances, a simple regression 
such as “the quiet transformation of status identification” that I take up in Chapter 
5 have also appeared in quite a few other studies.
 I should note, however, that the results obtained using this model that can be 
relied upon are limited to those cases in which the data contain few biases (i.e., 
where residual variances are independent from any other elements). On this point, 
several new analytical techniques—e.g., multilevel analysis, covariance-based 
structural equation modeling, and propensity score analysis—were developed pre-
mised by the question of how researchers are to infer the causal structures in which 
they are interested (frequently deemed “the true structures”) if the data used con-
tain, for example, considerable distortions, biases, and missing cases.
 These techniques can be seen as tools for coping with current conditions, when 
researchers are frequently forced to deal on a second-hand basis (as a secondary 
analysis) with compound social survey data that includes various errors and biases. 
The techniques share an interest in controlling for inconvenient distortions and 
gaps in the data available at the time of analysis, rather than spending enormous 
amounts of time and money to mitigate them at the time the data is collected.
 These are all superlative statistical techniques, and they likely represent a direc-
tion that should be encouraged in future research. However, using the predicted 
numerics these models produce to test the validity of our operational hypotheses, 
eventually is reduced to and verified as being a simple “true-false” of the results 
of a significance test. They instead make it difficult to get a sense of how much 
“weight” the derived findings carry when it comes to real society.12
 That said, recall that Japanese society is our focus, we know there already exists 
a stockpile of high-quality data about it from large-scale social surveys. This 
gives us the leeway to relax a bit and think about the progressiveness of statistical 
techniques. In those cases where the precision of the data being analyzed is high 
enough to assume it contains few biases, we can find meaningful insights through 
deep examination of the causalities within the data once we distill the essences 
inherent to the data itself to the extent possible.13 Accordingly, in this book I will 
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Figure 2-3    The Social Consciousness Studies-type Regression Model
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surveys, where one comes face to face with the reality of Japanese society that dif-
fers considerably with the image one develops doing data analysis. There are very 
few instances in which you feel like a fortune teller who has scored a hit. This is so 
even if the predictions you’ve made are based on a logic elucidated by some previ-
ous study, e.g., “if someone is of this age and gender with this education, their job 
history will be something like this and their annual income about this, meaning 
they are going to respond to questions about social attitudes something like this.”
 Social surveys do not aim to theorize every mechanism in contemporary society. 
No matter how much the data quality is improved, there will be some elements in 
the mix that sociological causal explanations will not address. That said, this does 
not mean that survey data analysis is inadequate. As Seiyama has also argued, “if X 
then Y ” statements are not the sort that are definitely true at any time and in any 
place (Seiyama 2004). They are descriptive statements about the real world and 
should more properly be described as (tentative) theories rather than principles.16
 I have an example I am particular fond of using in this regard. When whiskey 
is aged, the portion of the alcohol that volatilizes from the cask as the years go by 
is referred to as “the angels’ share.” This is not something that is begrudged, since 
distillers cannot omit losing this portion when it comes improving the quality of 
the goods they produce.
 Similarly, the variations in responses not covered by explanations in the social 
consciousness studies-type regression model comprise points of individual free-
dom that cannot be simply prescribed or forecast by social forces. They constitute 
the element of play that our society needs; without them, contemporary society 
would comprise rigidly engineered causal relationships. That being the case, such 
variations can be described as “the angels’ share” that cannot be begrudged when 
distilling and aging theories from survey data.
NOTES
1 In this book, I use the term “social structure” to refer to the aggregate system compris-
ing social relationships and attributes. “Society’s hardware” refers to essentially the same 
cluster.
2 Observers have recognized since the 1950s that the ratio of people in Japanese society 
who see themselves as belonging to the working class is inexplicably large regardless 
of occupational status. A rather large number of “capitalists” lay claim to a working-
class consciousness, for example. It has also long been known that people whose status 
one might expect would be thought of as unfair do not have a sense of unfairness (see 
Chapter 7). There has been no end to observers thinking up absent reasons and explana-
tions (in short, the analyst’s “excuse”) about why a relationship that should exist (the 
analyst’s belief ) is not evident between an objective status and the subjective individual 
(Kikkawa 2003, 2008).
3 Self-direction as developed by Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler rates high marks 
as one of the few examples of research to demonstrate the existence of reciprocal effects 
between two parties (see Chapter 6). However, even their work shows that the estimated 
values of the effect with which the social structure forms social consciousness are several 
analysis demonstrates sufficient efficacy. In addition, we can focus our probes on 
the beta (β) values—the standardized regression coefficient—even when it comes 
to the magnitude of the effects of the respective dependent variables since there is 
not necessarily an established scale for them.
 The second rationale is more important. The explanatory power of analyses 
based on the social consciousness studies-type regression model when it comes to 
explaining social consciousness through social attributes is 20 percent (R 2 = .200) 
at most. Depending on the analysis, it may even stop at roughly around 5 percent 
(R 2 = .050). For the regression model used in this book, the status-relatedness is 
sufficiently high even with a causal explanatory power of around 10 percent.14 
 Some readers may be doubtful about how small that causal explanatory power 
is. Even if our intention is to inductively know the actual state of society, such a 
result would end up treating as much as 80 percent of the information in the data 
obtained as a measurement error in practically any instance. From a statistical sci-
ence perspective, there is little leeway for justifying how low this explanatory power 
is. However, I offer the following assessment in light of the characteristics of social 
survey data. Imagine an experiment in which two-hundred people controlled for 
age, gender, and so forth are brought together and are asked to close their eyes. 
When they open them, some find 2,000 yen has been placed in front of them, oth-
ers find 1,000 yen, and still others find nothing. Under these conditions, ask each 
of these subjects about the level of their satisfaction. The causal explanatory power 
of such an experiment will not be the same as in a case where we observe the effects 
that annual income has on general life satisfaction for 10,000 respondents in real 
survey data. Naturally, we can expect the reactions to stimuli under experimental 
conditions to be vivid, and there will be few measurement errors. However, no 
matter how exacting the survey method, it is not easy to purely extract from social 
surveys only the relevant components of people’s public perceptions and decisions. 
Inevitably, you end up capturing only a blur from their responses rather than the 
picture itself. For example, people’s feelings are likely to vary between morning 
and evening. In polls conducted at the front door of someone’s home, response 
variations not especially relevant to sociological hypotheses invariably will come 
up. Finally, the respondent’s satisfaction might be due to something good that 
happened to their family, for example, or because they sometimes make good con-
nections on their work commute.
 Such “wobbly” responses inescapably are contained in the unexplained portions 
of the social consciousness studies-type regression model because the causalities are 
actually mounted on the society. However, these responses are outside the scope 
of a model that forecasts the state of social attitudes using such important compo-
nents of society as age, gender, education, occupation, and income. Hence, there 
is a “glass ceiling” for all practical purposes of about 20 percent on the explanatory 
power of a social consciousness studies-type regression model, given its exclusive 
focus on the effects of five primary variables.15 This, however, certainly does not 
mean we overlook other important socially prescriptive factors that can explain the 
remaining parts.
 In fact, I have frequently been present for individual face-to-face interview 
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multiples larger than that of the reverse causal relationships.
4 Asking questions about social consciousness differs from information obtained 
by asking about categories (mere nouns) such as education or occupation in that the 
researcher observes the subjective reactions to questions presented in the questioner and 
respondent’s shared language. In that regard, uncertainties arise here when it comes to 
the equivalence of responses among different countries. For example, saying that “totemo 
fuman” in Japanese is equivalent to “strongly dissatisfied” in English is not necessarily 
guaranteed from a linguistic perspective (Manabe 2004).
5 The main point of interest for independent variables is the influence of stratification 
status. However, while occupational status is seen as having a central role to play, its 
influence in Japanese society is not strong. When measuring the class-based gradients in 
social consciousness, we will usually very carefully examine a pluralistic class structure 
configured by economic power, educational attainment, industry and company sizes, 
and gender.
 On the other hand, the birth cohort of respondents is an indicator that includes the 
time concept as an independent variable. One must be careful here, though, about the 
fact that three concepts—the effects of the survey period, birth cohort effects, and age 
effects—are all mixed together.
6 The relationship between qualitative research and survey data analysis is the oldest 
“new” problem in sociology. I fully understand that the formal conclusions are in a 
mutually complementary rather than adversarial relationship. However, when it comes 
to social consciousness studies I believe I should make plain the fact that the relationship 
between the two is that of a division of labor.
7 This method—in which properly trained interviewers read off questions one by one 
while showing both the questions and response options to respondents and encouraging 
them to respond—was established at an early stage after World War II and adhered to 
for more than 50 years. Although the implementation costs are substantial, it makes it 
possible to obtain data that is even more precise than self-administered surveys.
8 While they may fall short compared to the General Social Survey (GSS) in the U.S. 
or various types of panel surveys when it comes to survey continuity, Japanese social 
surveys have nonetheless built up a large stockpile of high-quality data thanks to con-
siderable expenditures in labor and research funding. We see for example that random 
sampling using civil registers is not possible in many other countries, compared to Japan 
where sampling can be done using the Basic Resident Register or voter registration lists. 
As to survey methods, the self-administered format (collected by mail or leaving) that is 
easy to implement but offers low response precision is becoming common. Because of 
this, guaranteeing the possibility when designing a social survey in Japan that cross-time 
comparisons can be made with previous polls is more difficult than that of making trans-
national comparisons.
9 Even public opinion surveys report the differences in response distributions for each 
age cohort, by gender, or by region, very few indeed go on to carry out analyses that drive 
at social mechanisms (especially the influence of stratification variables).
10 In sociology, for ethical reasons it is difficult to carry out real-world experiments to 
learn about causal relationships. This should be instantly apparent if you think about the 
foolhardiness of social experiments and the ethical problems entailed if, for the purpose 
of conducting a comparative analysis, a researcher got half of one group of people to get 
married, got the other half to forego marriage, and then tracked the general life satisfac-
tion of people from both groups for 20 years. We input data collected in a social survey 
into a computer and apply statistical controls instead of imposing conditions on real 
society in order to learn about the causal mechanisms present without having to affect 
the actual lives of the respondents.
11 This is not particularly novel as an empirical technique; in fact, it is a quite standard 
regression model.
12 All these techniques are characterized by the fact that close readings that fit the data 
become difficult when it comes to the magnitude of the numbers that may be inferred 
from the model. For that reason, when unseasoned researchers use them, they are liable 
to chase from start to finish down points on the chart marked with asterisks that indicate 
statistical significance. Even if the figures can be interpreted accurately, the researcher is 
limited eventually to drawing rather negative conclusion on the order of “When observ-
ing the effects a certain social attribute has on social attitudes, having excluded nonim-
portant covariations and errors (the total amount of the excluded parts is not normally 
presented), they are present in a magnitude that viewed statistically cannot be said to 
be zero.” When performing data analysis, the causal relationship that supplies the basis 
for one’s argument must be significant. This is a necessary condition. However, for such 
analyses, it is not possible to know what issue exactly had however big an effect on the 
general inclinations of actual society (the total amount of information in the data col-
lected). This also illustrates that more than a few issues in the real world that are little 
more than trivial affairs get debated on a par with major causal structures.
13 If the intention is to correct errors from the outset using suppositions based on sophis-
ticated modeling, it will not be necessary to make efforts that inevitably entail spending 
enormous amounts of money to increase a survey’s precision and reduce non-sampling 
error.
14 In this book, for causal explanatory power we will look at all the coefficients of 
determination adjusted for degrees of freedom (referred to hereafter as adjusted R 2 ). 
However, because the number of independent variables is fixed there is little difference 
in the explanatory power of the size of a magnitude relationship from when we looked at 
unadjusted coefficients of determination.
15 Based on experience, for the most part we cannot expect to make any tremendous 
improvements to the explanatory power of a model even if we include further sociologi-
cal independent variables or consider the interaction effects among independent vari-
ables. Please refer also to Note 4 of Chapter 5 regarding experiences related to the size of 
causal explanatory power.
16 In those cases where the dependent variable is not a social attitude but rather some 
social attribute variable like household income, status in terms of employment, or prop-
erty holdings, the fluctuation in responses gets smaller and causal explanatory power 
grows because these are objectively clear facts. However, even in that case the causalities 
shown in the social survey data will be on the order of 40 percent. Propositions whose 
causal explanatory power exceeds 50 percent represent relationships that are already self-
evident even if they cannot necessarily be confirmed through a social survey. An example 
of such might be the relationship between monthly income and annual income. On 
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further reflection, the very fact of a causal relationship not being self-evident is what 
makes it a subject that should be investigated through survey data.
PART II
THE TRAJECTORY  
OF IDENTIFICATION
47
CHAPTER 3
Japan in 1985
In Part II of this book, I will consider the changing trends in status identification. 
I begin in this chapter by inviting readers to briefly cast their minds back 30 years. 
While those old enough to have lived through that period will find things much 
as they remember, those born after 1989 (i.e. Heisei umare sedai) will not have a 
firsthand familiarity with the era, and hence will benefit from hearing a bit about 
the particulars of that time.
An Age of Subtle Changes
There was once a time when the concept of the social mentality carried signifi-
cant weight in Japan. It was the 1980s, when themes such as the political struggle 
between conservatism and reform, tradition versus modernism, the mass-middle 
-class phenomenon, and Nihonjinron (to be discussed in depth below) received 
widespread coverage in the nation’s media. Moreover, it was a time when dis-
cussion of the social mentality focused overwhelmingly on objective numbers. 
Everyone from sociologists to policymakers, financiers, historians, and cultural 
commentators sought to understand the Japan of the day through the prism of 
public opinion figures suggesting that “X percent of the population held such-and-
such an opinion.” Though even today opinion polls remain a common feature of 
the national media, the regularity with which keywords from social consciousness 
studies peppered the front pages of every newspaper in the 1980s now seems no 
more than a distant memory. 
 I would like to propose this golden age of social consciousness and its study of 
1985 as a reference point for the comparisons I will be drawing later in this book 
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aimed at achieving an understanding of present-day Japan. I do this in order to 
reevaluate an age in which there was still a clear grasp of the Japanese social men-
tality of which we have since lost track.
 The “Bubble Years” around 1990 or so might also be worthy of consideration as 
a proposed benchmark for analysis. That vibrant age is, after all, well known even 
to those who grew up in the Heisei era, owing to the regularity with which it is 
referred to in the media. But the era of the bubble economy represents that point 
when the affluence of Japanese society briefly reached its high-water mark. Using 
such a period as a benchmark would make all subsequent generations seem by 
comparison to be mired in an inexorable decline. While that may be a reasonable 
way of seeing things with regard to industry and the economy, it is likely to give 
rise to misunderstandings on the topic of changes in the social structure.
 I for one do not see the subsequent changes that took place in Japanese soci-
ety simply as “deterioration” or “decline.” Indeed, when seeking a reliable barom-
eter of the prevailing social climate, some would point to the worth in observing 
the placid surface waters that precede a coming tsunami—in this case, 1985. Not 
only does this point in time represent the economic phase immediately prior to 
the bubble years, it also provides a snapshot of Japanese society in the late Shōwa 
period and thus prior to such major systemic changes as measures to promote 
deregulation and liberalization, promotion of equal employment opportunities 
among men and women, and the changes to welfare policy that came in the wake 
of the so-called “Gold Plan” of the mid-1990s. 
 It is also true that 1985 comes with a wealth of data generated by that year’s 
installment of the decennial SSM Survey. Moreover, whereas previous surveys 
had gathered data only on Japan’s male population, the 1985 study for the first 
time also saw women included in its remit. Furthermore, in 2010, as part of the 
SSP Project1—through which my colleagues and I have been working to set up a 
comprehensive study of social inequality in Japan—the SSP-I 2010 Survey was 
conducted for an intended comparison with the SSM 1985 Survey. As a result, 
I have at my disposal a high-quality data set that facilitates comparison of social 
consciousness over a period spanning a quarter of a century.
 A further reason for choosing this year as our starting point is to draw a concep-
tual distinction from other, earlier periods, i.e.: from what is referred to as “postwar 
society.” Dividing the 70-year period from the end of World War II to the present 
day into two halves, the latter period somehow seems less significant. Figures 3-1, 
3-2, and 3-3 show various indicators of the affluence of society, all of which display 
steady growth over the first half of this period before leveling off past the halfway 
mark. The overriding impression of social change in Japan is that the standards of 
affluence in society rose sharply until the country hit the era of high-speed eco-
nomic growth, after which they remained on a plateau for a relatively long period 
of time (Figure 3-4).
 When considering the history of contemporary Japan as a single, 70-year block, 
however, we have a seemingly unavoidable tendency to focus in great detail on 
the first half of that period. Probably the easiest way to visualize this problem is to 
consider the example of a soccer match. Imagine a first half in which your team 
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Figure 3-3     The Expanding Trend of Tertiary Education Attendance 
(Kikkawa 2013: 131)
concedes an early goal but then quickly ties the score, after which comes a second 
period altogether devoid of scoring chances. When discussing such a match, any 
observer would naturally be liable to focus mainly on the first half. However, given 
that most Japanese today are the erstwhile substitutes introduced in the second 
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contemporary society from the latter perspective. This understanding of society is 
collectively dubbed “reflexive modernity.” Although some theorists describe this 
concept as “second modernity,” or use the term “high modernity” to distinguish it 
from “modernity,” in this book I will use “reflexive modernity” as that is the most 
established term within Japanese sociology.
 Suddenly faced here with the term “reflexivity,” many readers might find them-
selves at a loss as to quite what this important keyword might mean. It is true that 
the term is difficult to explain concisely in a way that leaves no room for misun-
derstanding. In the final chapter of this book, I will discuss the current state of 
the Japanese social mentality from the perspective of reflexive modernity as thor-
oughly as space allows. But for now, let me simply say that it is best to think of the 
approach as describing a change from a simple, consistent age whose vectors were 
easily understandable to all, to a more complex, unpredictable, and unfathomable 
one. 
 Thanks to the explanatory interpretations of Yamada Mamoru, Mikami 
Takeshi, and Tomoeda Toshio, this understanding of periodization is already well 
established in contemporary Japanese sociology (Yamada 2013; Mikami 2010; 
Tomoeda 2010). However, the social theories surrounding reflexive modernity 
have themselves long been stalled at the stage of accurately “importing” Western 
premises into Japanese realities. Moreover, opinion among scholars is divided as to 
where the focus of such efforts should lie, be it globalization, the rise of informa-
tion technology, arts and culture, the relationship between society and the indi-
vidual, and so on.
 As a result, from the perspective of survey data analysis—one of the fields that 
puts such theories to use—two issues remain to be tackled when it comes to the 
reflexive modernity concept. The first is the continuing lack of a body of evidence 
to verify whether or not an understanding of periodization that describes reflexive 
modernity as having arrived is correct. The second is that attempts to apply an in-
depth understanding of such theories to studies of contemporary Japanese society 
remain inadequate.
 Throughout my own years studying sociology, the mantra that the modern 
era (“modernity”) has reached its end and that the next era has begun has been 
repeated ad infinitum with all the hypnotic air of a lullaby. That alone is enough to 
offer a vague understanding of when the concept of reflexive modernization began 
to penetrate Japanese sociology. But detailed research applicable when seeking to 
decipher exactly when and how Japanese society ushered in this era of reflexive 
modernity remains limited. In Europe, reflexive modernization is typically said to 
have gradually taken hold over a period of thirty to one hundred years. As such, it 
surely speaks to the “reality” of a great many people. In Japan and other East Asian 
societies, however, where a period of rapid, linear social change was followed by a 
sudden leap into a “post-modern” stage, the notion that the era of reflexive moder-
nity has arrived is to many observers far from a self-evident truth. Accordingly, the 
issue of how to empirically pinpoint the historical inflection point when it comes 
to social mentality for Japan remains a significant one.
 Many sociologists place this enigmatic juncture either at the turning point from 
half of this game, it behooves us to nonetheless get a precise understanding of their 
contributions no matter how unremarkable they may appear in comparison.2
 To put it more concisely, before our very eyes, there is a period of some 30 
years or more that—although it could reasonably be described as “our age”—we 
have yet to discuss in sufficient depth. During these years on the plateau, Japanese 
society experienced a number of complex changes, whose scale and direction can 
be difficult to grasp. As such, having set our focus on this block of years, it is neces-
sary to set aside the broad yardstick typically used in discussion of the remarkable 
development of the immediate postwar period, and employ a finer rule for a thor-
ough investigation.
Capturing the Eve of Reflexive Modernity 
Although it may seem a somewhat abrupt move, I would here like to introduce the 
concept of “reflexive modernity” as a means of understanding contemporary soci-
ety. The term “reflexive modernity” is a means of understanding different eras. It 
was introduced in the 1980s, principally to describe contemporary conditions in 
Western societies. This approach contends that contemporary society has arrived 
at a situation that differs from that of modern society (the so-called “first moder-
nity”) that extended to the start of the twentieth century, backgrounded by the 
rapid and drastic historical developments that occurred in Europe during the latter 
half of the century, including the end of the Cold War and the formation of the 
European Union.
 Sociological theory is split over how to discuss this change of eras, with one 
camp describing how we have arrived at an entirely new stage that ought to be 
termed “post-modern society,” while the other sees it as a derivation of mod-
ern society in an “evolved” form produced by the “completion of modernity.” 
The British-based sociologists Anthony Giddens (Giddens 1990, 1991) and 
Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman 2001), along with Germany’s Ulrich Beck, approach 
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year than we currently enjoy. Although the Japanese of the day were frequently 
said to be overworked, that was the extent of the extra study or work in which they 
engaged relative to the present day. 
 On the cultural front, this was the year of Expo ‘85, held in the new town 
of Tsukuba, east of Tokyo. The official name of the event can be translated as 
“The International Science Technology Exposition” (Kokusai kagaku gijutsu 
hakurankai), and 30 years later Tsukuba is now well established as a hub for the 
development of the latest technology. However, 1985 also drew a line under the 
principal theme of science and technology that had underlain the International 
Expositions since Osaka in 1970. The event returned to Osaka five years later in 
1990 reborn as The International Garden and Greenery Exposition (Kokusai hana 
to midori no hakurankai), and the motif of our relationship with nature was contin-
ued with the Love the Earth Expo (Ai-chikyūhaku) in Nagoya in 2005. It follows 
that 1985 can therefore also be seen as the eve of a shift in the principle emphasis 
of Japanese society from science and technology to Earth and the environment. 
 Another dramatic change—this one related to public-spiritedness—can be seen 
in smoking habits. In 1985, some 64.6% of men were smokers––roughly two out 
of every three adult males would light up with scant regard for time, place, or 
occasion. By 2010, that figure had fallen to 36.6%, a near reversal of the ratio 
of smokers to non-smokers from 2 : 1 to 1 : 2 (Japan Smoking Rate Survey, JT, 
2010). This change has also been accompanied by a remarkable improvement in 
the nation’s smoking etiquette. Thinking back to Japan’s streets around the end of 
the Shōwa era, litter was a vastly more common feature than it is today—not just 
cigarette butts, but also cans and other carelessly discarded trash. Looking back 
with today’s sensibilities, in those days Japan still had some way to go in terms of 
social etiquette. 
 Domestically manufactured automobiles figured among the items most desired 
by the youth of the day. Not just any old car would do, though: it had to be a two-
door coupe modeled after the European supercars of a few years prior. Prominently 
displayed on the body would be stickers and emblems, proudly proclaiming the 
presence of various makers’ patented high-performance engines, such as Toyota’s 
Twincam 24 Turbo, and the widely used DOHC 20 design. Indeed, many will 
remember how technology itself became a sort of fashion in this age when faith 
and hope sprung eternal for the cutting-edge innovation that was driving Japan’s 
major industries. Air quality was much worse than it is today, though, thanks to 
the exhaust gases those automobiles produced, and Japan’s cities were also coated 
in layers of soot.
 Turning to matters related to general convenience and comfort, although the 
Shinkansen bullet train network had yet to be graced by the Nozomi, Mizuho, and 
Hayabusa services that we see today, the recent introduction of the then-latest 100 
series trains to the Hikari and Yamabiko services had already slashed the journey 
between Tokyo and Osaka to a mere three hours. Smartphones and the Internet 
were of course not yet available, but automatic teller machines and the distinctive 
green of phone-card compatible public telephones were a common sight in most 
towns, along with a roster of fast food outlets not too dissimilar to the one we see 
the Shōwa to the Heisei eras or that from the twentieth to the twenty-first cen-
tury (Imada 1989, Tomoeda 2013). Certainly, postwar theories that placed mod-
ernization as a precondition to understanding phenomena can be seen to have 
started losing their explanatory power around that time. With this in mind, 1985 
becomes the eve of this inflection point in historical eras. This timing—which cor-
responds to the final stages of the era of the mass middle class—makes it possible 
to discuss this period as what might be termed the climax of the first modernity, of 
the final phase of modernity itself.
The Pinnacle for Shōwa Japan 
Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko has already pulled together a detailed assessment of the social 
conditions of this time, appropriately titled 1985﻿-nen (The year 1985) (Yoshizaki 
2005). Using his work as a touchstone, let us look back upon the trail of the social 
mentality of those years. Incidentally, on a personal note 1985 was the year in 
which I graduated from high school and left my hometown of Matsue, Shimane 
Prefecture, for the Kansai region, to embark on a new life as a student in a metro-
politan area. This left me with a clear and lasting impression of the “adult world” 
that I was newly confronting.
 Shōwa 60 (1985). Japanese society had entered its 40th year since the end of 
World War II, and with the reverberations from the period of high-speed eco-
nomic growth still being felt was moving into the bubble years. The signing of the 
Plaza Accord meant that this was also a key year on the international economic 
stage. The government of Japan, led by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, was 
still operating under the conservative vs. reformist two-party setup known as the 
1955 System (gojūgonen taisei). 
 Turning our attention to the industrial world, one after another state-owned 
enterprises including Japanese National Railways, Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone, and Japan Tobacco and Salt that collectively had been tagged “oyakata 
hinomaru” (essentially, “The government is our boss”) were privatized. But despite 
the creation of new companies that were referred to by their respective romanized 
acronyms of JR, NTT, and JT, much of industry and the economy continued to 
dance to the government’s tune.
 Turning to people’s working lives, Shōwa-era norms like long-term employ-
ment practices and a seniority-based wage system were still a reality. The SSM 
Survey provides detailed insight into the employment histories of Japan’s citizens. 
According to these figures, in 1985 the average male had changed jobs 1.16 times 
in his lifetime, but by 2005 that frequency had risen to 1.46 (Hayashi and Satō 
2011). The vertical line that repeats on Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 represents con-
ditions as they stood in 1985. A glance at these figures reveals that in 1985 some 
66.6% of the overall workforce was in full-time employment (as salaried workers), 
compared to 75.3% in 2013. The proportion of tertiary education attendance was 
37.6% as opposed to 55.1% in 2013, while GDP stood at around 70% of its cur-
rent total. Incidentally, at that time every Saturday was still a work or school day 
(if only in the morning) while Japan had at least three fewer national holidays per 
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Generational Change and the Human Life-Cycle 
Let us now continue by considering the people who made up this society. Figure 
3-5 compares the population pyramids for Japan in 1985 and 2010 (Source: 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau website). At 
first glance the most surprising thing is that Japan’s demographic makeup in 1985 
retains a clear flavor of the shape suggested by the term “population pyramid.” 
But by 2010, the low birthrate and rapid aging of Japanese society had created a 
today. 
 The retail landscape was however rather different. Licenses required for the 
sale of rice and alcohol meant that 24-hour convenience stores had yet to emerge 
to offer round-the-clock access to most daily necessities. Shopping malls with 
their massive selling floors were also a few years off. This was primarily due to the 
protection afforded to small-to-medium sized retailers by regulations and trade 
associations. Membership of trade unions was high, and the May Day rallies and 
Shuntō (“spring offensive”) wage negotiations loomed much larger in the pub-
lic consciousness than they do now. It was considered important to abide by the 
standards and unwritten rules of any organization to which one belonged, from 
schools to local citizens associations. This was less a matter of legal compliance 
than of respect for social conventions, enforced by peer pressure. For better or for 
worse, it was an era when people were deeply woven into the fabric of their society. 
 On the consumer electronics front, it was around this time that dedicated word 
processors and home computers first began to rapidly catch on, while microwave 
ovens and landline telephones were already ubiquitous. The iPod had of course 
still yet to be invented, but it was possible to listen to music on the move thanks to 
Sony’s portable cassette Walkman. Years before its descendants the Wii and the DS 
arrived on the scene, Nintendo’s Famicom (“Family computer,” marketed outside 
Japan as the Nintendo Entertainment System) emerged as a home games console 
to be connected to the family television, while the portable Game & Watch series 
offered the chance to enjoy a range of now-well-known titles such as Super Mario 
anytime, any place. 
 On the music scene, the genre now known as J-pop had yet to emerge. The rage 
instead was for so-called “new music.” Today’s youth would probably chuckle at 
the term, but at that time the word “new” seemed cool and fresh in a way that may 
now seem difficult to appreciate. 
 I may have rambled somewhat on this topic, but these snapshots of 1985 pro-
vide a glimpse of the achievements of Shōwa Japan at a time when faith in science 
and technology and in the economy was absolute. It was a long way removed from 
the poverty and hardship one normally associates with the label “postwar.” But 
there is no doubt that the overall mood of the times was rather different to how 
it is now. The changes that would befall Japanese society over the next quarter-
century followed a pattern similar to the transition from filament light bulbs, to 
fluorescent lamps, to LED lighting—the lack of apparent change on a superficial 
level masked major qualitative strides. Although material affluence did not differ 
greatly from the standards we enjoy today, standing on the cusp of a major transi-
tion from one era to the next—marked by the end of the Cold War and the passage 
from the Shōwa to the Heisei era—1985 represents a transitional moment in his-
tory, one in which the characteristics of the old era and the new one intermingled. 
Thus, if it were possible to travel back in time and visit those days, for a Japanese it 
would likely feel rather akin to alighting at an airport in one of Japan’s Asian neigh-
bors today, at once familiar yet somewhat peculiar.
Figure 3-5-a    The Population Pyramid for Japan in 1985
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Figure 3-5-b    The Population Pyramid for Japan in 2010
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Positive Reevaluations of the Uniqueness of Japan’s Culture:  
The Age of “Exotic Japan” 
Let us move on to the ways in which the social mentality of this era was expressed. 
I would like to start by stressing the fact that in any age a certain amount of predic-
tive debate takes place in the arena of public discourse. The initial stirrings of the 
era that was to follow can also be detected in the proclamations of 1985. But the 
social mentality that can be apprehended through data develops in synchrony with 
such discourse, which trails the former slightly and develops over a more extended 
period. In light of this, below I will look at explanations of this period that take in 
a five-to-ten-year timespan and have a consistent grasp of the social consciousness 
of the age.
 First, it is important here to recall a term that in 1985 was crucial to all discus-
sion of the social mentality but which has these days all but disappeared from 
public discourse. That term is Nihonjinron, sometimes called Nihonbunkaron—
“theories of Japanese national and cultural identity,” but most commonly rendered 
as “theories of Japanese uniqueness.” In either case, for brevity’s sake I will use the 
Japanese term Nihonjinron below.
 Toward the end of the Shōwa era, in tandem with a Japanese economy that was 
becoming a more and more significant force on the global stage, interest began 
to grow in the topic of “the essence of Japan.” The discussion began to collect 
around pride in the uniqueness of “Japan.” Blended together were a broad range 
of topics, including behavioral patterns and interpersonal relationships (shame 
culture, collectivism, and the balance between privately held [honne] and pub-
licly espoused opinions [tatemae]); distinctive features in the structure and orga-
nization of Japanese society (rigid vertical relationships [tate-shakai], a clan-based 
society [ie-shakai], and Japanese business and management practices); and unique 
culture and traditions (bushidō, Zen Buddhism, the tea ceremony, and wabi-sabi). 
This construct was Nihonjinron. Prominent writers who participated in this dis-
course included Nakane Chie (1967); Yamamoto Shichihei (1983); Doi Takeo 
(1971); Hazama Hiroshi (1971); Murakami Yasusuke, Kumon Shunpei, and Satō 
Seizaburō (1979); and Yamazaki Masakazu (1984). The era of 1985 was one in 
which any bookstore would have a section with shelf upon shelf of tomes dedi-
cated to works in the Nihonjinron vein.
 A few years later, Aoki Tamotsu provided a very concise summing up of the 
genre (Aoki 1990). Aoki saw the early 1980s as a time characterized by positive 
evaluation of Japan’s uniqueness. Prior to that point, i.e., from the end of the war 
through to the period of rapid economic growth, the tone of Nihonjinron had 
unanimously emphasized the unique failings of Japanese culture. The country’s 
unique history and culture were blamed for Japan taking the wrong path that led 
down the road to World War II. The postwar years were characterized by the con-
viction born of stern collective self-reflection that there was a need to leave behind 
the Japan of old and proceed instead along the route of Westernization. This was 
seen at the time as an incontrovertible fact. How else was it possible to explain 
the reality that Japan had lost the war? The starting point for social consciousness 
demographic profile rather different from other developed nations, resulting in a 
spindle-shaped chart that tells the tale of a society that has achieved “maturity.”
 On the topic of this demographic make-up, it is important to emphasize the 
fact that the Japanese social mentality of 1985 still bore strong echoes of pre-war 
and wartime society. The demographic born prior to 1940 (aged 45 and over) that 
made up the upper portion of the population pyramid for 1985 (Figure 3-5-a) 
represents a generation that was educated under the pre-war schooling system. 
Setting aside any evaluation of the quality of that system, Japan’s schooling before 
and during the war is sure to have had a far from negligible influence on shaping 
the social consciousness of the time. It is a topic that could not be openly dis-
cussed until relatively recently, but the fact is the modern Japanese society of 1985 
was one that had been built upon a major apostasy in values, for it was the “little 
citizens” (shōkokumin) reared in a system designed to instill an ultranationalist, 
patriotic mentality who had now taken on the role of “wise elders” in a democratic 
society. Indeed, the over-60s generation of the time (then known as rojin [“the 
aged”]) had all been born in either the Meiji (1868–1912) or Taishō (1912–1926) 
eras. From this, we can infer that the vector of the transition from a traditional, 
feudal society to a modern one was part and parcel of what it meant to live through 
these years.
 Still, the demographic that occupied the largest section of the pyramid for both 
1985 and 2010 is the generation born in the late 1940s, Japan’s “baby boom-
ers” (dankai no sedai). In 1985, this cohort—today in their 60s—were still in 
their mid-to-late 30s. Many were young parents raising a generation that would 
be dubbed the “junior boomers” (dankai jūnia). Parenthetically, my birth year of 
1966 presents a conspicuous slight indentation on the pyramid because of a com-
mon superstition about babies born in what was the Chinese year of the horse. 
As I mentioned earlier, 1985 was the year in which I myself graduated from high 
school. My birth cohort, having entered the workforce just in time to become an 
integral part of the thriving industrial boom of the 1990s bubble years, are now 
the parents of school-age children. Those born in 1985 are themselves now well 
into their late 20s and are beginning to assume the mantle of the workforce at the 
backbone of Japanese society and the parents of the next generation.
 When thinking in this way about what characterizes an era, it is not sufficient 
to focus solely on the passage of time; the role played by specific generations as 
they collectively age (the aging impact) must also be given adequate consideration. 
In this respect, too, concentrating on a 25-year span works in our favor. This is 
because we could lose track of the nature of the changes if we were to take the more 
facile approach of simply comparing ourselves first to our parents’ generation and 
then to that of our children. Conversely, working with an interval of 10 or 50 years 
would make it rather more difficult to get a sense of the shifts in the generations 
concerned.
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reprint 1988: 275) 
 Considered thusly, such key Nihonjinron interests as a society based on rigid 
vertical relationships (tate-shakai), collectivism, dependency, private and public 
opinion, and Japanese business and management practices begin to seem less the 
objects of dismissive gazes and instead take on a positive nuance as essential ele-
ments of the success of Japanese society. To be sure, by 1985 an increasing number 
of Japanese were already starting to go cool on this kind of “ultra-Japanism.” Even 
so, there is little doubt that to many at this time, this positive evaluation of the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture was something that came as second nature. 
 Incidentally, this was also the time that singer Gō Hiromi had a hit with his 
memorable piece Ni-oku yon-sen-man no hitomi, ekizochikku Japan (“240 million 
eyes of exotic Japan”), released in 1984. The 240 million figure in the title was 
apparently intended to reflect the number of eyes (specifically pupils) possessed by 
a Japanese population that had recently passed the 120 million mark. But thinking 
anew about the song’s repeated “Exotic Japan!” refrain, one realizes that just like 
Hamaguchi’s “Nihon-rashisa” no saihakken, it was born of the prevailing mood of 
looking proudly upon the uniqueness of the society to which we Japanese belong. 
The fact is, this truly was the era for making flamboyant proclamations about the 
positive uniqueness of Japanese culture—about “exotic Japan.”
Social Mentality in the First Modernity 
As Japan entered the 1990s and an increasingly global outlook and sense of cul-
tural relativism began to extend even to the general populace, people began to once 
more see themselves as “simply Japanese” and discussion of the national identity 
in an overwhelmingly positive light eventually faded from view. It was the coming 
of this age of internationalization that prompted Aoki’s theories.3 By the standards 
of the present day, the tendency of the Japanese to think with uncomplicated favor 
about our identity as Japanese is further fading from view.
 As such, we are now able to analyze the significance of the popular trends in 
the discourse of those days unburdened by judgments about the actual rights and 
wrongs of the arguments that Nihonjinron once made. In so doing, it becomes 
apparent that the rise of Nihonjinron in the 1980s has the following implications 
for social consciousness studies.
 Firstly, this period presented an opportunity for the society of the day to re-
adopt a Japanese sense of traditionalism that had earlier been targeted for rejection 
as being too conventional. That is not, of course, to say that all Japanese traditions 
were comprehensively rehabilitated. But at the very least customs seen as “tradi-
tional” or “orthodoxly conservative” ceased to be dismissed wholesale as they had 
previously been, and instead began to be deemed to possess an inherent value that 
was worthy of preservation.
 Secondly, it created an opportunity for Japanese social science and industry to 
aim at constructing a Japanese-type model that was not an imitation of modern 
Western society. Rather than view Western (read “modern”) offerings—in short, 
studies, which is rooted in that tension between tradition and modernity, was like-
wise steeped in this mood of negativity concerning Japan’s culture.
 Yet, by the 1980s, the tone of discourse surrounding Japan’s culture had under-
gone a major shift. Aoki described the phenomenon thusly: 
Studies of Japan broke free from the use of modern Western society as a point of 
reference that had been evident until that point and moved away from the posi-
tion that modernization meant Westernization, paving the way for attempts 
to cultivate an altogether new discipline. Japan’s rapid growth had improved 
the country’s global standing to that of an economic superpower and ushered 
in an age of prosperity. This placed a renewed focus in the nation on attempts 
to interrogate its identity, i.e., ‘What are Japanese, and what potential do they 
have?’ (Aoki 1990: 109) 
 In this era, it had once again become possible to discuss the social mentality 
from a position of positivity regarding the uniqueness of Japanese society. Without 
this change, it would be impossible to account for a situation that Ezra Vogel was 
already speaking of in 1979 with his title, Japan as Number One.
 Among the various discussions, perhaps the most definitive was the “contex-
tualism” (kanjinshugi) espoused by Hamaguchi Eshun. The “contextual person” 
(kanjin) proposed by Hamaguchi in his foremost work “Nihon-rashisa” no saihak-
ken (“Rediscovering Japanese-ness”) represented the unique, human-centered out-
look of the Japanese people. The main thrust of this concept can be summarized as 
follows. The Japanese people have absorbed the interpersonal relations character-
istic of Japanese society—in short, the context—into their fundamental identity. 
They are interdependent and have built a society based on mutual trust in one 
another. Accordingly, they can refer to standards that might change depending on 
the situation and take whatever actions may be appropriate, even in settings where 
in a Western society they might be expected to conform to every norm without 
exception. In recent parlance, this might be termed the ability to “read between 
the lines” (kūki ga yomeru).
 Hamaguchi’s main premise is that the mechanism by which this is achieved in 
Japanese society differs from societies founded on individualism in that it is best 
understood in terms of “the contextual” as opposed to “the individual.” From this, 
Hamaguchi drew the following conclusion.
It is not that the Japanese are naturally lacking in self-assertiveness, nor do they 
lack an individual identity. Rather, it is that, in contrast to the frank expressions 
of personal ego that are acceptable in Western society, such assertions have taken 
on a socially advanced and refined (read, “sophisticated”) form. Interpreted in 
this way, Japanese—who traditionally display a communal sense of self—have 
no difficulties when it comes to leading a “modern” lifestyle even without mak-
ing Western-style individualism their ideal. Indeed, it is even possible to say 
that, as society steadily becomes more systematically connected, this outlook 
facilitates an even more functionally superior lifestyle. (Hamaguchi 1977, 
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position nonetheless remained a train of thought in which people would keep the 
conflict between traditionalism and modernism in mind when thinking about the 
issues at hand and firmly link various opinions to it.
 A similar trend of clinging to the vestiges of the traditionalism–modernism axis 
even as it started to crumble has also been noted in Japanese politics of the time. 
In his analysis of voter behavior based on value consciousness (“cultural politics”), 
Watanuki Joji noted a correlation between “traditional” versus “modern” values 
among the Japanese electorate in the 1960s and their respective preference for 
either conservative or reformist political parties (Watanuki 1986). But turning to 
survey data from 1983, we see that the political culture underlying voter behavior 
is changing to one in which the traditional values that were still extant have begun 
to meld with industrial values whose basis lies in a faith in science and technology 
(ibid. 43). This seemingly unlikely union of the traditional and the industrial can 
be seen as one that evoked a transitional period when the traditionalism–modern-
ism axis was taking on a new form. Still, the framework of the social consciousness 
of the day was such that the word “tradition” continued to have a strong magnetic 
attraction; even such concepts associated with “orthodox” modernity as industrial-
ization and the advance of science and technology were drawn into its orbit.
 The foregoing illustrates how this period presents a subject that is at once fas-
cinating to analyze and difficult to interpret. It is my belief that both traits arise 
from deeply ingrained Japanese traditions (and/or the sense thereof ) that some-
how managed to abide within the advanced industrial society that achieved high 
levels of economic growth. To rephrase this from the standpoint of contemporary 
social theory, the Japan of 1985 represented the final moment in which its people 
were embedded in modern society (society of the first modernity). If that is the 
case, then Japan’s present day reality as a society in reflexive modernization will 
come steadily into focus once we have grasped the contours of its antecedent.
Homologies between Nihonjinron and the Mass-Middle-Class 
Phenomenon
My fourth and final point is something hinted at by the homologies between the 
“Nihonjinron boom” and the mass-middle-class phenomenon. The people of the 
age lived through a process that saw their personal circumstances being greatly 
improved by unprecedented social change. But it was their passage through the 
decade-long stable period that began in the mid-1970s that gave them a palpable 
sense that the age of social change had ended and that they had now settled into 
a prosperous, stable society. This may have been why there was the sense in 1980s 
Japan of wish fulfilment in that Japanese wanted the images they had of themselves 
at that moment of arrival to be confirmed in the form of a cultural theory—a “self-
reflection” backed with scholarship.
 Needless to say, the self-reflection that they expected had to be positive and 
also so simple that the majority would find it unequivocally compelling. Such 
a national self-image is something with which it is natural to identify. Against 
the backdrop of the “Nihonjinron boom,” people were eager to know what the 
things that were not Japanese—by virtue of their origin as offering the only course 
that society should pursue, people instead came to explore the possibilities of 
developing East Asian models (though the Japanese-type model that originated 
here would once again be rejected as symbolized by the term “Galapagos,” evoking 
evolutionary dead ends developed in isolation in a remote island ecosystem). It 
should also be stated here that, to keep pace with this cultural relativism, sociologi-
cal theory was forced to effectively retract so-called modernization theory, which 
held that a simple convergence on Western models of society was the chief prereq-
uisite for social change.
 Thirdly, the very emergence of a Nihonjinron that was effectively a rather loose 
agglomerate of disparate ideas is indicative of vigor at the central foundations of 
social consciousness. Nihonjinron was a construct made up of a series of simple 
dichotomies. These become apparent in the disparate themes it is necessary to con-
sider when one sets out to explain the notion of “a homogenous society funda-
mentally different from those in the West, with a unified culture based in a unique 
tradition;” it had to incorporate a “temporal” dimension (tradition vs. modernity); 
a “geographical” dimension (Japan vs. the West, or domestic vs. international); 
and the hierarchical dimension of class in combination with the very make-up of 
society (multicultural, class-based society vs. monoethnic, homogeneous society).
 Ultimately, however, the core axis that unites the social mentality is that com-
prising the traditionalism–modernism binary. Although the notion of tradition as 
diametrically opposed to modernity had indeed started to crumble, it abided as a 
somewhat inflexible premise to which most ideas remained moored and that pro-
vided a point of reference for most people. In short, with everyone understanding 
that their society contained such a self-evident basis for values, Japanese engaged 
in a constant process of evaluating whether they were being “old fashioned” or 
“new” based on that standard as they went about their daily lives.
 The notion that this conflict in values between tradition and modernity as being 
unshakably rooted in Japanese society of the time also received evidence-based cor-
roboration from contemporary social consciousness phenomena. Hayashi Chikio 
utilized a method of his own design to analyze response trends in the Japanese 
National Character Survey—which he himself had directed for three decades—in 
order to make plain the “logic” (kangaekata no sujimichi) behind the ways Japanese 
think. According to a succession of studies that Hayashi dubbed “quantitative 
Nihonjinron,” data from answers to a range of yes/no opinion-oriented questions 
gathered continually since the end of World War II indicated that the period until 
1970 clearly adhered to the traditionalism–modernism binary (the tradition-
modern mental logic) while from 1980 or thereabouts the tendency towards tradi-
tionalism started to become less and less pronounced. At first, it appeared that the 
younger generation were making efforts to revive certain traditions. But it soon 
became clear that this mental logic that saw tradition and modernity in opposition 
was beginning to crumble across a broad age spectrum. Over the next 20 years or 
so, the traditionalism–modernism axis gradually vanished without a trace. From 
Hayashi’s efforts to convey with some surprise these faint tremors in the mental 
logic of the late 1980s, it can be reasonably inferred that during this era the default 
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“standard image” (hyōjunzō) of their own society was, and furthermore hoped to 
find at the heart of this “Japan” something with which they could identify. It is 
Aoki, in fact, who had the insight to perceive early on that the pivot underpinning 
the enthusiasm for Nihonjinron in the 1980s hinged precisely on this fact. 
 Furthermore, this tendency for the popular social consciousness to be mobi-
lized en masse in a direction suggested by the intellectual elite dovetails squarely 
with received 20th century notions of “typical citizens” as depicted in mass society 
theory. In this regard, too, the prevailing climate of 1985 can clearly be seen to dif-
fer from that of the present day. 
 In any case, from the perspective of this book, the fact that a shift in the social 
consciousness—a movement defined by people seeking to align themselves with 
a radiant picture of themselves that came with scholarly backing—was visible is 
extremely suggestive. That is because the enthusiasm for Nihonjinron can be under-
stood in light of the same contemporary trends as the mass-middle-class phenom-
enon, which was being talked about with reference to stratification consciousness 
at practically the same time. The latter phenomenon—often also framed as “one 
hundred million-strong mass middle class,” (ichi oku sōchūryū)—gained impetus 
as survey data established “middle class” as the benchmark status of the Japanese 
with which the citizenry in turn unanimously identified. In this sense, both the 
Nihonjinron boom and the mass-middle-class phenomenon can be seen as efforts 
to affirm the national self-image that came as a product of the period of rapid eco-
nomic growth. Accordingly, almost in lockstep both phenomena rapidly tailed off 
as Japan entered the 1990s.
 The very phrase ichi oku sōchūryū originated from World War II-era slogans 
such as ichi oku hi no tama (“one hundred million fireballs”), and ichi oku gyoku-
sai (“one hundred million honorable deaths”), based on the official estimate of 
Japan’s population provided by the wartime military authorities. Such expressions 
were clearly intended to symbolize an illusion of unity—of “the whole of Japanese 
society!”4 In short, “ichi oku” was an expression used when seeking to emphasize 
the notion of “we Japanese all” (wareware Nihonjin subete ga). In much the same 
way, the postwar years also saw the occasional use of rather more negative expres-
sions such as ichi oku sōzange (the penitence of a hundred million) and ichi oku 
sōhakuchika (the madness of a hundred million). The final chapter of the postwar 
“ichi oku” expressions that had run the gamut from “honorable death” to “peni-
tence” came with “one hundred million-strong mass middle class.” Thought of 
in this way, the interpretation that the mass-middle-class phenomenon and the 
Nihonjinron boom were in closely related contexts becomes much more persuasive.
 To close, I would like to look back once again at the 1980s hit song “240 Million 
Eyes.” After the refrain of “exotic Japan,” the same phrase suggesting the hearts of 
one hundred million were all aflutter is repeated over and over almost like the 
chorus of a classical Greek drama. Reflecting all these years later on this curiously 
resonant phrase, the fact that this was an age in which the social consciousness of 
120 million people became wildly enthusiastic for the positive and unique aspects 
of Japanese culture (i.e., by “exotic Japan”) and in which a normalized image of 
what it meant to be Japanese possessed a strong pull suddenly becomes clear.
NOTES
1 For further information on the SSP Project, see: http://ssp.hus.osaka-u.ac.jp/
2 I accept the continuing potential for detailed future studies of postwar society to 
identify as-yet-unrecognized underlying factors that will rewrite scholarly understand-
ing. Such reassessments of existing theories are, however, unlikely to warrant major 
changes to the overall thrust of my argument here. It is high time that we move beyond 
to a sociology that remains narrowly focused and continues ad infinitum to concen-
trate on Shōwa-era historical concepts like “postwar” and the “period of rapid economic 
growth.”
3 In 1985, Professor Hamaguchi and Professor Aoki were colleagues at the School of 
Human Sciences, Osaka University. As a student in this faculty, I myself had the oppor-
tunity to study under Hamaguchi. My impression was of a modest and dignified gentle-
man entering the twilight of his years—something of a contrast with Aoki, who rather 
daringly moved in international circles.
4 As explained by Oguma Eiji, taking into account the territory under Japan’s control 
at the time of World War II, the figure of 100 million seems somewhat dubious (Oguma 
1998). It is, therefore, best seen as an “imagined community” (to borrow from Benedict 
Anderson) intended to symbolize the Japanese nation state.
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CHAPTER 4
The Real Nature of  
the Mass-Middle-Class Phenomenon
Many writers have already spoken about the visible forms taken by social class 
from the subjective viewpoint of Japanese in the 1980s. I, too, have offered my 
own analyses. However, in this chapter so that the reader may grasp the arguments 
presented in this book unimpeded, I will explore the situation from an angle that 
established theory does not elucidate.
The Catalyst that Changed the Debate about Stratification into One 
about Eras
“Mass middle class” (sōchūryū) is a well-known term used for describing the social 
class situation in Japan during the 1970s and 1980s. The focus in this phrase is on 
the status identification of individuals, i.e., their sense of where they are located if 
Japanese society has been split into upper, middle, and lower classes.
 We measure this based on the trends in responses to those survey questions 
we sociologists see as pertaining to status identification. The question texts and 
response options take several different forms, but the most representative one is 
that provided by the five-level status identification (go-dankai kaisō kizoku ishiki) 
framework. The questions using this form may be categorized as being one of two 
general types. One is that which has been used in the SSM Surveys from the outset 
in 1955, while the other is that which the Cabinet Office has used to understand 
public opinion trends in the Public Opinion Survey on the Life of the People 
(hereafter, Life of the People Survey) it has been conducting since the 1950s.1 
 The difference is that the SSM Surveys pose the question, “Assuming we can 
divide present-day Japanese society into five levels, into which of these do you fall 
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or negative, e.g., anxiousness, general life satisfaction, or pro-x feelings. It is there-
fore quite singular for a name like this to have been used that further emphasizes 
the centripetal point in the distribution of responses.
 In light of the heightened interest among the general public, various theories 
were put forth and intense debate ensued in stratification studies about why the 
numbers of Japanese who self-identified as “middle class” during the period of 
high-speed economic growth had increased. This was termed the mass-middle-
class controversy (chūryū ronsō). Status identification trends were such a major 
topic of interest that this debate played out on newspaper front pages of the day.3
 Today, however, the distribution of responses to status identification questions 
no longer attract the interest they once did. One reason is that the notion of a 
“mass middle class” is now seen as a somewhat antiquated one that smacks of the 
Shōwa period. Japanese society in the postwar period started from rock bottom 
amid the ruins of defeat. When people of the day thought about trends in industry 
and national living standards, the class to which they directed their attention was 
that of the workers living out their lives at society’s lowest levels. Politicians, the 
press, and academics all focused on the consciousness and activities of the prole-
tariat, a group that identified itself as “We workers!” As the character of the times 
gradually changed in step with high-speed economic growth, the focus of observ-
ers shifted to the social classes in the middle range that had begun to lay their 
hands on some wealth. The term “mass middle class” arose from this development. 
If we recall this sequence of events, then it becomes plain to see why no one spoke 
anymore of the “mass middle class” in the Heisei period—it was simply a term that 
captured the flavor of the period of high-speed economic growth and no longer 
had a role to play.
 Another reason why status identification no longer attracts societal attention 
is because there is now a mismatch between the output of the survey data analysis 
and the way people perceive their era. The response distribution for social attitude-
related questions is analytically meaningful only when there are differences in the 
distribution of responses to questions that have been repeatedly asked in the same 
format. However, an examination makes it unexpectedly clear that over the past 
four decades the distribution of responses to status identification questions has 
changed little.
 Figures 4-1 and 4-2 use the past five SSM Surveys and the most recent SSP-I 
2010 Survey to show the distribution of status identifications (for men only) at 
different points in time. Looking at Figure 4-1, the line representing the SSM 
1955 Survey reveals that the “lower” (“upper lower” and “lowest lower”) responses 
comprise a majority at 56.3%. This indicates that in the immediate postwar era 
(to the left of the figure) the distribution was definitely biased downward. A major 
upsurge in middle-class consciousness for the subsequent era of high-speed eco-
nomic growth (lasting until 1975) is reflected by the rightward shift in the shape 
of the graph (the arrows indicate the general nature of these changes). However, 
Figure 4-2 shows very little change in response distributions for the 35 years from 
1975 to 2010; the graph nearly perfectly coincides with the pattern of a normal 
distribution. In short, the visible form of social strata in Japanese eyes hardly 
in your view? (Kari ni Nihon shakai zentai o kono hyō ni aru itsutsu no sō ni wakeru 
to sureba anata gojishin wa dore ni hairu to omoi masu ka?)” while the Life of the 
People Survey asks, “From the general perspective of society, where do you think 
your standard of living fits in ? (Otaku no seikatsu teido wa seken ippan kara mite 
kono naka no dore ni hairu to omoi masu ka?)” Strictly speaking, the SSM Survey 
question is about status identification, while the one in the Life of the People 
Survey is about living standards. In addition, the SSM Survey seeks responses from 
five hierarchically asymmetrical categories—“upper,” “upper middle,” “lower mid-
dle,” “upper lower,” and “lowest-lower.” Meanwhile, the Life of the People Survey 
presents a straight five categories—“upper,” “upper middle,” “middle middle,” 
“lower middle,” and “lower.” Understandably, the ratio for the three middle catego-
ries tends to be higher in the latter survey, a result that provided the foundations 
for “90% of Japanese are middle class.”
 Status identification is a social attitude that, in Japan, takes in how Japanese 
understand the class structure of their society and where they position themselves 
within it. To examine the visible forms that social class takes among subjective 
actors by taking their pulse with this single measure helps with guiding people 
toward a basic understanding of industrial and class structures that are complex, 
subtle, and change ceaselessly. For that reason, this attitude has provided a refer-
ence axis for speaking about the nature of society from the end of World War II to 
the 1980s. For example, Satō Toshiki observed, “I have noted that non-specialists 
more readily recognize social trends in the distribution of class identifications than 
in the odds ratios for intergenerational mobility or the Yasuda index” (Satō 2009: 
736). He even gave his work Fubyōdō shakai Nihon (2000)—which dealt with class 
structure in its visceral forms—the subtitle, “Farewell to the mass middle class” 
(Sayonara sōchūryū). 2 Status identification research changes the debate about class 
into a more readily understandable one about what characterizes different eras 
(jidairon). In that light, quantitative social consciousness studies are compelled to 
investigate the role that this social attitude has played in Japanese society.
Curious Consequences
However, at present there is a considerable gap between the issues that scholars 
doing research at the cutting edge of the field take up and what the average person 
understands. I will begin by reviewing how this came to be.
 Based on the shift through the 1960s and 1970s that saw “lower” responses 
replaced by “middle” ones in the majority, scholars reported that status identifi-
cations were trending upward. “Middle” responses eventually comprised 70% of 
the whole in the SSM Survey and 90% in the Life of the People Survey. Given the 
size of the “middle” response ratios, observers came to speak of status identifica-
tion in shorthand as “middle-class consciousness” (chū-ishiki or chūryū ishiki); the 
rise in the number of respondents who had such consciousness was termed the 
“mass-middle-class phenomenon” (sōchūryū genshō, or sōchūryū-ka). The choice of 
nomenclature is itself indicative. Usually, when a common shorthand name gets 
assigned to a social attitude, the tendency is to use a term that is strongly positive 
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instead was that the changes had plateaued and the “middle” responses had in fact 
declined slightly. At the time, the sociological mainstream was awash with argu-
ments that held industrialization would continue to trend upward. Scholars still 
spoke in university lectures, for example, of the developmental process of post-
war Japanese society as a contemporary topic of interest. It is little wonder, then, 
that these findings were unanticipated. In the official survey report, Hara Junsuke 
would go on to describe this plateauing of the “middle” response as “‘middle class’ 
consciousness saturation” (Hara 1988).4
 This development that was so shocking for scholars of the day marks the start-
ing point for the discussion in this book. Figure 4-2 shows these later trends. The 
conclusion we might draw from referring to that graph is that the pattern of sta-
tus identification distributions remains the same at any point in time. However, 
in one respect that “reality” simply does not hang together. Despite the fact that 
people have spoken in volume and at length about changes in class patterns—toss-
ing around such phrases as “the shift from a mass-middle-class to an inequality 
society,” “the split into ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’” “lower-class society,” and “poverty 
society”—it has not been possible to track such changes over time. For that reason, 
what was once hailed as the latest trend in status identifications (Figure 4-2) and 
stands at the core of discussions today itself has become something that lacks vis-
ible form.
A Point of Debate Consigned to “Galapagos”
Allow me to mention something else here about status identification studies and 
the mass-middle-class phenomenon that may be unexpected. The fact is, the 
five-level status identification framework—and above all the ratio of “middle” 
responses it presents—is an indicator virtually unique to sociology in Japan. It is 
little used in other countries. Let us quickly review how that came to be.
 Almost immediately upon the end of World War II, the general public became 
interested in various terms with Marxist nuances such as “laborer,” “bourgeoisie,” 
and “capitalist.” Accordingly, surveys from the 1950s used such names for class 
and stratum categories as “proletariat” (rōdōsha kaikyū), “capitalist class” (shihonka 
kaikyū), “lower class” (karyū kaikyū), “lower middle range” (chūkansō no shita), 
and “quasi-bourgeoisie” (junchūsan kaikyū). The search for Japanese terms that 
captured the character of the various classes entailed a process of trial and error.
 That task continued in the same way as the public shifted its interest from the 
proletariat to the middle class. In the 1960s, two key figures behind class surveys 
of the time, Yasuda and Odaka, engaged in a debate over the precise meaning of 
“middle class.” The key point in contention was which term was the appropriate 
one to use for labeling the increasingly apparent group of people occupying the 
middle range. The possibilities included chūkan kaisō (literally, “intermediate stra-
tum”), chūsan kaikyū (the standard Japanese translation of the Marxism’s “bour-
geoisie”), and chūryū kaikyū (literally “class of the intermediate rank”), among 
other options. I will refrain from the details here,5 but the gist is that various words 
expressing social status got weeded out when theory came face to face with survey 
changed for a quite long period of time.
 Thinking back, I recall that the stratum studies scholars who carried out the 
SSM 1985 Survey were more than a little confused immediately after they had 
completed their descriptive data analysis. The distribution of responses in the 
most recent data they had collected did not match their forecasts (expectations) 
at all. The ratio of “middle” responses had gradually risen over the course of the 
three previous SSM Surveys, so they naturally had forecast that the ratio for 1985 
would be higher than that of 1975. Metaphorically speaking, they had set their net 
of comparisons between different points of time in the SSM Surveys to capture 
that particular fish. But when they actually pulled the net up, what they found 
Figure 4-1     Middle Response Trends during the Preriod of High-Speed 
Economic Growth
Figure 4-2    Middle Response Trends during the Period of Stable Economic Growth 
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from era to era. This reminds us again that the mass-middle-class question in Japan 
focused on characteristics associated with a particular era rather than with their 
status-relatedness.
The “Phony” Rise of the Mass Middle Class: The Case of the SSM Survey
The foregoing illustrates how tracking five-level status identification question 
responses and arguing about changes in their distribution as evidenced by the 
mass-middle-class phenomenon amounted to a sort of game that was popular to 
play only in Japan over the 1970s and 1980s. Still, the question remains as to why 
those trends in the distribution of responses so captured the public’s imagination 
at that time. How did those trends capture the atmosphere of those days? I will 
come back to this in the latter half of the chapter, relying on the dispassionate view 
that hindsight provides.
 Mori Naoto describes that train of thought that sees “mass middle class” as the 
key concept describing the state of Japanese society as “the mass-middle-class ide-
ology” (sōchūryū no shisō). He has speculated about the trajectory followed by this 
ideology as it took shape after the era of high-speed growth. In his view, the pre-
ponderance of “middle range” responses was due to the inquiry having reflected 
a normal distribution. He writes, “If consciousness of being ‘middle’ rose during 
the process of high-speed growth, then perhaps what we really need to be explain-
ing based on these historical trends is why it was so low in the 1950s” (Mori 2008: 
246). The post-1970s mass-middle-class phenomenon was an ideological one that 
surprised people because it assigned too much meaning to the operations of nor-
mal mechanisms that are not surprising in the first place. He saw that attention 
should have been directed precisely to the fact that there had been a preponder-
ance of “lower class” responses in the preceding postwar period.
 What, then, was the mechanism that caused the distribution of status identifi-
cation responses to change so dramatically between the immediate postwar period 
and the 1970s? Mori surmises that the usual mechanisms that would have kept 
“middle” responses in place as the mode value came to a halt due to the tempo-
rary drop in living standards produced by defeat and to the shock that the per-
sonal experience of that defeat generated. This caused the proportion of “lower” 
responses to fleetingly rise in the 1950s. Over the next two decades, the public’s 
inclination to offer “middle” responses gradually returned.
 The basis for Mori’s reasoning lies in the ratio of “middle” responses by reapon-
dents in the SSM 1955 Survey. Subjects had been asked to look back at which sta-
tus they identified with around 1935 or so and their sense of status identification 
after defeat. Mori points out that the “middle” ratio for the retrospective figures 
stood at 52.9% for 1935 and 41.6% for the immediate post-defeat period (1945). 
This he then paired with actual measured values of 42.6% for 1955 and 54.9% for 
1965. While this offers only a quasi-comparison between different points in time, 
we can still see that these trends produced a V-shaped trough with a 13.3-point dip 
in the middle of a 30-year period.
 However, what is hard to comprehend is the fact that “middle” response rates 
data. The terms that still survived by the 1970s became the five options (in the 
case of the SSM Survey) from which respondents made their self-identification 
choices—one “upper,” two “middle,” and two “lower.”
 The mass-middle-class phenomenon has its origins at this point, and this is the 
principal reason why the five-level status identification framework stepped into its 
central role in stratification studies. Repeating the same questions in class surveys 
has been seen as a critical prerequisite since the 1970s (even though problems may 
arise when it comes to continuity). Accordingly, this five-level framework for sta-
tus identifications is one of the few indicators that can facilitate analyses compar-
ing conditions at different points in time over the past half century. 
 To be clear, I do not mean to say that this indicator lacks real power. To the 
contrary, it has survived precisely because the way Japanese determined their own 
statuses has been based on an image of strata that is orderly to a certain degree 
that this framework grasped. That said, this framework was developed to provide 
materials for teasing out the contours of a particular point of debate—the mass 
middle class—in the context of Japanese society during the high-speed growth 
period. As a consequence, it would be difficult to find an international angle to the 
arguments and propositions developed based on this framework. In short, both 
the point being debated and the means for do so are consigned, as it were, to their 
own Galapagos.
 This raises the question of what kind of inquiries are used in other countries 
related to subjective social status and what issues are in play. To get ahead of myself, 
most questions may seem similar but they are based on slightly different premises. 
For example, the GSS Suevey in the U.S. has been asking about class identification 
for forty years by having respondents choose from among four categories: “upper 
class,” “middle class,” “working class,” or “lower class.” Note that the question 
here is not about “stratum” but rather “class.” Class refers to actual social groups; 
hence, what people are being asked about is their self-awareness of belonging to 
a particular group (their class identity). While it may seem similar at first glance, 
this is quite different from passively choosing from among the strata in Japan that 
researchers put into a given order. The fact that “working class”—a term that was 
weeded out from use in Japan—is still being used here speaks plainly to this fact.6
 In addition to differences in what is being analyzed, there are also major dif-
ferences in issues at play. As the sudden spikes in talk about topics like “mass-
middle-class society” and “inequality society” suggest, what interests the Japanese 
public about classes and strata fluctuates wildly from era to era. By contrast, in 
the West the flavor of the times does not color views of this subject in such an 
extreme fashion. This is because the awareness and self-consciousness of the people 
in those societies about being working, middle, or some other class is inseparably 
connected to other matters, including ethnicity, immigration issues, differences 
in religious denomination and sect, poverty, and community problems. Class is 
solidly entrenched at the grassroots level as a characteristic upon which social dif-
ferences are based. In short, the interest in class identity is not of a frivolous sort, 
quickly rising or subsiding depending on the times. For that reason, it is hard to 
imagine in the first place that proportions of the responses might change much 
The Trajectory of Indentification72 The Real Nature of the Mass-Middle-Class Phenomenon 73
and “karyū kaisō no ue no hō” (“toward the top of the lower-class stratum”). To 
wit, they incorporated questions that asked not about “middle” but rather “middle 
class,” and not “lower” but rather “lower class.” Furthermore, these options were 
presented in the Japanese right-to-left reading format based on vertical columns 
and used the Japanese “iroha” ordering system rather than numbers. This, it could 
remained low even in the SSM 1965 Survey. That survey was carried out the year 
after the Tokyo Olympics, an event that has been posited as a landmark indicating 
the end of the “postwar” period. Over the following decade, those rates jumped 
21.5 percentage points, from 54.9% to 76.4%. Normally, we might describe such 
a dramatic change in such a short period as a sign of “a flood into the mass middle 
class” (sōchūryūka), but in any case this trend cannot be explained solely as a conse-
quence of the effects of defeat.
 I myself view the notion that the pattern of status identifications changed when 
this era was reached with some skepticism (Kikkawa 2012). It is my belief that the 
phenomenon of a trend toward a mass middle class was created in the first place 
from something of a misreading of survey data. Allow me to sidetrack slightly from 
the Heisei-era trends that are my ultimate focus to use the benefits of hindsight to 
say something about the fragile clockwork of the Shōwa-period mass-middle-class 
phenomenon.
 In social survey research, all of the questionnaires on which interviewers write 
their subjects’ responses are themselves treated as source data and are seen as con-
taining genuine information. These forms are carefully preserved based on strict 
procedures for reference should there be concerns about the electronic data gener-
ated from them.7 I, however, do not completely subscribe to this doctrine of “orig-
inal-copy supremacy.” This is because I have noticed from the many times I myself 
have carried out face-to-face interviews that the object that provides the interface 
for communications between investigator and respondent is not the questionnaire 
itself but rather the groups of small cards showing response options that we call 
“show cards” (teiji-kādo).
 Show cards are a tool for visually conveying the options to the respondent, and 
the investigator will point to them as they read through the questionnaire. For 
that reason, even if the questionnaires that are the media for the investigator to 
transcribe information remain identical in format from survey to survey, if some 
aspect of the show card is changed then the identical question is not being asked. 
One would expect this to be a crucial point that researchers keep in mind when 
designing ongoing surveys, but it had been a blind spot in stratification studies 
in Japan. This fact tends to be overlooked, especially when it comes to using data 
from earlier surveys.
 In that light, I was somewhat surprised to discover that the designers of the 
SSM Surveys that established the contours of the mass-middle-class phenomenon 
had not paid attention to maintaining  continuity in the show cards for five-level 
status identification questions. Figure 4-3 presents the card used in the SSM 1955 
Survey; project leader Odaka has said (1967) that the same type of card was used 
for the 1965 Survey (Satō 2009; Kanbayashi 2010b). Figure 4-4 shows the card 
that has been used in stratification surveys from 1975 to the present.
 Just a glance is enough to show that the two show cards are configured quite dif-
ferently. The old style (1955/1965) card did not simply show possible answers like 
“lower middle” (chū no ge) or “upper low” (ge no jō) on their own. Rather, it supple-
mented them with explanatory phrases and readings of perhaps unfamiliar charac-
ters—chūryū kaisō no shita no hō (“toward the bottom of the middle class stratum”) 
Figure 4-3     Show Card for Five-Level Status Identification Used in the SSM 
1955 Survey
Figure 4-4     Show Card for Five-Level Status Identification Used in the SSM 
1975 Survey
Cited from SSM 1975 Survey Management Committee (1978).
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on the post-1975-type SSM status identification options. So that there would be 
no carry over effects, I pulled 10 of those questions out and configured them to 
be questions that used the 1955/1965-style language—i.e., offering a range of 
responses options running from “upper-class stratum” to “toward the bottom of 
the lower-class stratum” (the Japanese characters appeared without pronunciation 
guides)—and compared the response distributions (SSP Project 2013). The results 
have been graphed in Figure 4-6.
 The response trends show a statistically significant difference in the patterns 
of distribution for this style of question. As I expected, the ratio of “upper lower” 
responses was higher for those questions offering 1955/1965-style options with 
the word “class” (ryū) added in some fashion (25.76% and 30.23%).8 While this 
finding is not enough to completely explain the changes in distribution between 
be said, emphasized the non-hierarchical character of all the options. 
 On the other hand, today’s (post-1975) show card presents the options in a hor-
izontal, left-to-right format, and assigns them numbers in order from top to bot-
tom. In short, when the SSM Surveys were being pioneered, status identification 
had characteristics close to those of class categories, but since 1975 the emphasis 
in these stratification surveys has been on characteristics that allow placing it on a 
vertically-oriented ordinal scale.
 With this in mind, we notice something peculiar when we look at the mass-
middle-class phenomenon anew: the middle-range responses surged and “lower” 
ones plunged in the SSM Surveys between 1955 and 1975. As the bar graph in 
Figure 4-5 shows, changes in the first half of that period were characterized by 
a halving in “lowest” responses. In the second decade, “upper lower” responses 
halved and “upper middle” ones doubled. In terms of the data, the marked growth 
in the mass middle class actually occurred between 1965 and 1975. Meanwhile, a 
glance at the data from 1975 onward shows so little change in the distribution pat-
tern as to be nonexistent.
 It may be inferred that the following mechanism operated when respondents 
picked the category to which they belonged. First, from a procedural perspective, 
“middle” cannot be said to mean the same thing when it appears in a list of options 
arranged horizontally and tagged with the iroha notations as it does when they are 
arranged vertically and tagged 1 through 5. I cannot speak with absolute certainty 
about this since it is a matter related to cognitive psychology and hence outside 
my own field of research, but we cannot deny the possibility that the pattern of 
responses is more likely to be widely distributed when the options are presented 
horizontally instead of vertically. Doing so would probably increase the frequency 
of “lower” responses.
 More serious is the issue of changes to the text of the options themselves. The 
nuances when “karyū kaisō no ue no hō” is read aloud in Japanese are more than a 
little different than those we get from “ge no jō.” For example, reading the character 
for “lower” using the Wu dynasty Chinese-derived reading of “ge” somehow gives 
it a stronger negative connotation than it would have had if the Han Chinese-
derived one, “ka,” had been used. In fact, there are more compound terms includ-
ing this character that have the nuance of something humble or modest when it is 
read as “ge” than there are when it is read as “ka.”
 In that light, it is possible to imagine that the feelings of resistance toward 
the “lower” responses were slightly reduced in the SSM 1955 and 1965 Surveys. 
Supplementing the words in the options offered with parenthetical comments that 
expanded on their meaning may have been why those surveys had high “upper 
lower” response rates. Regarding the middle-range responses that are essential 
here, the supplemental gloss of “middle class stratum” conceivably could have 
brought a Western-style middle class readily to mind among respondents. They 
may have judged themselves as not yet being middle class as a result and hesitated 
to select the option.
 To at least partially verify this, in the most recent of these surveys (SSP-W 
2013 1st) I asked 2,822 adults of both genders questions with language based 
Figure 4-5     Response Distribution of Class identification in the SSM Survey
Figure 4-6     Distributions of Responses for 1955- and 1975- Style Language Options
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phenomenon may not have been the major change that observers have claimed. 
 Today, it is treated as an “historical fact” that even shows up in Japanese high 
school history textbooks. However, I am compelled to say that the magnitude of 
the growth in middle-class consciousness to some degree was—even if uninten-
tionally so—phony. As already noted, no overseas studies have reported any cases 
in which the distribution pattern of subjective social statuses changed as dramati-
cally as it did during Japan’s period of high-speed economic growth.10 If we also 
take as fact the likelihood that the continuity of the indicators showing this change 
fluctuated, then my observation is a conclusive one in every respect.
The Fiction and Reality of the Mass Middle Class
I want to stress that I am not completely rejecting the existence of a “one hundred-
million-strong middle class,” or attempting to make light of history. To the con-
trary, I am confident that Japanese during the 1970s and 1980s undeniably lived 
in an atmosphere in which they were singing their praises of the affluence they 
were experiencing and the sense that things were only getting better. However, we 
should consider again the possibility that it was not so inevitable that we would 
someday be talking about “one hundred million hearts aflutter” in connection 
with the distribution of responses to queries about status identification. As Sudo 
Naoki, whose views are similar to mine, puts it: “The important thing is not status 
identification distribution. Rather, it is whether the contours of what people con-
sidered to be ‘middle’ were clearly defined or not” (Sudo 2010: 185). 
 That granted, the question remains as to why empirical sociologists of the day 
1965 and 1975, it does leave open the possibility that the language used had 
some effect on response trends. Also, aside from differences in the text of response 
options, the possible effects of differences in horizontal vs. vertical orientation and 
in the use of the iroha system vs. numbering have yet to be examined.
 Regardless, the foregoing suggests we cannot completely deny the possibil-
ity that the mass-middle-class phenomenon that so stunned the public to some 
degree originated in a change in the distribution of responses to survey questions, 
and that this in turn was caused by an alteration to the format of the show cards. 
If this is the case, then the story behind the explosive growth in middle-class con-
sciousness—a phenomenon that has been regarded as distinctive to Japanese soci-
ety during the period of high-speed growth—is one that has been told based on 
somewhat exaggerated data.
The “Phony” Rise of the Mass Middle Class: The Case of the Life of the 
People Survey
Even if this is the case, how do we explain the increase in “middle” responses 
for almost the same time period in another ongoing polling project, the Life of 
the People Survey? In fact, we already know that there were a few fluctuations 
in the continuity of the questions essential to us here from 1958 through 1970 
(Kanbayashi 2010b). The chief concern is that there are blank spots for three years. 
There are several reasons for this. First, the question text currently in use—“your 
standard of living” (“otaku no seikatsu teido”)—had yet to be settled on during the 
early years of the survey. From 1958 to 1961 the survey inquired instead about 
“your living circumstances” (otaku no kurashimuki). The responses for these years 
are shown on the four bars standing apart on the left side of Figure 4-7. Second, no 
questions were asked about either “living standards” or “living circumstances” in 
1962 or 1963. Additionally, minor alterations continued to be made in language 
even after 1964 (see the six bars in the center of the graph). The centermost cat-
egory was changed from “middle” to “middle middle” and responses were limited 
to “head of household or similar” (setainushi nado) rather than all respondents.9 
A survey in which such changes have been made does not constitute one that was 
rigorously repeated. Continuity in the survey questions was not maintained until 
after the 1970s.
 These facts in mind, let us now examine the trends in the Life of the People 
Survey (Cabinet Office of Japan 2014). As Figure 4-7 shows, the period from 1960 
to 1964 when the most striking growth in middle-class consciousness occurred 
corresponds to the break in survey continuity. A period when 41.0% of responses 
to the “living circumstances” question were “middle” is followed immediately by 
one when 50.2% of responses to the “standard of living” question were “middle 
middle.”
 Taken together with my earlier discussion, it is plain that the growth in middle-
class consciousness in the 1960s and 1970s in both ongoing surveys overlapped 
with a period when each was changing the way it asked the relevant questions. 
Cross-checking these facts leads to the suspicion that the mass-middle-class 
Figure 4-7     Distribution of Class Identification in  the Life of the People Survey
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did not notice these simple inconsistencies in the data. Perhaps it was because they 
had already strongly prejudged what they would find before looking at the data; 
they were certain that the visible form of class that people embraced was changing 
to keep up with the times.
 The story of how the distribution of status identification as an opinion statistic 
shifted from “lower” to “middle” at first glance dovetails well with various aspects 
of the social changes that unfolded in postwar Japan. Such aspects include the 
decline in the number of agricultural workers and increase in that of salaried work-
ers; the fact that a growing segment of the population was able to get jobs that 
were more stable and better paying than those their parents’ generation had held; 
news reports about the greater competitiveness of Japanese industries and annual 
increases in the Gross National Product that came in conjunction with bigger 
paychecks for blue-collar workers; and the fact that the presence of people with 
diverse status attributes really did increase around society’s middle ranges.11 For 
that reason, as Mori (2008) has also indicated, it seems likely that Japanese of that 
era in general, and not just sociologists, projected the spirit of the times—one that 
mixed affluence, leveling, and equalization among the members of society—onto 
opinion statistics that were otherwise ordinary. If this is so, then the gap between 
the reality of social consciousness and the way people talked about it can be seen as 
an ideological phenomenon that speaks to the wild enthusiasm of the era.
 Finally, I want to touch on another caricature concerning status identifications. 
In the mid-2000s, the phrase “lower-class society” (karyū shakai) emerged seem-
ingly overnight and captured the public’s imagination. It was the product of a 
social analysis carried out and presented in a book with that very title by marketing 
analyst Miura Atsushi (Miura 2005). His argument, roughly speaking, was that 
the distribution of status identifications was starting to see “lower class” responses 
increase, coincident with the growth of an economically divided society during the 
administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō. Miura warned that Japanese 
needed to keep a careful watch on this newly emergent social group. 
 As is plain from a single glance, Miura’s claim that status identifications—whose 
configuration is not something any sociologist would expect to change after all 
these years—had begun to shift was little more than idle chatter. While the data do 
appear to show that a lower class was taking shape, viewed more rigorously from 
a quantitative social consciousness studies perspective we find no evidence other 
than the “data” that Miura himself obtained that shows a “lower-class society” is at 
hand (Kikkawa 2009).
 In short, Miura’s presentation was nothing more than a picture drawn on a 
lark—a degraded copy of the framework that had described the mass middle class 
with added embroidery. Stratification studies scholars have not taken it seriously 
and have dismissed the “lower class society” notion as something to be laughed 
off.12
 But the term quickly captured the public spotlight at that time and was on 
everyone’s lips. The general public was more attracted than they could imagine to 
a story that they seemed to already know. It seemed foreordained in the sense that 
with everyone already talking about a divided society, it must mean it is divided 
into winners and losers. What they wanted was a diagram they could understand 
of this mysterious “divided society” situation that economic liberalization had 
produced.
 The sudden spate of interest in the notion of a “lower-class society” that emerged 
after the so-called “Lost Decade” of economic doldrums, as well as the spate for 
“mass middle class” that came after the period of high-speed growth, both contain 
elements of some value. They represent analyses of society that were developed 
based on first getting an accurate read on the social mentality at a given point in 
time. However, both relied on superficial data to present patterns of distribution 
in status identifications. From the perspective of quantitative social consciousness 
studies, these are discussions of a dubious sort—like smoke rising from a place 
where there’s no fire. This is what makes these two fads homologous.
 The question we are faced with, then, is sorting out what the best way will be for 
us to examine changes in the trends of the times that have developed in Japanese 
society in the quarter century since the start of the Heisei period. This matter will 
be taken up in the next chapter.
NOTES
1 Other surveys such as the Japanese National Character Survey, the JGSS, and the 
various opinion surveys conducted by media organizations also repeatedly ask five-level 
status identification questions using almost equivalent queries and response options.
2 Fubyodō shakai Nihon is known for having pointed out the strength of inter-genera-
tional connections in occupational status, making it the first volley for the “unequal” or 
“divided” society discourse.
3 For a detailed recapitulation of the course of the chūryū debate, please see Sudo (2010) 
and Kanbayashi (2012).
4 These results show that the inflection point between eras came prior to 1975 more or 
less around the time of the oil shock (1973). Social survey data by nature tend to follow 
behind actual social realities; when we analyze it, we are verifying conditions a bit after 
the actual fact.
5 Kanbayashi (2010a) has laid out the details in his discussion of the matter.
6 Some comparative surveys conducted on a global scale use a 10-point status identi-
fication ladder (number line). Using numbers means the response categories can avoid 
having to rely on words; as a consequence, this approach is said to be the optimal one for 
comparing multiple cultures.
7 Taking the SSM 1965 Survey as an example, the questionnaires were converted into 
numeric data immediately after the poll was conducted. However, in 1981 the SSM 
Trends Analysis Study Group led by Tominaga discovered inadequacies in the numeric 
data and re-coded it using the survey questionnaires that had been saved. Satō Toshiki 
and Tsuburai Kaoru further re-recoded it around 1994, again using the questionnaires. 
On each occasion, the aggregate results for the SSM Survey were corrected and in effect 
the situation at the times they respectively depicted changed. The original questionnaire 
forms have been saved for a half century now, and I understand there are scholars who 
would like to code them yet another time. This shows just how much emphasis is placed 
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on survey questionnaires in their role as the original wellspring for the facts that govern 
the authenticity of quantitative findings.
8 The difference in response distributions is significant by the 1% level under the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
9 The ratio of men increases when responses are limited to “head of household or 
similar.” We know there is a greater tendency for men to identify with lower statuses 
than women (Sudo 2009). From this, it may be surmised that there were more “lower” 
responses until 1969.
10 Michael Hout has examined status identifications in the American GSS Survey across 
a 20-to-30 year timespan. He did not find any major changes in response distributions 
across different eras. The same state of affairs persisted, with around 90% of the valid 
responses indicating respondents who self-identified as either middle or working class 
(Hout 2008).
11 The gossip that purported these structural changes had produced the mass middle 
class (naive realist reflection assertion) was not supported by the data. Observers have 
repeatedly suggested that some more complicated mechanism is hiding somewhere 
(Naoi 1979; Seiyama 1990). The fact is, it was pointed out at a relatively early stage that 
the relationship between high-speed economic growth and the mass middle class con-
tains puzzles that defy explanation.
12 Karyū shakai was published in 2005, the same year another SSM Survey was con-
ducted. However, the format of response options was changed slightly in the SSM 2005 
Survey. This was due to a change from the face-to-face interview method for the status 
identification survey that had been used for 50 years running to a leaving-self-adminis-
trated method. As a consequence, scholars in quantitative social consciousness studies 
lost the opportunity to show the general public the results of their comparisons between 
points in time and encourage a correct understanding of them (Satō 2009).
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CHAPTER 5
From Mass-Middle-Class Society  
to Mass-Inequality Society
The phenomenon of a mass middle class—as to be expressed “one hundred mil-
lion hearts beating as one”—certainly existed in Japan. However, the middle-class 
consciousness (seen in the distribution of responses to questions about status iden-
tification) at its epicenter was not necessarily the appropriate indicator for exhib-
iting this social consciousness phenomenon. While the specifics of this may be 
somewhat complicated, this is the conclusion that we arrived at in the previous 
chapter. Accordingly, in this chapter I will change the yardstick I use for measuring 
social mentality as we observe how the character of the times changed from the 
1980s to the present.
Redefining Mass Middle Class
First, consider the mass middle class as an ideological phenomenon (i.e., false 
social consciousness). In the 1980s, many Japanese trying to catch a glimpse of 
themselves in the mirror set their eyes on the data coming out of opinion surveys. 
Underneath that interest lay their uncertainties about what the current form of a 
rapidly changing Japanese society was, paired with their desires to sort out where 
they fit into it. The result was that most people took society in its entirety as their 
reference group, one with a membership defined by the idea, “I am the same as 
other Japanese.” The spate of Nihonjinron-based theorizing that emerged at this 
time provides evidence that the overall image of an ostensibly ethnically homoge-
neous society possessing favorable unique characteristics served as the wellspring 
for Japanese identity.
 In such an atmosphere, once academic experts began talking about a “mass 
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 With that in mind, in this chapter I will shift the analytical focus of status iden-
tification from changes in form to changes in causality. By probing just how certain 
the ties are between objective and subjective status, I hope to explain the mecha-
nisms by which the social mentality shifted from the condition of a mass-middle-
class society to that of a mass-inequality society over the next quarter century.2
Enhancing Causal Explanatory Power
I will use for my analysis the men and women between 25 and 59 years old who 
were respondents in the SSM 1985 Survey and the SSP-I 2010 Survey. The method 
will be an OLS regression analysis, with the dependent variable being five-level sta-
tus identification. Setting gender (0 for males and 1 for females) and age as control 
variables, I will look at the influence (direct effects) that the independent vari-
ales of educational background (years of schooling), the logarithmic value of ho 
that the indepedent variables usehold income, and occupational category (using 
upper class white collar as the reference category, with lower class white collar, self-
employed, skilled blue collar, unskilled blue collar, farm worker, and unemployed 
as dummy variables [Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992]). These are the ingredients 
for the typical social consciousness studies-type regression model that will be used 
throughout most of the rest of this book.
 Table 5-1 shows the results of the analysis on five-level status identifications for 
1985, while Table 5-2 shows those for 2010 (hereafter, unless otherwise explicitly 
noted, all tables denote statistically significant figures with * at the level of 5%, 
and ** at the level of 1%). The first thing that catches the eye here is the fact that 
the coefficient of determination indicating the amount (as a percentage) of causal 
explanatory power of the entire model grew about 2.5 times over the quarter-
century (adjusted R 2 = .068→.173). Looking more closely at the nature of the 
changes based on the size and significance of the individual regression coefficients, 
the positive effect of household incomes indicating the wealth of household bud-
gets stands noticeably out (β = .210) in 1985. Adding in the slight positive effect 
of educational credentials, the effects of occupational status (i.e., an upper-class 
white-collar individual would have a status identification somewhat higher than 
that of a skilled blue-collar individual) shows this to be a comparatively simple 
causal structure.
 For 2010, on the other hand, the regression coefficients were all statistically sig-
nificant with regard to all of the independent variables. Comparing this to 1985, 
we can see that the effects of economic power remained at roughly the same level 
while those of educational attainment and category of occupation increased. This 
contributed to an increase of causal explanatory power.3 The fact that it became 
possible to comprehensively evaluate not only economic power but also educa-
tional attainment and occupational status suggests that people had become more 
conversant about and aware of a pluralistic class structure.
 Figure 5-1 illustrates this in modal form. We already saw in the last chapter the 
lack of change in the distribution pattern of status identifications itself between 
1985 and 2010, but the determining structure of those identifications changed 
middle class” it is not surprising that the populace developed the tendency to self-
assimilate in the direction of the standard value (correspondent with mode and 
median) that reference group presented. Accordingly, people who one might oth-
erwise expect to see themselves as “upper” or “lower” if they were to accurately 
assess their respective statuses on their own instead tended to suspend judgment 
and avowed they were in the “middle.” Even those who made a point of declaring 
that they belong to a category such as “upper middle” and or “upper lower” that 
stands slightly apart from the modal one (“lower middle”) may very well have 
made a judgment based not on an accurate status assessment but rather due to a 
mechanism skewed by the gravitational pull of “mass middle class.”
 From our standpoint, demonstrating each and every part of this past process 
would be unrealistic. However, at the time many researchers had already noticed 
that something had become a little odd about the state of the social mentality. 
This was clearly demonstrated by the fierce controversy that broke out over the 
mass-middle-class phenomenon focusing on the discrepancy between the objec-
tive stratification structure and the nature of subjective response.1
 Among those describing the trend toward the middle range as illusory was 
Kishimoto Shigenobu. He argued that for everyone to now claim that they were 
part of the “middle” did not mean a peaceful, rich, leveled, and equal society had 
come into being, and he warned that all the points being touted mixed both fact 
and fiction (Kishimoto 1978). The evidence came from various places: the fact 
that most of Japan’s middle strata lived in “rabbit hutch” apartments (the small 
residences situated in four- or five-story public housing projects) meant they were 
not comparable to the middle classes in North America or Europe, social dispari-
ties persisted unchanged in the postwar period, and inequalities remained deep-
rooted in intergenerational relationships and educational opportunities. In the 
period’s waning years, Imada Takatoshi would go on to label the controversy the 
“fantasy game of middle class” (chūryū no gensō gēmu). He opined: “It’s not the case 
that everyone imagined the middle class was real and then determined they, too, 
were in the ‘middle.’ . . . People understood from the start that it was a fantasy and 
knowingly played (or pretended to play) the game” (Imada 1989: 27).
 Based on the foregoing, we can redefine the mass middle class (in its guise as 
social mentality) as presenting a state of affairs in which it is difficult to specify 
why someone chooses (or does not choose) to describe themselves as being in 
the “middle.” Reframing a social mentality of such uncertainty into a form that 
would be opperationable through survey data analysis could ease this problem. 
Using the framework of quantitative social consciousness studies, we can employ 
a social consciousness studies-type regression model to examine whether the social 
mentality changes when our metaphorical adjusting screw somewhere in society is 
turned. We could then set our focus on the relationship between objective strati-
fication variables and subjective status identities. This would permit us to opera-
tionalize this otherwise difficult situation, turning it into one where the defining 
powers (causal explanatory power) that such stratification variables as an advanced 
education, a high occupational status, and economic power have on status identi-
fication are weak.
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Table 5-1    Determinants for Five-Level Status Identification in 1985
Table 5-2    Determinants for Five-Level Status Identification in 2010
Figure 5-1    Summary of Changes during 25 Years
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Mass inequality society in 2010
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quietly but considerably during those years. First, for 1985 the total amount of the 
variation of status identification unexplained by the stratification variables (resid-
ual variance in the regression formula) is large. Even if we subtract the fact that this 
includes a certain amount of variation among the respondents that is difficult to 
remove from social survey data (“the angels’ share”), the situation is still such that 
the mechanism by which respondents self-identified their status contained distor-
tions and errors (the unexplained portions) to a comparatively large degree. 
 On the other hand, the total amount of unexplained variation for 2010 was rel-
atively small. Once a researcher heard someone’s educational background, occupa-
tional status, and household income, they could now make a more definite guess 
about the stratum with which that individual self-identified.4
 Naturally, it is difficult to ascertain the characteristics of the social mentality 
from looking at the situation in 1985 in isolation. Only when viewed in com-
parison with the situation a quarter century later in 2010 does it become plainly 
evident that people in that era had no set criteria for self-identifying with one 
or another status. In short, the situation was we don’t really know on what basis 
people were identifying with the “middle”; that in itself can indeed be said to have 
been the actual form of that social mentality known as mass-middle-class society.
 Furthermore, this cross-time comparison also delineates the characteristic fea-
tures of the era defined by 2010. In addition to economic power, people expanded 
their view to also take in educational attainment and occupational status to get an 
accurate fix on their own statuses in industrial society. The plurality and accuracy 
of these status assessments is itself the outstanding feature of the social mentality 
of today’s mass-inequality society—a label I venture to assign because of the trend 
toward heightened knowledgeability and awareness of the hierarchy in statuses 
that presented itself among all respondents.
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .057 ** .156 .040 .088 **
Age (25–59) −.013 .000 .002 .002
Education (years) .127 ** .021 .008 .065 **
Household income (logged) .236 ** −.279 .027 .210 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .027 −.089 .056 −.039
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.006 −.062 .061 −.024
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.047 * −.110 .060 −.045
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.085 ** −.187 .058 −.083 **
Agricultural (VIIab) −.004 −.021 .080 −.006
Unemployed −.003  −.106 .066 −.044
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .071 ** Adj. R 2 .068 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 2590
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .057 .161 .041 .101 **
Age (25–59) .022 .005 .002 .064 **
Education (years) .279 ** .069 .011 .175 **
Household income (logged) .302 ** .198 .023 .218 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .032 −.218 .061 −.107 **
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.060 * −.342 .074 −.126 **
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.052 * −.235 .072 −.094 **
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.191 ** −.449 .067 −.204 **
Agricultural (VIIab) −.068 ** −.644 .161 −.098 **
Unemployed −.012  −.209 .064 −.104 **
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .178 ** Adj. R  2 .173 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1482
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The Quiet Transformation of Status Identification
Over the quarter century when the proportion of people self-identifying with the 
“middle” did not budge, it was already well-known that the relationship between 
stratification variables and status identification had strengthened. This proposi-
tion was referred to in academic circles as “the quiet transformation of status identi-
fication.” I first pointed out this transformation in an earlier work, where I drew on 
evidence from the period from 1975 to 1995 (Kikkawa 1999).5 Using the effects 
of economic power as the focal point, I interpreted that 1985—a year right on the 
eve of the bubble economy—stood at a transitional point where changes in objec-
tive stratification variables were becoming more strongly associated with subjec-
tive status identifications. I also demonstrated that the contemporary determinant 
structure—in which individuals are aware of which strata they fit into based on 
multiple factors, including economic power, occupational status, and educational 
attainment—had taken shape by the post-bubble year of 1995. In a later work, I 
showed that the causal explanatory power of this transformation has risen further 
since the start of the 2000s (Kikkawa 2006).
 This quiet transformation has gradually strengthened the causality between 
stratification variables and status identity. Researchers have subjected it to further 
examination, adjusting such factors as survey date, respondents, and the numbers 
and properties of the inputted variables. In all cases, they have confirmed similar 
transitions, based on as much as 40 years of data for Japan dating back to the 
1970s  (Kikkawa 2008; Kobayashi 2008; Sudo 2010; Kanbayashi 2010a,  2010b; 
Tanioka 2012; Kikkawa and Fujihara 2012).
 Figure 5-2 collectively shows the growth of the coefficients of determination 
reported on in those studies. Given the various constraints on time-series data 
Figure 5-2     The Quiet Transformation of Status Identification 
(Increase in Coefficients of Determination)
0.35 Kikkawa (2006) Male
Kikkawa (2006) Female
Kikkawa (2013) Male&Female
Kobayashi (2008) Male
Kanbayashi (2011) Male
Kikkawa and Fujihara (2012) Male
Kikkawa and Fujihara (2012) Female
R2
0.30
0.20
0.25
0.15
0.10
0
0.05
1975 1980 1990 19951985 2000 2003 2005 2010 (Year)
from Japanese social stratification surveys,6 it is difficult to use the same analytical 
model to make simple cross-time comparisons among multiple points in time. 
However, the results of various studies make manifest the fact that causal explana-
tory power has steadily improved as the years have gone by.
 This quiet transformation in status identifications from the era of the mass-
middle-class society to that of the mass-inequality society is perhaps not yet widely 
recognized either among the general public or in global social science circles. 
Nonetheless, the distribution of “middle” responses that in the previous chapter 
highlighted the weaknesses of rationales does allow us to see that there has been 
a definite change in the social mentality across eras. We need not rely only on 
our impressions to say that the mass-middle-class society has ended and a mass-
inequality society has arrived—it is a transformation that can be plotted on a 
graph and be shown to have definitely grown.
The Mechanism behind Era Change
We turn next to the question of what mechanism caused this quiet transformation 
to occur. Addressing an issue on the frontiers of research means we lack theories as 
yet that can offer decisive proof for one or another proposition. Nonetheless, with 
an adequate accumulation of descriptive facts, drawing inductive corollaries lies 
within the realm of possibility.7 Care must also be taken so that any explanations 
offered that rely on feelings do not duplicate the kinds of mistakes that were made 
with respect to the mass-middle-class phenomenon. These caveats in mind, I will 
lay out the series of findings and interpretations that scholars have offered to date.
 First, a number of measurable facts have already been identified about this quiet 
transformation. In my own research, I found that the fluctuations that emerged 
in the associative structure formed by educational attainment, occupational sta-
tus, and economic power—that is to say, in the social strata themselves—did not 
have sufficient influence to sway the determinant structure of status identifications 
(Kikkawa 1999). The quiet transformation thus was not something that induced 
changes in patterns on the “hardware” side of society, like a weakening in the 
cohesiveness among stratification variables or increased inconsistencies in status. 
Rather, it was a development in which the relation between objective and subjec-
tive status themselves became stronger as time went by.
 Second, the transformation did not emerge as a result of changes in the birth 
cohort. Analyses comparing survey results between two points in time focusing 
on the same cohorts clearly show the transformation was a product of people from 
the same cohort changing their perceptions of status between eras (Kikkawa 1999, 
2006; Kanbayashi 2010b).
 Based on this evidence, I am of the view that 1975 marked an era in which the 
causal explanatory power of status identification was scant; 1985 was one that 
had an aggregation of prescriptive factors for status identification oriented to the 
effects of economic power; and 1995 was one in which people used multiple stan-
dards for identifying their own status. The situation in 2010 that I present in this 
chapter shows that this latter era of multiple standards is not yet over; what’s more, 
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the connection between stratification variables and status identification has grown 
even stronger.
 A more recent study used GSS data to compare this cross-time change in Japan 
with trends over the same period in the U.S. As Table 5-3 shows, that work found 
that in Japan the status-relatedness of status identification increased over time 
(for example, among men R 2 = .187→.352), but in the U.S.—where status-relat-
edness was already higher than in Japan—there was almost no change at all (for 
example, among male R 2 = .574→.571) (Kikkawa and Fujihara 2012).
 To summarize the findings thus far, the quiet transformation was not the out-
come of some fluctuation in the stratification structure or a change of generations. 
Rather, it was a product of people having changed their ways of thinking as years 
went on. Furthermore, we have also seen that no such change occurred in the U.S., 
at least, during this same time period. These are the conditions we must bear in 
mind, then, as we consider next why people became more conversant—“literate,” 
as it were—about status identity.
 At present, the item of greatest interest is the effects produced by the slow-
down in social change over the period (an era change in the social structure). I’ve 
already noted that the associative structure of independent variables (stratification 
variables) did not transform much during this period. Now, I want to consider 
whether or not it was macro structural changes covering society in its entirety, 
as opposed to the associative structure of social attributes for individuals, that 
induced conditions that made it easy for people to overlook status positioning.
 During the era of the mass-middle-class society, an individual looking back at 
their youth and at their parents’ generation would see that there were huge differ-
ences in the standards of affluence. This was apparent whether they considered 
occupation, income and assets, or educational background. That state of affairs 
can be observed on Figure 5-3. I simplified the ways in which status is inherited 
there, depicting it with four arrows; they represent maintaining upper status, mov-
ing up, moving down, and stagnating in the lower status. In addition to the rise in 
their absolute standards for affluence compared to their parents’ generation, some 
people here are smiling especially broadly for they have been able to move from a 
Figure 5-3    Class Identification in the Era of Mass-Middle-Class Society
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lower to an upper status. They were known as the “new middle mass” (Murakami 
1984).
 In any case, the point we should note in this figure is that not only these “upward 
movers’” but even people who in comparative terms had stagnated in a lower status 
or moved downward, still had positive states of mind. The era was one in which 
few people saw their standards of living decline, since the standards of affluence 
had risen for everyone. Given the general feeling of well-being, it would have been 
difficult for someone to pay attention to the fact that their own position was drop-
ping in relative terms. Additionally, with the social structure in constant change 
it was also possible to feel optimistic about the future, i.e., “I may have not have 
caught the first boat, but sooner or later my own ship will come in.” People work-
ing in old-style independent businesses like small shopkeepers and so forth (the 
old middle class) in 1985 were likely grasping at straws of this ilk. 
 All told, in an era when affluence had dramatically expanded, figuring out 
where someone was situated in society relative to someone else was difficult to 
begin with; furthermore, people just didn’t think it was particularly important. We 
can therefore infer that many people blindly embraced positive images about the 
statuses they had achieved in vertical comparison with their own past selves (“I’m 
Figure 5-4    Class Identification in the Era of Mass-Inequality Society
Upper
Lower
Upper
Lower
1985 1995 2010 (year)
Japanese Male .187 .173 .352
Japanese Female .187 .226
1987 2000 2010 (year)
American Male .574 .639 .571
American Female .455 .518 .497
Note: The result of multigroup SEM by maximum likelihood estimation, cited  
from Kikkawa and Fujihara (2012).
Table 5-3     Coefficients of Determination (R 2 ) of Socioeconomic 
Status for Subjective Social Status (Multiple Indicator)
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able to lead a richer life now compared to what I could in the past”) rather than by 
making horizontal comparisons with their neighbors.
 The situation today, however, long after the end of the era of rising statuses, is 
one of leveling out. The gap has shrunk between the standards of affluence from 
when someone has set out on their life and those of where they have reached now. 
Those who are maintaining their upper status and those who are stagnating in the 
lower status are not experiencing many changes in their standards of living as the 
years go by. As Figure 5-4 suggests, it is difficult to determine if these individuals 
feel happy to have maintained their status, or if they see not having risen higher as 
a bad thing. Regardless, what can be said with certainty is that because living stan-
dards in society as whole remained almost entirely unchanged, it became possible 
for people to coolly ascertain their own status identities—i.e., determine where 
they fit into society—and it also became easier to figure out where others stood as 
well.
 That figure reflects the fact that standards of affluence have been improving 
in an absolute sense only for those individuals who are moving up to a higher 
strata, as their smiles suggest. People in the downward-moving strata, on the other 
hand, are shown to be unreservedly troubled because for the first time they are 
experiencing a decline in their living standards. Overall, we see two categories of 
people: one that is troubled, and just one that is smiling. In short, even if the way 
the four arrows intersect (the composition of inequality) for example were to go 
unchanged, when the standards of affluence for society as a whole remain largely 
the same the nature of peoples’ consciousness of strata or class will differ radically 
from that of the previous era. 
 Indeed, many phenomena today begin to make sense if we compare Figures 5-3 
and 5-4: the striking fact that people in lower strata judge themselves to be in a 
lower class, the fact that people are becoming more vocal with their worries about 
how their standard of living may drop if they cannot succeed in a divided society, 
and the fact that the observer gets a very strong sense that the compositions of the 
upper and lower strata are becoming set in stone or keeping others out.
 The foregoing interpretation is one I offered in 2009 in Gakureki bundan 
shakai. Sudo has made a similar observation: “People may find it difficult to get 
an accurate read on what is happening when society goes through intense changes, 
but as the situation calms down and society stabilizes doing so tends to become 
easier” (Sudo 2010: 200). Invoking Sudo, Kanbayashi adopted a similar position. 
“In a low-growth rate era, changes in a society’s economic and living standards 
slow down. Under such conditions, it is conceivable that as time passes people’s 
class standards become more defined, as they accumulate and share among them-
selves information about living standards and economic differences. Put another 
way, in a slow-growth era the more time that passes by the more ‘visible’ the real 
state of society becomes. For that reason, the correspondence relationship between 
status identification on the one hand and socioeconomic status and standards of 
living on the other is reflected by the actual situation; as a result, it is believed 
that the relationship between consciousness and objective socioeconomic vari-
ables becomes stronger (Kanbayashi 2011: 176).”8 The view we all share is that the 
plateau situation that had long prevailed has been replaced by one that has seen us 
gradually wake up to the image we have of classes and status today.
 This can be likened to a footrace in that when everyone is running full out, 
individual runners tend to have little interest in where they are within that group 
and are not really giving it much attention anyway. But when everybody stops 
and remains in place for a while, runners will start to look around to notice what’s 
different about everyone else and get a more specific sense of where they are in the 
pecking order.
 On the other hand, keep in mind also that status awareness remained consis-
tently high in U.S. society. There, people did not experience conditions like those 
Japan’s mass middle class faced, who scarcely had the chance to plant their feet on 
the ground, so to speak, due to the rapid pace of growth.
 The foregoing is largely hypothetical reasoning that will require further inves-
tigation. What I can say here is that this is a powerful approach for explaining 
the mechanisms of the quiet transformation that led from enthusiasm to diversi-
fication, and it does so in a form that is not inconsistent with the circumstantial 
evidence.
What Is the Era of the Mass-Inequality Society Like?
The changes involving status identification presented in this chapter provide sig-
nificant clues for helping us to understand what the era of the mass-middle-class 
society was like. They hint also at what that of the mass-inequality society con-
fronting us now will be like.
 Japanese frequently look back on the society of 1985 as one wreathed in bright-
ness and a feeling of security. However, stratification survey data do not provide 
any objective facts that would confirm differences had been leveled or inequalities 
eliminated to any considerable degree in the 1970s and 1980s. The communal 
image of having achieved a society that was affluent, leveled, and equal provides a 
view of what the social mentality was like through and through.
 The facts presented in this chapter that allow us to understand conditions during 
that era show that people of the time were quite interested in their status—mean-
ing the mass middle class—but lacked the necessary literacy for getting a clear read 
on its form. Regardless, given that so many Japanese were drawn strongly toward 
the society’s center, the way people approached status identification in the mass-
middle-class society of 1985 can be defined as a state of illusory leveling.
 On the other hand, people have been saying for nearly a decade that Japan has 
become an unequal or divided society. Studies focusing on class structure and 
microeconomics have not been able to obtain any definite evidence showing that 
society is becoming unequal or that the divides within it are growing. Research 
conducted near the turn of the century tell us there was talk that the Gini coef-
ficient representing income inequality was trending upward (Tachibanaki 1998) 
and that there was a growing tendency for the stratum of the white-collar class to 
be locked down (Satō 2000). These can be said to be harbingers of the discourse on 
social inequality. However, subsequent evidence to the contrary has upended both 
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of these claims completely.9 As to objective conditions of inequality from 1985 to 
the present, based on the SSM 2005 Survey the strong understanding currently is 
that the situation remains that of a plateau (Ishida and Miwa 2011). In short, the 
inequality society that has been subject of so much noisy discussion also seems to 
possess aspects of a transmutation in the social mentality; this phenomenon, too, 
is not accompanied by any objective changes in the stratification structure.
 The findings presented in this chapter on this point show the following: it is 
now possible for Japanese to surmise the status identity of one of their fellows with 
2.5 times greater certainty than a quarter century ago if they inquire about their 
household income, final level of education completed, and occupational status. 
Simply put, contemporary Japanese are more literate now about the complexly 
intertwined configurations that status boundaries—i.e., disparities—take; they 
can now get an unerring grasp of where each person fits in. The variations in sta-
tus identification that roughly correspond to those of a normal distribution have 
stabilized into an accumulation of mechanisms for making determinations coolly 
and without hesitation. The blind pull of centripetal force that once existed is no 
more. As a result, status identification within Japanese society in 2010 can now be 
said to be in a state of disillusioned inequality.
 The present era is one in which we who are alive today must remember that 
we—having aroused ourselves from the wild but temporary enthusiasms of 
growth—will have to continue to cope with conditions of inequality, and that 
their pattern cannot be changed to any considerable degree. Society is now one in 
which everyone has a grasp on the boundaries and vertical relationships between 
themselves and their fellows. It is one where those whose status is lower sense that 
is so, and those whose status is upper similarly are aware of it. This is an ideal soci-
ety in the sense that everyone understands it. However, living directly faced by 
inequalities is more difficult than living in an erstwhile mass-middle-class society. 
 While the mass-middle-class society may have been illusory, you could be 
happy in it. The mass-inequality society, in contrast, is one with less happiness 
because there are no illusions. Moreover, it is deadlocked, with conditions like the 
plateau period that are difficult to modify. Thinking of the situation this way gives 
rise to fleeting thoughts about which society is more desirable, but regardless, the 
only choice we Japanese today have is to coolly confront the conditions of our own 
society.
NOTES
1 Mori views the mass-middle-class phenomenon as a sort of “normalcy mechanism” 
that began to operate after Japan recovered from the shock of defeat (Mori 2008). 
However, I have found no other interpretations that see the mechanisms of normalcy 
operating in the social mentality of this era.
2 The issue of quantitative analyses examining the bivariate relationship between status 
identification and stratification variables was taken up repeatedly from the 1970s to the 
first half of the 1990s. Naoi Michiko carefully reviewed cross-tabulation tables to tease 
out the mechanisms by which an individual self-identified as “middle” when objective 
class conditions exceeded those of a certain standard, as well as those by which they 
self-identified as “upper” based on still higher standards. However, she was unable to dis-
cover the system by which people made precise strata assessments (Naoi 1979). Mamada 
Takao followed up on Naoi’s work with studies of his own, but he reached no definite 
conclusion in his analyses, either (Mamada 1990).
 Seiyama coined the term “naive realist reflection assertion” (soboku jitsuzai han’ei-ron) 
to describe approaches that attempt to unravel who self-identified as “middle” and why 
their numbers increased by using such simple measures as objective class and subjective 
response. He rejects the possibility of its subsistence (Seiyama 1990). Studies attempt-
ing to discover such simple rules are all certain to end in failure, which is why the mass-
middle-class phenomenon has frequently been deemed an insoluble puzzle.
3 This reading is not a matter of stating impressions, but rather is based on conclusions 
obtainable from other analyses (Kikkawa and Fujihara 2012).
 Furthermore, when gender differences have been input as a control variable across 
both points in time, a significant trend emerges in that women identify with higher 
statuses than men. Sudo (2009) has conducted a detailed investigation of this deeply 
interesting phenomenon of women identifying with higher statuses despite being in a 
minority position when it comes to power than men in their majority position do.
4 While it is not possible to say with certainty just how much of “the angels’ share” (the 
error variance in a social survey that cannot be eliminated) is included here, based on 
experience the nearly 18% explanatory power of the social consciousness studies-type 
regression model used to present the analytical results for 2010 is close to the upper lim-
its for quantitative social consciousness studies of Japan. The figures have been created 
with such substantial explanatory power in mind.
5 That evidence demonstrated that immediately after the period of high-speed eco-
nomic growth the causal explanatory power of the stratification variable with respect to 
status identification was even more tenuous than it was in 1985.
6 The ideal is to conduct surveys with exactly the same designs repeatedly on a regular 
basis. However, at some points in time the needed variables were not included, data on 
women was not collected, the survey modes were different, or the age groups surveyed 
shifted from year to year.
7 Given that the quiet transformation was the product of using a simple causal model to 
create a trend-oriented description about the realities of relationships among variables, 
the researcher needs to adopt a mathematical approach to develop an “explanation” of 
the scientific mechanisms present within. That may indeed be the natural tack to take, 
but the fact is even mathematically deductive theories do not have precision sufficient 
to “explain” the mechanisms of an actual society the way that, say, the laws of physics 
predict experimental results (Kōsaka 2000; Hamada 2012). Accordingly, we should see 
this field in its current state as one in which descriptions of current conditions and theo-
retical “explanations” mutually supplement one another.
8 Seiyama (1990) was the first to point out that the standards people use for evaluating 
their status change with the times.
9 For details, please see Kikkawa (2006).
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CHAPTER 6
The Quiet Retirement  
of Traditionalism–Modernism
Pondering the modernity of social consciousness was an omnipresent issue that 
distinguished the 20th century. Digging further into the significance of this leads 
one to realize that the focus in fact was on what it meant to be an individual as 
a constituent subject of democracy, or perhaps on the attitudes that people had 
toward it. Accordingly, the next task for us to tackle in this book is to think about 
the social mentality of democracy.
Modern Society and Traditionalism
Modernity is usually understood as the reverse of traditionalism. As a term that 
refers to the society from the era predating the modern one, traditional society 
supposes there is an “absolute zero” point somewhere in social change. In theory 
originating with Max Weber and other Western sociologists, its component ele-
ments include conventionalism, a sense of magic or enchantment, ceremonialism, 
a closed nature, formalism, and a stress on Gemeinschaft. These point to social con-
ditions that are consistent but irrational, at the opposite pole to modern industrial 
society and its pursuit of goal-oriented rationalism.
 However, it would be incorrect to say “traditional society” has only one pattern; 
moreover, no one has ever seen its “real” form in the first place. Traditionalism as 
conceived in sociology is quite simply an ideal type for suitably understanding the 
vectors present in contemporary society. The movement that produces distance 
from the “absolute zero” point as idealized therein is called modernization; the 
definition of a modern society is a society that lies along that vector.
 Accordingly, though it may be a slightly paradoxical way of putting it, the very 
What Happened to Orientation?98 The Quiet Retirement of Traditionalism–Modernism 99
authority (sadism), were an attempt to escape from the difficulties of facing up to 
a complex social environment with their autonomous selves not yet established. 
This, in sum, was the well-known mechanism of escape.
 Fromm’s study was superb for its thoroughgoing focus on the social conscious-
ness of the people who had supported Hitler and had not seen Nazism as some-
thing that could simply be attributed to his personal insanity. That Fromm had 
deduced from this the Janus face of modern freedoms with their positives and 
negatives was a major achievement, as was his exposure of the authoritarianism 
that lurks in the hearts of millions. The approach that Fromm developed provided 
a means for understanding much about Japanese militarism despite its different 
historical and social context. Indeed, the concept of authoritarianism was a key-
stone for postwar social consciousness studies (Kido 1970).
 The historical fact of fascism, which gave rise to authoritarianism research, 
already lies in the distant past. Nonetheless, the body of study it generated raises a 
number of issues for us to consider. First is that the concept of authoritarianism is 
not meant to be used for looking at pre-modernity. Rather, it is a superb modern 
thinking tool for addressing the strong yearnings for traditionalism embedded in 
20th century society.
 Second, the authoritarian attitude as a measurable operational variable has 
been refined to a considerable degree as a scale for social psychology. Research 
based on psychological measurements of authoritarian attitudes began with The 
Authoritarian Personality, produced by the a group of scholars at the University of 
California, Berkeley, that included social theorist Theodor W. Adorno (Adorno 
et al. 1950). This comprehensive, social sciences project undertaken in 1940s 
America showed that even certain clusters of ordinary citizens were easily attracted 
to antidemocratic propaganda.
 The authoritarian attitude scale widely used today is modeled after the psycho-
logical indicators developed through a vast amount of trial and error in this and 
subsequent studies. It measures the strength of the inclinations to be subservient 
to external authority that lurk in the hearts of many. The method entails asking 
numerous peripheral questions while avoiding direct references to, say, fascism 
or xenophobic exclusionism, or bluntly asking reseach participants if they self-
identify as authoritarian. The approach provides a means for avoiding bias that 
the socially desirable position of not seeing authoritarians as good people would 
otherwise engender. These studies succeeded in teasing out universal points of ref-
erence, unbiased toward one or another specific issue, to be found in the depths 
of the personalities of contemporary persons. Subsequent studies have measured 
authoritarian attitudes in Europe and East Asia among people of all ages and both 
genders using almost the same approach that was used in the U.S. This corpus of 
research confirmed that similar psychological operations are at work in any society.
 In both theory and substance, authoritarianism is now regarded as a basic social 
attitude that strongly affects a range of expressive social phenomena, from nation-
alism and ethnicity to the patriarchal system and political conservatism. Owing 
to its central position and general utility, the authoritarian attitude as a tool has 
become distanced from its initial purpose of elucidating the psychology of fascism. 
facts that traditional society explicitly figures as our absolute zero, and that tradi-
tionalism is incorporated within the system as an indispensable element, comprise 
an essential prerequisite for (first) modernity (Giddens 1991). For that reason, we 
regard the situation where people living in a given era do not refer to, or conform 
to tradition (which does not necessarily mean affirming its values), as the sign of 
the arrival of reflexive modernity that lies still further ahead.
 In social consciousness studies, investigating traditionalism–modernism has 
been a major area of interest from the start. The ongoing effort in the contem-
porary era to ascertain what happened to this reference axis demonstrates the 
arrival of that era that has been much spoken of in sociological theory, reflexive 
modernity.
What Is Authoritarianism?
Throughout the world, essentially the same yardstick for measuring attitudes is 
used when examining the traditionalism submerged in the social mentality of con-
temporary people. That yardstick is the authoritarian attitude. That being the case, 
let us examine here what makes authoritarianism appealing as a sociological con-
cept, and explore the role that this yardstick plays in social consciousness studies.
 The authoritarian character refers to a personality type that extols and attempts 
to submit to authority, while simultaneously asking that it, too, can be that self-
same authority and make others submit to it. The question of what kind of author-
ity is the object here deserves careful thought, but in any case in modern society it 
is traditional authority that is in mind. There are hardly any examples of authority 
with great power that has not been backed by tradition. The varied labels assigned 
to this concept have their origin here; they include authoritarian traditionalism, 
authoritarian conservatism, conventionalism, and even conventionality.
 The concept of authoritarianism was extracted from mass psychology theory to 
explain fascism as the greatest historical fact of the 20th century. Fromm saw the 
rise of the Nazis in the 1930s as coming out of a deeply submerged sadomasoch-
istic characteristic and psychological factor present among the German masses at 
the time (Fromm 1941). For a brief spell, the citizens of the Weimar Republic had 
obtained their freedom as modern individuals cut loose from primary ties (i.e., 
connections based on status or kinship). However, they also had economic liabili-
ties as citizens of one of the defeated countries of World War I. The modern indi-
vidual exists in a state where on the one hand they are free, and on the other they 
are without power, have lost their embedded affiliations, and are isolated. They 
also cannot escape from the need to continuously think introspectively about right 
and wrong when it comes to ethical norms, responsibility, and behavioral objec-
tives. That is what it means to be one of the citizens who make up a democratic 
society, and that in turn is why the freedoms of modernity (democracy) that had 
been achieved so suddenly were not received as stable or comforting. The Weimar 
Germans eventually threw away the freedoms they had won and rushed to sup-
port Nazism. Their uncritical acceptance of powerful external authority and sub-
mission to it (masochism), paired with fierce attacks on others grounded in that 
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and Personality clarified how such processes gave the vertical ordering of contem-
porary society uniform shape in both its hardware and software, and how the 
influences of these in turn played off one another. This finding is precisely the 
fundamental issue that social consciousness studies has investigated since Marx.
 Self-direction is a key concept in this study. It is used to indicate the true nature 
of the status-relatedness with respect to both independent (stratification variables) 
and dependent variables (social attitudes). The concept carries a general idea of 
being able (and in the right living environment) to make personal decisions about 
your living situation and actively choose how to orient yourself toward it. At the 
opposite pole here is conformity, which entails passively submitting to the norms 
that society dictates and repeatedly making the same stereotypical decisions.1
 Kohn and Schooler use the expression “self-directed orientation” for the refer-
ence axis of subjectivity that resonates with self-direction in working conditions. 
The concept pulls together those social attitudes (e.g., authoritarian attitude, 
feelings of alienation, self-esteem, anxiety, morality, and idea of conformity to a 
group) that have long been seen in sociological social psychology as having sta-
tus-relatedness. We can think of this as the essence of status-relatedness in social 
orientation.2 What they rediscovered to be the most potent indicator of how low 
someone’s tendency toward self-direction was—in short, their tendency toward 
conformity—was the authoritarian attitude scale that originated in the Berkeley 
group’s research. In keeping with Work and Personality, I will refer to this general 
concept below as authoritarian conservatism.
 Given that the essence of rank ordering in the workplace is based on authoritar-
ian human relationships, it is not difficult to imagine that authoritarian conser-
vatism bears a particularly clear correspondence relationship with social status. 
Meanwhile, as Hans Eyseneck (1954), Milton Rokeach (1960), and then Kohn 
and Schooler (1983) have pointed out, low levels of flexibility in ways of thinking 
and in cognitive ability produce authoritarian tendencies in individuals. This is 
also a major component of status-relatedness in self-direction.
 As I have already shown, early authoritarianism research saw an overabundance 
of conformity to authority among citizens as a pathological predisposition in mod-
ern society. The debate was framed from a perspective informed by ideas about 
the Enlightenment and its legacies, which is why “democratic”—representing the 
desired societal condition—was positioned with “authoritarian” as its polar oppo-
site. In scholarship since the 1950s, the negative implications of authoritarianism 
that held it to be equivalent to antidemocratic had lessened, but researchers still 
used the term with sociopolitical nuances that equated it to a rigid conservative 
tendency.
 What Work and Personality did was to drag the rediscovered self-direction con-
cept away from that opposing pole and put it front and center. The study swept 
aside the concept’s historical baggage and political aspects to emphasize only 
status-relatedness in social attitudes. It described the tendencies of people who 
lived in environments at society’s upper levels where they could design their own 
lives as “self-direction,” while the vague authoritarian tendencies among the peo-
ple who went along with social conditions as already molded were described as 
It now functions as an indicator for grasping the traditionalism in the social men-
tality that remains strongly rooted in modern society.
Self-Direction
A third characteristic of authoritarianism research that deserves mention is that 
while the traditionalism–modernism axis may be its primary subject, it has also 
regularly addressed social status-based differences in personality characteristics. 
Interest in the status aspects of authoritarianism originates with the historical fact 
that the strongest supporters of Nazism in German society during World War II 
were people such as small independent business owners who came from the urban 
lower-middle class (Fromm 1980). The stage upon which subsequent studies of 
mass society took place then moved to the U.S., where authoritarian leanings in 
the working class were a major focus of debate (Lipset 1959). As to contemporary 
Japanese society, scholars have noted a striking tendency toward authoritarianism 
among individuals who have completed only compulsory education (Naoi 1988; 
Kikkawa 1998; Todoroki 2000).
 There is one study that has focused on the status aspects to authoritarianism 
from the standpoint of stratification studies rather based on the previous inter-
est in fascism or traditionalism–modernism. That is Work and Personality (1983), 
a major survey data analysis-based study begun in the 1960s by two American 
scholars, Melvin Kohn, a sociologist of work and occupations, and his National 
Institutes of Health-based colleague Carmi Schooler. Also known in English-
speaking academic circles as the Kohn-Schooler study, in Japan it is usually tagged 
“the WP Study” (WP kenkyū) (Kikkawa ed. 2007, 2012). The book’s main subject 
was the causal cycle in social consciousness studies. This cycle is centered on the 
way a person’s place in industrial society forms and reshapes their personality in 
general, and the way that personality in turn controls their social life (refer back to 
Figure 2-1). However, Kohn and Schooler paid little attention to status identifica-
tion, the prototypical theoretical construct for this field. Their research interests 
focused completely on social orientations (intellectual flexibility and value prefer-
ence), i.e., the degree to which people positively and spontaneously address their 
living environments as they go about their lives.
 The members of a modern industrial society are quite deeply committed to voca-
tional lives; unquestionably, that fact forms the point of contact between individu-
als and the industrial sector. If an individual is put in an environment where they 
can make decisions in their vocational life and design their jobs to suit themselves 
as they deal with complex, constantly changing conditions, it will enable them to 
mentally prepare themselves to act spontaneously and flexibly. Conversely, when 
an individual is put into a job situation where the work is quite routine and the 
actions they take are performed passively under the direction of a superior, there 
will be a strong tendency for them to be in sympathy with external authorities and 
established procedures.
 Furthermore, differences in the social orientations of such individuals have 
repercussions in their approaches to how they work throughout their lives. Work 
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of trends at different points of time, I examined data from the SSM Surveys for 
1985 (face-to-face interviews in the home) and 2005 (leaving self-administered 
method) that allowed comparing authoritarian conservatism in male respon-
dents. Next, for supporting evidence of those trends, I crosschecked by looking 
at changes in authoritarian conservatism among women during these periods, 
changes in authoritarian conservatism among both adult men and women from 
1995 to 2010, and changes in attitudes toward gender-role segregation among 
women. Finally, I synthesized the results of previous studies to make arguments 
from a broad perspective about the trajectory that  traditionalism–modernism fol-
lowed over these years.
 In this book, I use authoritarian conservatism as a yardstick generated by per-
forming a principal component analysis on the responses to the following four 
yes-no questions. They constitute inquiries about authority, conservatism, con-
ventionalism, and the tendency to entrust; all were translated from the questions 
used in Work and Personality.5
• One should always show respect to those in authority (Ken’i no aru hitobito ni 
wa tsune ni kei’i o harawanakereba naranai)
• It’s wrong to do things differently from the way our forefathers did (Izen kara 
nasarete kita yarikata o mamoru koto ga saijō no kekka o umu)
• People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually just 
end up causing trouble (Dentō ya shūkan ni shitagatta yarikata ni gimon o motsu 
hito wa, kekkyoku wa mondai o hikiokosu koto ni naru)
• In this complicated world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on lead-
ers (Kono fukuzatsu na yononaka de nani o nasu beki ka shiru ichiban yoi hōhō wa, 
shidōsha ya senmonka ni tayoru koto de aru)
 Table 6-1 shows the results of the analysis for men using the 1985 data. It is 
important when it comes to the status-relatedness of the authoritarian attitude to 
know what the actual situation seemed to be—whether authoritarian inclinations 
were strong among people in all cases—before ascertaining which stratification 
variable contributes to their formation. If authoritarians are concentrated in a spe-
cific stratum of society, then regardless of what caused this it means there is a clus-
ter of people who can be easily mobilized by extreme social movements. In 1930s 
Germany, for example, due to multiple overlapping social factors the authoritar-
ian personality manifested itself chiefly among the lower middle classes (Fromm 
1980).
 Looking at this through the correlations (extent of apparent relationships) on 
the left side of Table 6-1, we see the coefficient between education and authoritar-
ian conservatism is strongly negative (r = −.317). For the correlation between an 
attribute and an attitude to exceed 0.300 in social survey data means that it is so 
clear people can readily perceive it in the real world. In Japanese society in 1985, 
it was quite easy to sense that people with low levels of educational attainment 
(people who had completed only compulsory education) were authoritarians.
 In fact, the following mechanisms are known to have been behind the strong 
“conformity.” Viewed this way, the fact that strata-based differences in the self-
direction orientation exist and reciprocally amplify one another does not inevita-
bly mean constructs like “the elite vs. the masses” will arise to obstruct the practice 
of democracy. To the contrary, it becomes possible to see this merely as a necessary 
“gradient” that helps to stably maintain the social order.3
 Thus, the concept of self-direction had an important mediating effect. It made 
it possible to take the reality discovered by 20th century authoritarianism research 
that traditionalism and status-relatedness overlap, chip away at that situation to 
find its more neutral implications, and then smoothly incorporate those in turn 
into contemporary quantitative social consciousness studies.
 The self-direction concept was introduced to Japanese stratification conscious-
ness research in the latter half of the 1970s. The process began with an interna-
tional comparative survey related to Work and Personality (research project leader; 
Naoi Atsushi) carried out in 1979 by the then-Department of Sociology in the 
University of Tokyo’s Faculty of Letters (Naoi 1987; Kikkawa ed. 2012). In tan-
dem with this project, the members of that department also instigated the SSM 
1985 Survey (research project leader: Naoi Atsushi) that provided the data for the 
first period addressed in this book. Using multiple approaches, these two surveys 
sought to shed light on the realities that Japan’s middle strata faced. They targeted 
using conceptual axes other than status identification to get a multi-dimensional 
schime of the social mentality of the society’s middle ranges. The expectation was 
that the questions authoritarian conservatism and the self-direction concept raised 
would remind specialists of the trends that had developed since the days of post-
war social consciousness studies, and provide exactly the tool needed to carve out 
a new dimension to stratification consciousness (in the broad sense). Since then, 
Japanese sociologists have deemed this social attitude as providing the most useful 
perspective for observing the status-relatedness of social consciousness in socio-
logical surveys done in the country (Kikkawa 1998).
The Trajectory of the Authoritarian Attitude
Employing the social consciousness studies-type regression model as I did in the 
previous chapter, here I have carried out a comparative analysis to see how the 
place of  traditionalism–modernism in society changed from 1985 to the pres-
ent. Given the limitations regarding the respondents chosen, survey methods, and 
question design in the poll data I used, I again will not be able to draw cross-time 
comparisons freely. For example, in the SSM 1985 Survey very few of the social 
attitude-related inquiries were directed to both men and women; unfortunately, 
only the men were asked about authoritarian conservatism.4 Even in the most 
recent data, there are no signs that adult men and women were asked the battery of 
questions concerning authoritarian conservatism using the highly precise method 
of face-to-face interviews in the home; instead, I was forced to use data collected 
from either mail-in or leaving self-administered surveys.
 In light of these circumstances, I decided to use the following procedure to 
observe cross-time changes in traditionalism–modernism. First, to get a sense 
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authoritarianism score if we know their age, educational attainment, occupation, 
and income. The status-relatedness in this situation can be said to be relatively 
high. Incidentally, among men and women at this same (1985) point in time, the 
coefficient of determination for status identification remained at adjusted R 2 = 
.068 (Table 5-1).
 Looking next at the (standardized) regression coefficients for individual causal 
effects, the deprivation effects that formal education has on authoritarian atti-
tude—i.e., authoritarian inclinations grow weaker the more years of schooling 
someone has—are striking (β = −.239). The direct effect of birth cohort is also 
apparent in the tendency for someone to be more authoritarian the older they 
are (β = .134). A close reading of the significant effects apparent with regard to 
occupational status shows that being a lower ranked white-collar individual or 
a farmer strengthens authoritarian inclinations compared to upper class white-
collar individuals (management and professionals), who constitute the reference 
category. While this agrees with the findings of Work and Personality, the influence 
of occupational status in Japan cannot be said to be as strong, relatively speaking.
 Table 6-2, on the other hand, shows that the situation in 2005 was quite differ-
ent. First, while the correlation shows that a slight education-related difference (r 
= −.159) remains, on the whole social attribute-based differences have attenuated. 
This greatly reduces the causal explanatory power of the model overall, and the 
coefficient of determination remains at just about 2.4% (adjusted R 2 = .024), or 
less than one-quarter of 1985 levels. Looking at the standardized regression coeffi-
cient for formative factors, the only thing that catch our eye is that the correlation 
between years of schooling and authoritarian attitudes materializes from a direct 
causal relationship (β = −.138).
connection between educational attainment and authoritarianism at the time. 
Among the birth cohorts (born between 1925 and 1960) being analyzed, there 
was a strong negative correlation between age and educational attainment. The 
effects of the rapid educational expansion after the war were such that the younger 
the person, the more likely they were a graduate of secondary or tertiary educa-
tion. As a result, differences in birth cohort (the earlier someone was born the 
stronger their traditionalist orientation) overlapped with the effects of educational 
background (the less schooling someone had the more authoritarian they were). 
Additionally, around 10% of the individuals in the prime of life who had com-
pleted only compulsory education were from a cohort (born between 1925 and 
1934) where the formal education they received before entering adulthood was 
the extremely militaristic one provided under the old primary education institu-
tions known as “national people’s schools” (kokumin gakkō). The seasoning that 
this education provided made authoritarian inclinations especially strong among 
the less educated persons who grew up before and during the war. On the other 
hand, the cohort of younger, college-educated persons raised after the war (e.g., 
individuals who were involved in the various campus conflicts) were quite strongly 
anti-authoritarian in orientation. Thus, a clear disparity had emerged in terms of 
educational background and age differences (Kikkawa and Todoroki 1996).
 Having verified this gradient in the authoritarian characteristic over these 
years, I want next to examine the results of a regression analysis to uncover the 
determinants of authoritarian conservatism. First, the coefficient of determina-
tion (adjusted R 2 = .113) shows that there is a causal explanatory power of 11.3% 
for authoritarian conservatism when the combination of independent variables 
is adjusted for. This allows us to guess with a predictive power of 10%+ a person’s 
Table 6-1    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 1985 (Male) Table 6-2    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 2005 (Male)
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .205 ** .015 .004 .134 **
Education (years) −.317 ** −.091 .016 −.239 **
Household income (logged) −.103 ** −.074 .062 −.045
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .001 .283 .117 .092 *
Self-employed (I + Vab) .028 .073 .107 .028
Skilled manual (V + VI) .035 .089 .112 .033
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .076 * .161 .115 .059
Agricultural (VIIab) .106 ** .366 .168 .080 *
Unemployed .017  −.124 .262 −.017
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .122 ** Adj. R 2 .113 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 834
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .045 .004 .004 .035
Education (years) −.159 ** −.059 .020 −.138 **
Household income (logged) −.049  −.087 .078 −.050
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.037 −.046 .137 −.014
Self-employed (I + Vab) .099 * .238 .137 .077
Skilled manual (V + VI) .074 .071 .125 .028
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.004 −.092 .131 −.034
Agricultural (VIIab) .006 −.018 .294 −.002
Unemployed −.033  −.329 .284 −.050
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .038 ** Adj. R 2 .024 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 649
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was that the less education someone had the greater their authoritarian attitude (β 
= −.164). Still, it was possible to see a trend largely similar to that revealed by the 
analyses of male subjects in the SSM 1985 Survey. 
 The result of the analysis for women in 2005 shown in Table 6-4, meanwhile, 
demonstrates that the causal explanatory power eventually declined to a consider-
able degree (adjusted R 2 = .025). Among the direct effects, what stands out is the 
fact that, if we add in the previously noted negative effects of education, we see 
that among the women of the present age (born between 1945 and 1980) it is the 
younger ones who are more authoritarian (β = −.168); at one time, of course, we 
would have seen an opposite tendency for new values to be replaced by old ones.
 The foregoing analysis confirms the weakening in the status-relatedness of 
authoritarian conservatism to be a trend shared by men and women alike. Just 
to be sure, I will review the changes to the results of the analyses for authoritarian 
conservatism between 1995 and 2010 generated by the social consciousness stud-
ies-type regression model.7 The 1995 data come from the SSM Survey (question-
naire B), while those for 2010 are from a national survey of almost the same scale 
(SSP-P 2010 Survey). The merit of these data sets is that their compositions allow 
for extracting the same principal component from samples that combine men and 
women. However, we should also be mindful of a methodological difference in 
that the former used face-to-face interviews conducted in the homes of subjects 
chosen by random sampling, while the latter was a mail-in survey sent to a master 
sample throughout the country (ages from 20 to 59).
 Tables 6-5 and 6-6 present the results of these analyses. The transient conditions 
that existed between 1985 and 2005 can be seen in the results for 1995 whether 
we look at the coefficient of determination (adjusted R 2 = .058) or the size of the 
 These two sets of results make it plain that the status-relatedness of authoritarian 
conservatism produced in the 1980s by the synergies between educational effects 
and birth, compounded by the effects of occupational status, had lost its shape in 
the mid-2000s. In short, it was no longer easy to see where the authoritarian indi-
viduals were in society, and what social forces had produced them. The mention I 
have made of sociologists losing track of the social mentality refers precisely to this 
situation.
 To be perfectly clear, this does not mean authoritarian conservatism no longer 
exists. True, findings from earlier research (Todoroki 2000) and opinion statistics 
have shown that authoritarian inclinations in society have been weakening. But 
the argument I am making here is based on a different aspect. Simply put, I believe 
that this social attitude variable has become ubiquitous in society, making it dif-
ficult to gauge.
 What about women? As I already mentioned, the nature of the data from the 
SSM 1985 Survey bars us from learning about authoritarian conservatism among 
women at that time. Accordingly, I will instead use the data on married women 
from the 1982 Work and Personality survey conducted in Japan (Naoi ed. 1989; 
Kikkawa ed. 2012)6 and on women in the SSM 2005 Survey (in both cases, 
women aged from 25 to 29) to make a visual comparison of the analytical results 
for authoritarian conservatism produced by the social consciousness studies-type 
regression model.
 Table 6-3 shows that for 1982 the causal explanatory power was approximately 
9% (adjusted R 2 = .089). The status-relatedness of authoritarian conservatism 
thus presents itself with relative clarity just as it did among men. Owing to the 
rather small sample size, the only thing significant about the regression coefficient 
Table 6-3    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 1982 (Married Female) Table 6-4    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 2005 (Female)
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .157 ** .008 .006 .078
Education (years) −.211 ** −.069 .027 −.164 *
Household income (logged) −.089  −.171 .092 −.098
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .123 * .263 .242 .126
Self-employed (I + Vab) .034 .212 .549 .021
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.139 ** −.494 .278 −.151
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .046 .025 .256 .010
Agricultural (VIIab) .135 ** .322 .286 .091
Unemployed −.132 ** −.085 .235 −.046
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .111 ** Adj. R 2 .089 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 376
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) −.095 * −.016 .004 −.168 **
Education (years) −.115 ** −.081 .026 −.150 **
Household income (logged) −.065  −.009 .071 −.006
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.053 −.166 .128 −.074
Self-employed (I + Vab) .018 .070 .181 .019
Skilled manual (V + VI) .045 .164 .209 .037
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .040 .041 .150 .016
Agricultural (VIIab) .019 .145 .367 .018
Unemployed −.007  −.053 .124 −.026
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .041 ** Adj. R 2 .025 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 559
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effects of individual stratification variables. In contrast, the most recent (2010) 
results show that—even accounting for the differences in survey methods—the 
causal explanatory power derived from the stratification variable has markedly 
weakened (adjusted R 2 = .016). The authoritarian inclinations among the younger 
generation discovered in the analysis of women from 2005 are now apparent in the 
2010 data for both men and women as a significant trend (β = −.071).
 The weak but nascent tendencies toward traditional values and increasing con-
servatism among the younger generation will require careful probing in the future. 
If the 20th century relationship between age and conservatism (the older someone 
is the more conservative or conventional they are) that family sociology, gender 
studies, political sociology, cultural studies, and ethnic studies see as self-evident 
is weakening in the 21st century, then traditionalism’s place in the Japanese social 
mentality must be seen as something that is truly decaying down to its roots.
Post-Modernization in Attitudes toward Gender-Role Segregation
To broadly gauge the course that the values conflict between traditionalism and 
modernism is taking, I want now to look at the trends in different eras regarding 
the attitudes in society toward gender-role segregation. This social attitude exists 
in an area where the family, work, and gender overlap; we can use it to measure the 
dimensions of the conflict between emphasizing the differences in the male-female 
roles or emphasizing their equality. Particular attention should be paid to the fact 
that the “traditional” view of family with gender-role segregation laid the founda-
tions for the existence of the modern family, that being the nuclear family com-
prising a salaried worker husband and a full-time housewife. This social attitude is 
a primary indicator for taking stock of traditionalism, which was embedded as an 
indispensable component of modern 20th century society.
 Two questions were used here to get a bead on gender-role attitudes. The first is 
a yes-no question regarding the opinion, “The man should work outside and the 
woman should maintain the household” (referred to below as the “inside-outside 
role” attitude). This is a social attitude that has had a major influence on family 
sociology in Japan; the very text of the question alludes to the matter of work/
life balance that is much-discussed in Japanese society at present. The other is a 
yes-no question that addresses a way of thinking: “Men play the central role and 
women play a supporting role” (referred to below as the “master-subordinate role” 
attitude). Today, in all parts of society the male-female relationship as a question of 
privilege vs. disadvantage is a topic of debate.
 Both questions have been asked in several surveys conducted since the SSM 
1985 study. Usually, four response options are offered: “agree,” “relatively agree,” 
“relatively disagree,” and disagree.” I will again use the same social consciousness 
studies-type regression model for the analysis, with women between 25 and 59 
as its subjects. Given the limitations in comparable data, I decided to look at the 
results of the SSM 1985 and 2005 Surveys with respect to inside-outside attitude, 
and the results of the SSM 1985 Survey and the SSP-I 2010 Survey with respect to 
master-subordinate one.8
Table 6-5    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 1995 (Male and Female)
Table 6-6    Determinants of Authoritarian Conservatism in 2010 (Male and Female)
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) −.007 −.048 .056 −.024
Age (25–59) .124 ** .009 .003 .082 **
Education (years) −.216 ** −.067 .013 −.151 **
Household income (logged) −.115 ** −.130 .045 −.077 **
Farmer (reference)
Professional −.078 ** −.035 .153 −.011
Exective −.063 * −.219 .182 −.043
Clerical −.079 ** −.074 .139 −.031
Sales .036 .111 .147 .036
Skilled manual .085 ** .094 .143 .034
Semi-skilled manual .047 .043 .148 .013
Non-skilled manual .058 * .196 .177 .039 *
Unemployed −.006  .002 .142 .001
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .065 ** Adj. R 2 .058 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1523
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .002 −.059 .064 −.030
Age (25–59) −.055 −.007 .003 −.071 *
Education (years) −.116 ** −.061 .015 −.125 **
Household income (logged) −.042  −.014 .043 −.009
Farmer (reference)
Professional −.004 .076 .124 .025
Exective −.069 * −.151 .154 −.035
Clerical −.012 .037 .111 .015
Sales −.012 −.007 .132 −.002
Skilled manual .011 −.001 .127 .000
Semi-skilled manual .044 .120 .147 .029
Non-skilled manual .056 .297 .167 .059 *
Unemployed .010  .063 .115 .026
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .026 ** Adj. R 2 .016 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1227
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 Looking first at the inside-outside attitude, the explanatory power of stratifica-
tion variables in 1985 as shown on Table 6-7 was comparatively high (adjusted 
R 2 = .070). Education and birth cohort-effects manifested themselves clearly; the 
better educated or younger the subject, the more likely they were against gender-
role segregation. Furthermore, there was also an occupational effect in that women 
having upper-class white-collar jobs (the reference category for analysis) tended 
to be strongly opposed to gender-role segregation. The fact that women’s stances 
toward gender-role segregation vary significantly based on the kind of jobs they 
do can be said to have a pertinent result in the form of how they think about such 
segregation. We can also see with respect to the overlap between education and 
birth-cohort effects that there are homologies with the authoritarian conservatism 
among male respondents in 1985 that was shown in Table 6-1.
 On the other hand, the results of my analysis on the SSM 2005 Survey as 
presented in Table 6-8 show the coefficient of determination dropping slightly 
(adjusted R 2 = .043). What’s surprising is that the education effect—previously 
a main determinant—has lost its significance. Moreover, taking its place is a ten-
dency for subjects to be more likely to have a positive (conservative) stance toward 
inside-outside role segregation the younger they were. This indicates that the pro-
gressive, reformist inclination among the younger and better-educated clusters 
that were once regarded as practically self-evident has disappeared.
 Turning next to determinants for the master-subordinate attitude, Tables 6-9 
and 6-10 permit a visual comparison of two points in time separated by a quar-
ter century. As expected, the coefficient of determination showing the strength 
of the stratum factors’ overall causal prescriptive force dropped by almost half 
(adjusted R 2 = .081→.038). Turning next to the effects these various social attri-
butes produce, the 1985 results show a tendency largely resembling the one seen 
with respect to attitudes toward inside-outside gender-role segregation (positive 
correlations for age, negative effects for educational attainment, and “non-elite” 
occupation effect). In contrast, the significant influence that occupational status 
and age had is gone from the 2010 results. Only an educational background effect 
can be found—to wit, the more advanced a subject’s education the more opposed 
they would be to master-subordinate role segregation.
 As many readers may know, Japanese society during these years saw moves 
aimed at changing what was socially desirable toward expanding women’s rights 
and rejecting male chauvinism. It is not difficult to imagine that this develop-
ment weakened the “gradient” that runs the master-subordinate attitude along the 
traditionalism–modernism axis. The fact that differences due to age or occupa-
tional status became less visible speaks precisely to this point. However, among less 
educated women the values about gender-based role segregation that assign men 
to a privileged position and women to a disadvantaged one remained as strongly 
rooted as ever, relatively speaking.
Table 6-7    Determinants of the “Inside-Outside Role” Attitude in 1985 (Female)
Table 6-8    Determinants of the “Inside-Outside Role” Attitude in 2005 (Female)
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .152 ** .008 .004 .071
Education (years) −.207 ** −.063 .021 −.126 **
Household income (logged) −.113 ** −.095 .053 −.059
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.089 ** .314 .158 .118 *
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.057 .076 .230 .013
Skilled manual (V + VI) .007 .389 .198 .090 *
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .000 .375 .169 .126 *
Agricultural (VIIab) .080 * .584 .210 .126 **
Unemployed .133 ** .630 .153 .272 **
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .079 ** Adj. R 2 .070 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 914
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) −.074 ** −.008 .003 −.087 **
Education (years) −.031 −.009 .016 −.018
Household income (logged) −.065  −.031 .045 −.021
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.052 .194 .084 .091 *
Self-employed (I + Vab) .003 .347 .121 .094 **
Skilled manual (V + VI) .026 .426 .142 .094 **
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.038 .217 .100 .082 *
Agricultural (VIIab) −.015 .223 .235 .028
Unemployed .178 ** .530 .082 .265 **
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .050 ** Adj. R 2 .043 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1243
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Disappearance of the Gradient of Social Mentality
In this chapter, I used the social consciousness studies-type regression model as 
a framework for comparing the past and the present. Specifically, I examined 
changes in how traditionalism–modernism is connected to the social structure 
within the limits that the data allow. Adding the results of Todoroki Makoto’s anal-
yses (Todoroki 2000, 2011) of the authoritarian attitude (conservatism) to Figure 
6-1, we get a picture of cross-time trends in these studies in the coefficient of deter-
mination of authoritarian conservatism and in attitudes toward gender-role seg-
regation. From this we can see that causal explanatory power has been trending 
steadily downward since the 1980s for any of the cross-time comparisons shown 
on the figure. Based on this stubborn fact and the changes in the direct effects of 
each independent variable, we can get the following reading on the trend over 
those years.
 First, in the 1980s the fact that a traditional orientation remained strongly pres-
ent in particular strata was clearly evident on the surface of society (as a zero-order 
correlation). However, neither the working conditions that Work and Personality 
stressed nor socioeconomic status (narrowly defined) in terms of household wealth 
gave status-relatedness to traditionalism (modernity) in Japanese society at this 
time. Rather, differences in birth cohort set against the context of rapid modern-
ization, overlapped by educational background, are what had a formative effect 
on social consciousness. Consequently, the sympathetic vibrations between birth-
cohort and education effects—linked with the educational meritocracy and the 
replacement of old industrial sectors with new ones—created a pattern that made 
it easy to determine at a glance which individuals (e.g., “young, well-educated, 
white-collar, employable, urban resident” or “prime of life, compulsory education, 
non-white-collar, rural resident”) had which form of social consciousness. The 
effects of these links among birth cohort, educational attainment, and occupational 
stratum produced the characteristics distinctive to the social mentality of Japanese 
from this period—status-relatedness with respect to traditionalism–modernism.
 Looking back, it is apparent that the self-direction concept derived from 20th 
century survey data had grasped the prototypical form of (simple) modern society. 
In that society, the  traditionalism–modernism axis functioned as the ingredient 
necessary for maintaining the status order. However, a close look at 1980 Japanese 
society shows that the status-relatedness there was not like that in U.S. society. 
Rather than occupation as the determinant, it was instead educational attainment 
(Kikkawa 1998).
 That said, when we compare this gradient in the social consciousness (formed 
by the correlation between birth cohort and education against the populariza-
tion of higher education as backdrop) with actual status-relatedness (predicated 
by the direct effects of occupational status and economic power), we can see it 
was on unreliable footing. The nature of this unreliability differs from that of the 
dubiousness of status identification we examined earlier. The dubiousness there 
was due to its reasoning, since the class-based differences that had been expected 
to be present could not be detected. In contrast, the status-relatedness visible in 
Table 6-9    Determinants of the “Master-Subordinate Role” Attitude in 1985 (Female)
Table 6-10    Determinants of the “Master-Subordinate Role” Attitude in 2005 (Female)
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .188 ** .007 .004 .067
Education (years) −.270 ** −.093 .019 −.194 **
Household income (logged) −.082 * −.034 .050 −.022
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.025 .474 .150 .187 **
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.016 .322 .218 .059
Skilled manual (V + VI) .054 .574 .189 .137 **
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .051 .495 .161 .174 **
Agricultural (VIIab) .093 ** .606 .200 .136 **
Unemployed .002  .465 .145 .211 **
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .091 ** Adj. R 2 .081 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 903
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Age (25–59) .061 .001 .003 .011
Education (years) −.205 ** −.092 .020 −.176 **
Household income (logged) −.097 ** −.050 .040 −.045
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.050 .029 .104 .014
Self-employed (I + Vab) .024 .111 .145 .032
Skilled manual (V + VI) .009 .062 .155 .016
Non-skilled manual (IVc) .062 .123 .126 .045
Agricultural (VIIab) .047 .383 .292 .047
Unemployed .041  .132 .103 .064
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .049 ** Adj. R 2 .038 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 828
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traditionalism–modernism stood on shaky legs due to the fact that a status-relat-
edness originally not expected to have been present in fact put in a pseudo-appear-
ance, emerging from the vestiges of social changes from the 1940s to the 1980s.
 Eventually, between the end of the Shōwa period in 1989 and the start of the 
21st century the composition of the social consciousness—based on the status-
relatedness in traditionalism–modernism that had developed as a result of these 
acrobatics—became amorphous. As this unfolded, the basic structure itself—one 
built on the birth cohort differences when it came to traditionalism–modern-
ism—had begun to weaken due to the departure of older generations from the 
scene and the slowly increasing conservatism of younger ones. On top of that, 
we should note well the fact that, as the popularization of higher education came 
to an end, the negative correlation between age and educational attainment dis-
solved. The overlap in education and birth-cohort effects could no longer be seen 
(Kikkawa 2006). The correspondent relationship between birth year, education, 
and stratification status was no longer so close, and it became difficult to gauge the 
gradient of social mentality—who is traditionalist.
 Once that happened, it became difficult to get even a simple sense of which 
strata supported which perspective; one could no longer state with certainty that 
one strata harbored many traditionalists and another modernists. Moreover, the 
shared understanding throughout society about the traditionalism–modernism 
axis became less certain.
 Traditionalism–modernism as a reference axis provided an indispensable “aux-
iliary line” for understanding all manner of social phenomena in 20th century 
Japanese society. It worked whether we looked at gender-role segregation (the 
entry of women into the workforce and the work-life balance question), the 
Liberal Democratic Party’s longtime rule in the political sphere (the 1955 System 
and its conservative-progressive standoff), or at participation in community and 
citizen movements. However, as I have shown here, thanks to social changes that 
had truly become a thing of the past at the turn of the 21st century, traditional-
ism–modernism became disconnected from the Japanese social structure and qui-
etly stepped away. The loss of this “auxiliary line” has turned the social mentality of 
contemporary Japan into a thing of chaos.
NOTES
1 Based on survey data from the 1950s, Kohn discovered that middle-class men tended 
to value the autonomous orientation while working-class men tended to set store in con-
forming to norms. He made it his objective to clarify the mechanisms that were at work. 
His empirical studies renewed research in using job titles as its basic unit to examine the 
differences in how each person dealt with the vocational lives, which he accomplished by 
using questions of his own design to measure job conditions (Kohn 1969).
2 Self-directed orientation is made measurable by using a secondary confirmatory fac-
tor analysis in the quantitation operation. Kohn and Schooler used this to derive a defi-
nition and significance for the self-directed orientation.
3 Some have criticized the use of the vertically oriented concept of self-direction to 
view the magnetic field of social consciousness, seeing it as excessively simplistic (Yoneda 
2007). Work and Personality focused on American society of the 1960s; the respondents 
whose life courses were actually tracked were gainfully employed white men who were 
born in the first half of the 20th century. In that respect, it got right at a basic construct 
that should be recognized as the prototype for 20th century industrial society. For that 
very reason, the argument it developed should also be seen as lucid and powerful.
4 Given that the SSM Surveys did not include women until 1975, for all intents and 
purposes it is not possible to analyze the social attitudes of both men and women until 
after the SSM 1995 Survey.
5 In terms of response options, a three-item method comprising “agree” (sansei), “nei-
ther agree nor disagree” (dochira to mo ienai), and “disagree” (hantai) was used in the 
SSM 1985 Survey. In the surveys of more recent years, however, a five-item Lickert-type 
scale is used, with responses comprising “agree” (sō omou), “modestly agree” (yaya sō 
omou), “neither agree nor disagree (dochira to mo ienai)” “modestly disagree” (amari sō 
omowanai), and “disagree” (sō omowanai). For that reason, while we know that the com-
parative possibilities are not complete, almost identical factor structures can be built if 
the measurement variables are assumed to have a normal distribution and the principal 
components are extracted.
 In this book, all the principal component score variables for authoritarian conserva-
tism were computed using this method. While the results of the principal component 
analyses differ slightly for each target set, in all cases the patterns they show are roughly 
the same as those in previous studies. Consequently, in this book I have foregone show-
ing the numerical values for factor loadings and affinities (Kikkawa 2008; Todoroki 
2000, 2008).
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6 The respondents were the spouses of men—in short, married women—chosen 
through random sampling, who lived in the seven prefectures of the Kantō region. For 
that reason, it must be kept in mind that the data is not fully reliable in terms of repre-
sentativeness and sample size.
7 Todoroki (2000, 2008) has already presented the results of comparative analyses of 
the status-relatedness aspect to authoritarian attitudes in 1985, 1995, and 2005. The 
analysis here was undertaken with reference to those findings.
8 The possibilities of performing a strict comparison between the results of the SSM 
2005 Survey and those from other points in time have not been secured because the 
responses to the 2005 survey were collected using the leaving self-administrative method 
rather than through interviews.
 Still, since there were few response options when it came to attitudes toward gender-
role segregation and they could be broken down into “yes” or “no” replies, I attempted 
both multinomial logistic and OLS regression analyses. Given that the trends in the ana-
lytical results were largely the same, I used those from the OLS regression analysis with 
its greater causal explanatory power.
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CHAPTER 7
The Doctrineless Age
The analysis in the previous chapters showed on the one hand how today’s Japanese 
are increasing their literacy about status identity, while on the other how the rela-
tionship between society’s mechanisms and the traditionalism–modernism axis is 
gradually growing more tenuous.
 Here, we now confront a single question: how are we to understand a state 
of affairs in which two changes that appear to be polar opposites are unfolding 
simultaneously? We will get to thinking about our ultimate conclusion later, but 
at the very least, it is reasonable to forecast that the era change in social conscious-
ness will not permit some simple understanding, such as the further increase in 
inequality or the growing (or declining) power of class.
 In this chapter, I would like to bring in some additional ingredients for under-
standing the contemporary social mentality. In the first half, I will investigate the 
orientation that has replaced  traditionalism–modernism in providing the back-
bone for social consciousness in contemporary Japan and see what doctrine it con-
stitutes. In the second half, I will outline the current state of the social mentality 
from a different angle—that of frequency of daily activities.
The “Misfire” of Equity Studies
From the latter part of the 1980s to around 2005, expectations were that “equity” 
would follow status identification and  traditionalism–modernism to become the 
third indicator of stratification consciousness. At the time, following the mass-
middle-class era (which people spoke about as implying wealth, homogeneity, and 
equality), it appeared this might be the decisive factor for deciphering the nature 
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mentioned earlier. Most people probably do not give much thought to whether 
the world is fair or not as they go about their lives, so they won’t have an answer 
readily at hand. The answer a respondent provides on their doorstep to questions 
about feelings of unfairness may comprise any number of elements. These may 
include not only some well thought-out value judgments about the desirability of 
certain social conditions (what the researcher would call justice), but also that per-
son’s concept of equality, conservative inclinations (in the sense of being positive 
about conditions as they are), and on occasion their sense of being dissatisfied (or 
satisfied) with or inconvenienced (or liberated) by contemporary society.
  Here, we might first suspect the inquiry about feelings of unfairness to be the 
archetype of a vague question, which should be avoided in a social survey.1 The 
researcher is anticipating an answer about justice. Even if this agenda setting is 
handled skillfully, the respondent will still wonder which question to answer: jus-
tice in their immediate space (an attitude toward themselves), in the conditions of 
local government, when it comes to opinions about the government’s redistribu-
tion policies, or in the international situation (all of these being attitudes toward 
the society and world around them). Responses will contain a mixture of micro 
and macro perspectives. Whatever the case, questions about the nature of fairness 
and justice will always remain a dilemma. Michael Sandel’s discussion of justice 
makes this clear. When we have to choose one of two paths to follow, we don’t 
go out of our way to opt for the just one as being absolutely desirable. Rather, we 
choose the better of two injustices (Sandel 2009). Of course, this does not mean 
the sense of unfairness has been swept away just because a more fair alternative was 
selected.
 Talk of the existence of unfair conditions is suitable material for a fiery delib-
eration. However, when we bring a difficult technical concept like “equity” into a 
survey’s line of sight, the text of the questions themselves will lack specifics when 
taking daily life into account and, moreover, they will include any number of 
ambiguous elements. In light of its potential for substandard explanatory power (a 
multitude of measurement errors), it cannot be denied that operationalizing the 
concept of equity presents difficulties.2 Still, in light of this recognition, we should 
consider the possibility that the analytical results repeatedly generated might actu-
ally reflect to some degree actual conditions in contemporary Japanese society. 
of the new era.
 The unequal distribution of resources and opportunities is intrinsic to the defi-
nition of social classes. Just how individuals assess this is a contentious issue that 
bridges both the objects and subjects of social stratification. “Equity,” on the other 
hand, is a term that also connects to such other terms as fairness and justice. It is 
regarded as a key concept for thinking about economic theory and policy when it 
comes to determining the direction in which democracy is headed.
 When thinking deductively like this on paper, the importance of examining 
the relationship between a sense of equity and social class can be acknowledged as 
largely self-evident (Umino 2000). However, survey data analysis has yet to pro-
duce any findings useful to social consciousness studies. The time spent on it thus 
far has been for nothing.
 The old standby yardsticks for equity are a general feeling of unfairness (i.e., 
“Generally speaking, do you think today’s world is unfair? [Ippanteki ni itte ima no 
yononaka wa kōheida to omoi masu ka?]”) and feelings of unfairness in certain areas 
(i.e., “Do you think there is unfairness in Japanese society today as a result of X ? 
[Ima no Nihon shakai ni wa X ni yoru fukōhei ga aru to omoi masu ka?]” where X is 
replaced by some social attribute like race, gender, ancestry, education, age, and so 
on). However, when attempts have been made to use them for survey data analysis, 
all that has been discovered among Japanese is the usual tinge of status-relatedness 
in the sense of equity or unfairness (Umino and Saitō 1990; Oda and Abe 2000; 
Saitō 2011).
 As a typical example, Table 7-1 presents a sampling of the results that Saitō 
Yuriko and Ōtsuki Shigemi obtained with a multiple indicator for feelings of 
unfairness using a social consciousness studies-type regression model (Saitō and 
Ōtsuki 2011). The figure shows the coefficient of determination remained largely 
in the two-to-four percent range for any point in time after 1985. Such results do 
not provide the necessary “horsepower” to argue that feelings of unfairness might 
transform if the adjusting screw in society I have spoken of before were turned the 
right amount. 
 I can conceive of two factors as having contributed to this research “misfire.” 
One may be termed the human agency explanation: the expected results could not 
be obtained because the indicator did not perform well when it came to measuring 
equity. The other might be termed the real situation explanation: the class-induced 
“gradient” in feelings of unfairness was not a strong one in the first place. I have 
spoken elsewhere before about this meager empirical reality behind the feeling of 
unfairness as “stratification consciousness based on unrealistic speculation,” and 
thought it a failure attributable to the scholars who designed and analyzed the 
questions asked (Kikkawa 2003). However, when confronted with the opacity 
now shrouding the whole of Japanese social consciousness, I came to believe that 
the “misfire” in studies of equity may well have been an omen of a sea change in the 
nature of contemporary Japanese social consciousness.
 Let us first do some soul-searching about problems in question design. First 
there is the issue of what exactly came to the respondent’s mind regarding “fair-
ness” and “unfairness” when they answered social survey questions of the sort I 
Table 7-1    Determinants of “Feeling of Unfairness” (Males in the SSM Surveys)
2005 1995 1985 (Year) 
Age −.107 *** −.119 *** −.027  
Years of education .092 * .104 ** .159 ***
Occupational prestige (present job) .090 * .027 −.032
Personal income −.119 *** −.010  −.055
Coefficient of determination (Adj. R 2)  .039  .031  .022
***: p < .005, **: p < .01,*: p < .05.
Result of OLS regression analysis; Figures represents standardized coefficients.
Extracted from Saitō and Ōtsuki (2011).
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produced valid findings. The five-item scale with responses ranging from “agree” 
to “disagree” was used.
• If opportunities are provided equally, then differences between poverty and 
wealth through competition are inevitable (Chansu ga byōdō ni ataerareru nara, 
kyōsō de hinpu no sa ga tsuite mo shikata nai) 
• Doing away with inequality is more important than protecting free competi-
tion (Kyōsō no jiyū o mamoru yori mo, kakusa o nakushite iku koto no hō ga taisetsu 
da) (−)
• I do not mind if inequality becomes more widespread in Japan in the future 
(Kongo, Nihon de wa kakusa ga hirogatte mo kamawanai)
• The inequalities in incomes in Japan today are too great (Ima no Nihon de wa 
shūnyū no kakusa ga ōkisugiru) (−)
(The “−” indicates an attitude with a negative load.)
 I have extracted a principal component score from these items to serve as our 
yardstick.3 An examination of how these questions work shows the points in con-
tention for each are free competition and where they stand on reducing inequality. 
Moreover, it should be evident that orientations that support the policy stances of 
neoliberalism were selected. For that reason, I label this the neoliberal perception of 
inequality.
 Table 7-2 displays the results of an analysis regarding these items using the 
social consciousness studies-type regression model. The coefficient of determina-
tion (adjusted R 2 = .110) shows considerable predictive power—three times that 
After all, it is largely impossible to predict based on social attributes who might or 
might not sense unfairness, which bears evidence to the fact that this social atti-
tude is ubiquitous and latent throughout society.
 To be able to describe a certain orientation as a doctrine—an “ism”—with the 
power to drive society, it should constitute a clear axis running through a conflict 
in values that represents a social fact everyone knows, and have a specific social 
stratum shown to be its supporters. Here, equity is not a concept positioned as an 
“ism” or a subject—it is, rather, nothing more than a feeling. Accordingly, when 
some person or organization (a politician or political party, say) makes the feeling 
of unfairness that people might have the focus of their appeals, the people are not 
likely to be set in motion even if the appeals were aimed at creating some sort of 
social reforms.
 The idea that equity might seem useful from a theoretical perspective despite 
not being tied to social mechanisms in the real world is still regarded as somewhat 
incomprehensible. However, taking in the broad social consciousness landscape, 
we similarly see numerous other instances of social attitudes that may be nothing 
more than a “sense” or “tendency” that do not function sociologically as a doctrine. 
Upon reflection, it is now possible to see that the research that led to the equity 
“misfire” was actually the earliest to grasp the fact that the contemporary Japanese 
social mentality was becoming opaque.
Perception of Inequality Driven by Personal Interest
At any rate, some studies have seen fit to move forward on the path suggested by 
the study of equity. One of the problematic aspects of equity studies was the diffi-
culty respondents had with understanding the abstract questions posed. Recalling 
the process discussed in Chapter 6 by which the authoritarian attitude scale was 
developed, the success there came from not directly asking respondents if they 
were “authoritarian.” That in mind, perhaps the social mentality could be explored 
using an approach in which the concept of equity is not directly mentioned. 
Research on “inequality perception” (kakusa-kan) (respondent’s understanding 
of divisions or inequalities in society) emerged from taking equity studies in this 
direction.
 After the Koizumi Administration (2001–2006), there was much discussion 
in the mass media about government policy relying on terms such as “expanding 
inequality,” “easing of regulations,” and “free competition” that quickly attracted 
public interest. The “game” of thinking about disparities became popular, and 
such perceptions of inequality became such a concern that they even steered poli-
tics. When this happened, the researcher could anticipate that any inquiry men-
tioning words related to inequality would be met with responses rooted in actual 
feelings. The fact that “inequality” had entered everyday language in such a major 
way cleared the way for a new social orientation to take the stage.
 The most recently designed SSP-I 2010 Survey inquired about the following 
four social attitudes. All related to inequality and competition, they were selected 
from among those taken up in earlier surveys going back as far as 15 years that 
Table 7-2    Determinants of “Neoliberal Perception of Inequality” in 2010
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) −.215 ** −.392 .054 −.195 **
Age (25–59) −.126 ** −.011 .003 −.111 **
Education (years) .217 ** .068 .014 .136 **
Household income (logged) .173 ** .133 .030 .116 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .021 −.001 .079 .000
Self-employed (I + Vab) .013 .001 .097 .000
Skilled manual (V + VI) .023 −.017 .092 −.005
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.090 ** −.159 .087 −.057
Agricultural (VIIab) −.050 −.390 .209 −.047
Unemployed −.107 ** −.086 .083 −.034
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .116 ** Adj. R 2 .110 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1494
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sontoku o hanarete shakai zentai no rieki o taisetsu ni subekida)
• I want to know in detail about the workings and events of the world around 
me (Watashi wa yononaka no shikumi ya dekigoto o kuwashiku shitte okitai)
 Just how strong is this prosocial nature among people in the different social 
strata? Table 7-3 presents the results of a social consciousness studies-type regres-
sion model analysis for the defining factors of prosocial nature. First, the coef-
ficient of determination is unexpectedly low (adjusted R 2 = .025). As was the 
case with feelings of unfairness, this result indicates that while it may be possible 
to make the dependent variable measurable, we cannot identify who in society 
has a highly prosocial nature. The fact that this prosocial nature is spread evenly 
throughout society is a favorable tendency for thinking about social movements.6 
But when it comes to the issues this book is interested in, we are forced to conclude 
that prosocial nature is a social attitude that is not tightly moored at any point to 
the social structure. It is thus not endowed with a sociological nature that lends 
itself to being described as a doctrine.
A Meltdown Caused by the Acceptance of Diversity
While this search for some new doctrine—some new “-ism”—in contemporary 
Japan may only create further confusion, the fact is there indeed is one social atti-
tude that has strong status-related characteristics. To get ideas about what kinds 
of inquiries to make in the World Values Survey, respondents to the SSP-I 2010 
Survey were asked for yes-no opinions about whether they approved of a society 
for feelings of unfairness.
 Looking first at the zero-order correlation, an affirmative inclination toward 
inequality is linked to being male, having a higher education, being young, hav-
ing a high household income, and being upper class white collar (the reference 
category). Of these, those characteristics not tied to occupational status—male, 
young, university educated, high household income—have positive direct effects 
(significant regression coefficients) on the neoliberal perception of inequality.
 The status-relatedness of inequality consciousness among contemporary 
Japanese can plainly be seen here. There is a strong tendency to favor the neolib-
eral perception of inequality among those positioned among society’s privileged 
“majority” (the “winners”), and to desire leveling through redistribution on the 
disadvantaged “minority” (the “losers”) side (Kikkawa 2011). This indicates that 
the social mentality of Japanese with respect to competition, distribution, and fair-
ness is built upon a calculation of gains and losses based on one’s own position in 
society.
 As should be immediately evident, this finding does not undercut what anyone 
might predict. The status-relatedness of inequality could even be described as a 
cornerstone of social consciousness. However, the nature of the “interested party” 
to be found here is some form of egoism; this is rather different from the kind of 
“auxiliary line”—i.e., a doctrine of some sort—that we hope to discover.
A Ubiquitous Prosocial Nature
This still leaves the question of which orientation to focus on to get a sense of 
what has become of the social mentality in contemporary Japan. I turn again to 
the same SSP-I 2010 Survey to examine another social attitude that may help us 
understand the social orientation of contemporary Japanese.
 Ever since the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (or “the Kobe earthquake,” as 
it is more commonly known abroad), there has been considerable interest among 
the Japanese public in promoting voluntarism and getting people to feel greater 
concern for others.4 Volunteer activities are supported by the ideal that everyone 
should familiarize themselves with those parts of society that tend to be over-
looked and be proactive in getting involved for the public good. Inaba Keishin has 
discussed this new trend in Japan in terms of altruism (Inaba 2008).
 That in mind, I have attempted to work this new current in the social men-
tality—the inclination to proactively engage and connect with society—into the 
quantitative social consciousness studies framework. I have extracted a principal 
component, from the following three items, and label the current itself “prosocial 
nature” (kōshakaisei).5
• I think more about what I want to do for society than what I want to get from 
it (Shakai kara nani ka shitemorau koto o kangaeru yori mo shakai no tame ni nani 
ka o shitai)
• We should get away from the gains and losses in own daily lives and place 
greater value on benefits to society as a whole (Jibun no hibi no kurashi no 
Table 7-3    Determinants of “Prosocial Nature” in 2010
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) −.073 ** −.126 .055 −.064 *
Age (25–59) .091 ** .011 .003 .108 **
Education (years) .107 ** .054 .014 .112 **
Household income (logged) .059 * .027 .030 .024
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.017 .005 .081 .002
Self-employed (I + Vab) .031 .057 .099 .017
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.031 −.064 .095 −.021
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.007 .026 .089 .009
Agricultural (VIIab) −.051 * −.461 .207 −.059 *
Unemployed −.017  .026 .085 .011
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .032 ** Adj. R 2 .025 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1509
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from the upper-class white-collar reference group; agricultural workers conversely 
are fairly conservative in their thinking. Economic power (household income), 
however, has no significant effects. In other words, the connection between social 
attributes and this social attitude is such that a person is more likely to be accept-
ing of diversity if they are young, female, college-educated, or have a non-elite job 
or are unemployed. This is an extremely interesting discovery.
 Unfortunately, however, this result does not provide the trump card needed 
for a breakthrough in social consciousness studies. This quickly becomes appar-
ent when some thought is given to what “acceptance of diversity” actually means. 
Having this social attitude means accepting a condition in which diverse family 
configurations, diverse modes of living, and diverse value systems are concurrently 
present. It implies rejecting the very notion of committing to the framework of 
value conflicts—e.g., male superiority vs. gender equality, traditional family vs. 
modern (nuclear) family, or conservative vs. progressive—that the society in its 
entirety shares. Such a way of thinking is frequently required for democracy in 
the contemporary age. However, it does not constitute the expression of opinions 
affirming the desirability of something singular; it does not amount to some doc-
trine we might tag “diversity-ism.” Accordingly, we cannot think that with this we 
have discovered a new cornerstone for the social mentality.
 Rather, the fact that there are certain social tendencies to the development of 
this acceptance of diversity paradigm merely indicates that a meltdown in the 
framework—one in which individuals positioned themselves on the spectrum of 
various doctrines—is progressing among the young, the female, the highly edu-
cated, and the workers in non-elite jobs.
 From the foregoing we can see that evidently there are limits on the attempt to 
discover foundational doctrines akin to those of the 20th century when it comes to 
contemporary Japan’s social mentality. At present, we seem to be facing an era with 
no overriding doctrines—one without “-isms.”
Searching for a Gradient in the Frequency of Daily Activities
While they may not have detected the arrival of this doctrineless age, since the 
1990s class survey studies in Japan have been measuring subjectivity using a 
method that differs from the psychology-derived approach for measuring attitudes 
to understand how people live their lives. This method entails asking respondents 
about the frequency of their participation in various activities in daily life. The 
response options are “frequently do” (yoku suru), “sometimes do” (tama ni suru), 
“do not do often” (amari shinai), “hardly ever do” (hotondo shinai), and “have 
never done” (shita koto ga nai). The approach uses the actual state of someone’s 
daily activities to make conjectures about social mentality as a latent preparatory 
mental state rather than for grasping the mentality as a subjectivity itself.
 Focusing on frequency of daily activities in Japanese class survey studies began 
with operationalizing Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. Eventually, the approach 
became an extension of quantitative social consciousness studies. Behind this 
development are Bourdieu’s ideas of cultural capital and cultural reproduction 
where people with diverse views coexisted, as well as whether or not they endorsed 
different forms of family. The three social-attitude items were as follows.
• Having a lot of people with different ways of thinking is desirable for a society 
(Chigatta kangaekata o motta hito ga takusan iru hō ga Shakai ni totte nozomashī)
• It is fine for two people of the same gender to love one another (Dōsei dōshi ga 
aishi atte mo yoi)
• It is not absolutely necessary to have children even if two people get married 
(Kekkon shite mo kanarazushimo kodomo o motsu hitsuyō wa nai)
 One principal component can be extracted from these that I will label “the 
acceptance of diversity.”7 Table 7-4 shows the results of my analysis examining the 
links between this social attitude and society. First, the coefficient of determina-
tion shows it has sufficient causal explanatory power (adjusted R 2 = .115). The 
correlation shows a considerable birth-cohort disparity—the younger the respon-
dent, the more accepting of diverse ways of thinking (r = −.270). Meanwhile, the 
regression coefficient shows this reflects the direct causal power of the respondent’s 
age (β = −.234). We can probably say this new orientation spread starting with the 
younger generations.
 Two other items deeply interesting as direct effects are the tendency for women 
to be more accepting of diverse ways of thinking than men, and the tendency for 
the acceptance of such diversity to rise with a respondent’s educational attainment 
(β = .145). With respect to occupational status, skilled blue-collar workers and 
the unemployed tend to be more accepting of diversity compared to respondents 
Table 7-4    Determinants of “Acceptance of Diversity” in 2010
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .170 ** .309 .054 .153 **
Age (25–59) −.270 ** −.024 .003 −.234 **
Education (years) .144 ** .072 .014 .145 **
Household income (logged) −.006  −.005 .030 −.004
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .087 ** .135 .079 .053
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.039 .104 .097 .030
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.014 .226 .092 .072 *
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.055 * .115 .087 .041
Agricultural (VIIab) −.090 ** −.414 .209 −.050 *
Unemployed .079 ** .209 .083 .083 *
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .121 ** Adj. R 2 .115 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1493
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(Bourdieu 1979). Cultural capital—distinct from economic capital—is based on 
the idea that society’s ordering of ranks is created not only by such hardware-related 
elements as occupational and economic status, but also a hierarchy of subjective, 
cultural factors. The concept suggests that sophisticated behaviors, interests, sen-
sibilities, and aesthetic tastes really function as a kind of software that indicates 
how high an individual’s status is and produces opportunities and benefits in that 
person’s life. For its part, cultural reproduction refers to how, due to the effects 
of cultural capital, subjective, cultural factors have hegemony as the framework 
that structures the ways formal education and occupational status are approached 
(Kikkawa 2006).
 Given that this entails examining the status-relatedness of culture, it plainly 
comes within the ambit of stratification consciousness research. However, cultural 
capital is concealed in daily life. Moreover, it possesses a hard-to-grasp-quality in 
that it has effectiveness to others to demonstrate its latent presence in the pertinent 
field. Habitus is the word distinctive to Bourdieu that expresses how cultural capi-
tal gets embodied in this fashion; that being the case, it is not something easy to 
operationalize through survey data analysis in the first place.
 Nonetheless, Bourdieu himself made an attempt at a quantitative study. His 
method for operationalization in turn was introduced to Japanese survey-based 
studies around 1990. The approach taken was to ask respondents about the fre-
quencies of their cultural activities—“Do you listen to classical music?” “Do you 
read history books or novels?” “Are there things that you practice?”—and examine 
what class differences that revealed. Ironically, the cultural capital theory for a time 
built a bridge connecting the long-alienated fields of stratification consciousness 
studies and sociology of culture. Meanwhile, another concept of capital—that of 
social capital, which involves the connections between the individual and society 
(e.g., social participation activities, organizational involvements, networks, and 
so forth)—was added to the roster of research topics related to frequency of daily 
activities (Putnam 2001).
 The talk that began of a society marked by inequality added still another topic 
for discussion. The focus of our approach here would be the status-relatedness of 
such economic activities as consumption, thriftiness, and saving. This is done not 
due to some complex theory; rather, it is because the causal cycle between objec-
tive and subjective has as its chief provision the self-evident relationship between 
economic power and economic activities. That is to say, it comprises a microeco-
nomic relationship in the narrow sense of an economically affluent person engag-
ing in qualitatively high acts of consumption. If that is our chief provision, then 
we can certainly see the status-relatedness. However, sociology is not interested in 
conclusive proof of such a self-evident causality based on economic power. Rather, 
what is crucial are differences in economic mode based on gender, age, educa-
tion, occupational status, and the like—in short, observing the modes of cultural 
consumption.
 I again turn to the SSP-I 2010 Survey, this time to look at status-relatedness in 
the frequency of cultural, social participation, and (cultural) consumption activi-
ties. The foci now are on “frequency of museum visits” and “frequency of library 
Table 7-5    Determinants of “Museum Visit” in 2010
Table 7-6    Determinants of “Library Visit” in 2010
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .100 ** .249 .051 .127 **
Age (25–59) .044  .011 .002 .110 **
Education (years) .316 ** .149 .013 .311 **
Household income (logged) .160 ** .090 .028 .081 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .085 ** .111 .075 .045  
Self-employed (I + Vab) .047 .162 .092 .049  
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.100 ** −.058 .088 −.019  
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.107 ** −.052 .082 −.019  
Agricultural (VIIab) −.083 * −.619 .192 −.080 **
Unemployed −.012  −.017 .079 −.007  
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .146 ** Adj. R 2 .140 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1516
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .179  .430 .060 .189 **
Age (25–59) −.095 ** −.004 .003 −.032  
Education (years) .295 ** .157 .015 .280 **
Household income (logged) .144 ** .117 .033 .090 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .078 ** .030 .088 .010  
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.057 * −.126 .107 −.033  
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.082 ** .000 .103 .000  
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.104 ** −.042 .096 −.014  
Agricultural (VIIab) −.085 ** −.626 .224 −.069 **
Unemployed .069 ** .118 .092 .041  
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .145 ** Adj. R 2 .139 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1512
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Table 7-8    Determinants of “Premium Product Purchasing” in 2010
Table 7-9    Determinants of “Participation in Volunteer/NPO” in 2010
Table 7-10    Determinants of “Foreign Travel” in 2010
Table 7-7    Determinants of “Voting in Election” in 2010
 
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) −.005  .049 .055 .024
Age (25–59) .221 ** .025 .003 .244 **
Education (years) .132 ** .076 .014 .152 **
Household income (logged) .108 ** .068 .030 .059 *
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) −.028  −.057 .081 −.022
Self-employed (I + Vab) .009 −.073 .099 −.021
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.058 * −.121 .095 −.038
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.015  −.016 .089 −.006
Agricultural (VIIab) .036  .108 .207 .013
Unemployed −.014  −.049 .085 −.019
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .084 ** Adj. R 2 .078 **
*: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1515
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .047  .076 .046 .044  
Age (25–59) −.205 ** −.014 .002 −.158 **
Education (years) .279 ** .077 .012 .179 **
Household income (logged) .193 ** .138 .025 .140 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .143 ** .100 .067 .045
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.001 .001 .082 .000
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.130 ** −.284 .079 −.104 **
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.126 * −.170 .073 −.071 *
Agricultural (VIIab) −.080 ** −.466 .171 −.067 **
Unemployed −.036  −.078 .070 −.036
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .147 ** Adj. R 2 .141 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01 n = 1512
 
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .018  .095 .054 .048  
Age (25–59) .105 ** .014 .003 .140 **
Education (years) .163 ** .071 .014 .147 **
Household income (logged) .098 ** .041 .030 .036
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .022  −.082 .080 −.033
Self-employed (I + Vab) .011 −.115 .098 −.034
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.061 * −.201 .093 −.065
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.070 ** −.217 .087 −.080 *
Agricultural (VIIab) −.027  −.391 .204 −.050  
Unemployed −.034  −.193 .084 −.078 *
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .055 ** Adj. R 2 .049 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1517
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) −.004  .034 .045 .020
Age (25–59) −.030 .003 .002 .030
Education (years) .359 ** .122 .011 .288 **
Household income (logged) .235 ** .139 .025 .142 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .057 ** −.064 .066 −.029
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.033 −.186 .080 −.063 *
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.102 ** −.234 .077 −.087 **
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.144 * −.238 .072 −.101 **
Agricultural (VIIab) −.059 ** −.486 .171 −.069 **
Unemployed −.017  −.076 .069 −.035
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .164 ** Adj. R 2 .159 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1514
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Figure 7-11     The Consummatory Nature of the Doctrineless 
Age (Summarized Result)
visits” for cultural activities; “frequency of voting in elections” and “experience of 
and frequency of participation in volunteer and non-profit organization (NPO) 
activities” for social participation activities; and “frequency of purchase of pre-
mium goods” and “experience and frequency of foreign travel”—an item that 
straddles both internationalism and upmarket consumption—for cultural con-
sumption activities.
 First, a glance at Tables 7-5 and 7-6 for the status-relatedness of cultural activities 
based on frequency of museum visits and library usage shows causal explanatory 
power for both is sufficiently high at around 14% (adjusted R 2 results of .140 and 
.139, respectively). On closer examination, the direct effects of a more advanced 
education are shown to be extremely strong, resulting in greater frequency in the 
usage of such institutions. Economic power and occupational status also influence 
cultural activities, but their effects are not nearly as great. Furthermore, regardless 
of these influences, women are more engaged in cultural activities.
 We turn next to Tables 7-7 and 7-8 for voting in national and local elections as 
well as experience and frequency of participation in volunteer and NPO activities 
(as 53.3% of respondents have no such experiences, the data shown in substance 
represent “experience and frequency”). From the size of the coefficients of deter-
mination, the causal explanatory power for these two behaviors is not as high as it 
is for other activities (adjusted R 2 results of .078 and .049, respectively). It is also 
evident that the more education a respondent had, the more likely they were to 
participate in such activities; the same was true the older a respondent was. Put 
another way, members of the younger generations or lower social strata who are 
frequently spoken of as the objects of policies and aid are not so assertive about 
getting involved with social participation activities.
 Looking at these results from the perspective of society in its entirety, a structure 
emerges marked by a contrast between university graduates in the prime of life 
who are active in society and non-university graduates in younger generation with 
low levels of activity. This is a new construct not seen in the 1980s, characterized 
by an inversion in the relationship between birth cohort and education effects.
 Finally, Tables 7-9 and 7-10 show the prescriptive structure of premium product 
purchasing and experience and frequency of foreign travel (including the 39.5% 
of respondents who had no such experience). The word “premium” is meant to 
connote an item that is of a higher grade than a “standard” or “normal” product. 
The strategy of using that word to differentiate customer bases is a new one in 
Japan that has become common over the past decade or so. The question of who 
today responds to this message that a product is not just average (“middle”) is 
deeply interesting not just from a cultural capital perspective, but also for strati-
fication consciousness research. When it comes to experience and frequency of 
foreign travel, economic power is also in play alongside whether someone has a 
cosmopolitan outlook or not.
 The causal explanatory power indicated by the social consciousness studies-type 
regression model for both is around 15% (adjusted R 2 figures of .141 and .159, 
respectively), showing that the social structure and consumption behavior are 
intimately connected. These results largely support our forecast that, in essence, 
individuals of higher status will be more active in their consumption in these cat-
egories while those from lower strata are less motivated to do so.
 However, examining the magnitude of influence that these factors have on each 
activity, having a household income that suggests considerable buying power is 
not necessarily the main factor involved (β = .140 and .142, respectively). Being 
young (β = −.158) or highly educated (β = .179) exhibited considerable predictive 
power on par with that of economic power when it came to purchasing premium 
products, while higher education (β = .288) did the same with respect to the expe-
rience and frequency of foreign travel. These results allow us to say that cultural 
consumption is not just a function of economic power; it is also a function of edu-
cational attainment (and birth cohort). That overlap is why the status-relatedness 
here is so clear.
The Consummatory Nature of the Doctrineless Age
In this chapter, I have thus far pursued my data analysis through two procedures: 
by searching for the new cornerstones of some doctrine—some “-ism”—that 
might be influencing contemporary Japanese society, and by attempting to discern 
status-relatedness in the frequency of daily activities. I now bring the results of 
these analyses together and present them systematically in Table 7-11.
 First, let’s consider the results of the search for some “-ism” as shown in the 
upper part of the table. The coefficient of determination is small when it comes 
to equity and prosocial nature. While it is possible for one or another social strata 
Coefficient of 
Determination 
(R 2) 
Educational 
Status
Occupational 
Status
Economic 
Status Age Gender
Equity 0.039 **
Prosocial nature 0.025 ++ + Male
Neoliberal perception  
of inequality 0.110 ++ ++ ** Male
Acceptance of diversity 0.115 ++ +  *** Female
Museum visit 0.140 +++ + + ++ Female
Library visit 0.139 +++ + + Female
Voting in election 0.078 ++ + +++
Participation in  
volunteer/NPO 0.049 ++ ++
Premium product purchasing 0.141 ++ ++ ++ **
Foeign travel 0.159 +++ +++ ++
Note: +++: Large positive effect, ++: Medium positive effect, +: Small positive effect, ***: Large negative 
effect, **: Medium negative effect, *: Small negative effect.
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to induce changes in these social attitudes to some degree if the right opportunity 
arises, the mechanism involved is not well understood. Furthermore, it is also not 
precisely clear as to who strongly favors these social attitudes. These are not atti-
tudes tied to the structure of society as would occur when  traditionalism–mod-
ernism abided—rather, they are freely floating orientations. For that reason, they 
cannot be seen as functioning as the doctrines we seek.
 The neoliberal perception of inequality for its part certainly appears to have 
linkages with society. However, those amount to an evaluation of gains and losses 
as the “interested party” (stake holder), which is based on the individual’s own 
status. It does not involve the mediation of some process whereby that individual 
refers to the criterion of some doctrine ubiquitous in society. To the contrary, we 
can see that the very fact that an individual’s perceptions of inequality comprise 
the accumulated results of their pursuits of unadulterated self-interest shows how 
doctrines have lost their influence.
 My analyses of the acceptance of diversity, meanwhile, make it clear that this 
way of thinking that accepts diverse value systems as concurrent realities is gradu-
ally beginning to spread, starting with the younger generations, women, and the 
highly educated. This, too, suggests a further meltdown in the very framework 
defined by accepting or rejecting one or another doctrine.
 To put this all together, we can conclude that the increasingly tenuous status-
relatedness of traditionalism–modernism has not been accompanied by people 
transferring to some other “-ism” as a reference axis. The end has come to the 
modern-society state of affairs that saw the whole of society pointed in the same 
direction and its members all relying on standard for how to orient themselves. We 
are now living in the “doctrineless” age.
 This is not to say that being in a doctrineless age means individuals are discon-
nected from society and behave in ways that are completely without rhyme or 
reason. The frequency of daily activities shown on the bottom part of the table 
indicates that the stratification variable has direct effects whether we are talking 
about cultural, social participation, or consumption activities. 
 This illustrates that people engage in behaviors that correspond to their respec-
tive positions regardless of intermediation by some doctrine. In contemporary 
sociology, this is what we define as a consummatory situation. To be consumma-
tory—“autotelic” or “self-absorbed” are other descriptives used—in this context 
means to simply act without goal or reason. This does not mean acting irresponsi-
bly or blindly. Rather, a consummatory activity is one largely constrained by where 
the individual’s place in society. This makes it a mechanism that can be explained 
sociologically. The “interested parties” of inequality that came up earlier can be 
properly understood as one aspect of this consummatory shift.
 Table 7-11 also offers a suggestion as to what might be important as prescriptive 
factors for social consciousness. Based on the results of analysis using the social 
consciousness studies-type regression model, we can say educational attainment—
followed by age and economic power—has had a steady influence on social orien-
tation. Educational attainment once held a nodal position. Its effects overlapped 
with those of birth cohort owing to the influence of the increased popularity of 
Table 7-12    Principal Component Analysis for Neoliberal Perception of Inequality
Table 7-13    Principal Component Analysis for Prosocial Nature
variable Communality Loadings
If opportunities are provided equally, then differences 
between poverty and wealth through competition are 
inevitable 
.410 .640
Doing away with inequality is more important than  
protecting free competition .590 −.768
I do not mind if inequality becomes more widespread in 
Japan in the future .546 .739
The inequalities in incomes in Japan today are too great (-) .315 −.561
Eigenvalue %
first component 1.861 46.515
second component .888 22.204
third component .688 17.192
forth component .564 14.089
Extraction: Principal Component. Cronback’s α = 0.606.
variable Communality Loadings
I think more about what I want to do  
for society than what I want to get from it .600 .774
We should get away from the gains and losses in our own 
daily lives and place greater value on benefits to society as a 
whole
.501 .708
I want to know in detail about the workings  
and events of the world around me .423 .650
Eigenvalue %
first component 1.524 50.796
second component .820 27.337
third component .656 21.868
Extraction: Principal Component. Cronback’s α = 0.512.
higher education. They also overlapped with other stratification variables owing to 
the influence of the education-based meritocracy. This is why educational effects 
provided the backbone in the 1980s for status-related differences along the  tra-
ditionalism–modernism axis. Educational attainment’s direct influence on social 
orientation—that is to say, the tendencies for the highly educated to be flexible, 
liberal, and proactive—has been a constant ever since. In contrast, while we can 
see that economic power has a certain degree of prescriptive influence over daily 
activities, as was the case in the 1980s the influence of occupational status is feeble 
at best. Thus, in contemporary Japanese society where it has become difficult to 
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Table 7-14    Principal Component Analysis for Acceptance of Diversity
variable Communality Loadings
Having a lot of people with different ways  
of thinking is desirable for a society .161 .401
It is fine for two people of the same gender  
to love one another .655 .809
It is not absolutely necessary to have children  
even if two people get married .674 .821
Eigenvalue %
Factor 1 1.489 49.628
Factor 2 .942 31.395
Factor 3 .569 18.977
Extraction: Principal Component. Cronback’s α = 0.483.
predict how someone might think or behave, the most useful question you could 
use to find out would be how much education (educational attainment) a person 
has (Kikkawa 2006, 2009).
 When it comes to birth cohort, the trend in social participation activities is the 
younger someone is the less likely they are to have a prosocial nature or be actively 
engaged. The gentle tendency among younger generations toward conservative 
revival is a factor here. The fact that there are cohort-based differences in social ori-
entation has been known since the era of rising industrialization. However, closer 
examination shows that the past construct of younger generations being liberal 
and active and middle-aged and older generations being guarded and conservative 
has almost completely disappeared in the past three decades. A reversal of orienta-
tions is emerging in its place. The continuity in the education effect and reversal in 
that of birth cohort are changing a construct defined by a clearness in the contrast 
between young university graduates and old non-university graduates. In some 
cases it is flipping the construct over to produce one characterized by a contrast 
between old university graduates and young non-university graduates.
 Finally, a look at gender differences shows that men tend to be more affirma-
tive when it comes to neoliberal perceptions of inequality and a prosocial nature, 
while women tend to be more affirmative when it comes to cultural activities and 
acceptance of diversity. While these points require further careful examination, it 
is possible to see that certain gender differences are emerging: men are attempting 
to grasp social conditions and be involved while remaining embedded in market 
principles, while women are acknowledging diversity and possess cultural wealth.
NOTES
1 Responses to vague questions are distinctive in that their covariance with social attri-
butes tends to become small.
2 Postwar social consciousness theory was outfitted with a thesis originating in Marx 
that served to largely immobilize it: “workers ought to identify with the working class.” 
Much time and effort was expended on the quest to find absolute proof for this hypoth-
esis. However, it eventually became evident that the class affiliations of Japanese were 
not in a clear objective-subjective correspondence relationship (Misumi 1990). This is 
another example of scholars not getting the results they expected because they imposed 
a theoretical concept on people, who do not usually think about the definition of words 
like “worker.”
 The lesson here is that if people do not palpably sense as a reality whatever phenom-
ena a theory may propose, then no matter how refined that theory may be it won’t gener-
ate research results that satisfy the standards of quantitative social consciousness studies. 
Work in this area should maintain a stance of deriving theories from induction and stay 
out of the deep furrows such prejudged theories lay (Kikkawa 2008).
3 Table 7-12 shows the results of the principal component analysis for neoliberal per-
ception of inequality.
4 Except for an extremely small group of respondents, this survey was conducted prior 
to the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami.
5 Table 7-13 shows the results of the principal component analysis for prosocial nature.
6 If I had to list statistically significant direct effects, I would note the tendency for 
respondents with higher education and respondents who are older to be more proac-
tively involved with society. With respect to gender, men tend to have a slightly more 
prosocial nature.
7 Table 7-14 shows the results of the principal component analysis for acceptance of 
diversity.
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CHAPTER 8
A Hidden Era-Change in  
Quality of Life Orientations
Having now collected the various fragments needed to identify the social mental-
ity of contemporary Japan, all that remains is to assemble the pieces of this puzzle 
to gain a more complete picture that will help drive our study of contemporary 
Japanese society. But to do so, we first require some sense of the overall image we 
are trying to piece together.
 With that in mind, in this chapter I would like to focus on one quantitative 
study of social consciousness actually undertaken as part of the arguments that 
make up this book.1 The various data analysis studies that have been carried out 
can be likened to boats sailing along the river of history. Selecting one of these 
boats to study the trails left in its wake can provide constructive hints as to the 
river’s course and how strongly it flows.
Attitudes to Health and the Environment in Contemporary Japan
The major issues in contemporary Japanese society arise from the interplay of 
improvements in personal quality of life and the sustainable development of soci-
ety. The May 2013 installment of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s “Better Life Index” counts environmental and health stan-
dards among its core components; it regards these variables among the most 
important indicators of the direction in which contemporary society is head-
ing (OECD 2013).2 There is an indivisible connection between environmental 
and health risks. Together, they represent a direct trade-off against such elements 
idealized by modern society such as economic development and convenience of 
lifestyles. This trade-off is exemplified by a succession of incidents such as the 
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 Moreover, by looking at the systems by which environmental initiatives (such 
as modern-day drives to recycle paper, plastic bottles, and aluminum cans; or to 
save water and electricity), as well as notions like “healthism” and “anti-aging,” 
have taken root and spread, we can also perceive aspects that differ from those of 
the existing frameworks. Aside from the novelty of such emergent phenomena, 
they can be interpreted as having arisen from changes in certain deeply submerged 
drives.
 Improving one’s quality of life is something that for people today has achieved 
the status of an unshakeable desire. In the past, the QOL orientation manifested 
itself in the active engagement among certain sectors of society in various types 
of activism and advocacy through one or another movement or activity. Today, 
it should be seen as a gentle gradient that runs throughout society, delineating 
who is the most strongly committed throughout day-to-day practices based on 
the idea of improved quality-of-life. At one time, how active people might be was 
strongly dictated by value systems and ideologies, but at present it may be sur-
mised that the influence of such factors has diminished. In fact, in recent years the 
term LOHAS—short for “lifestyles of health and sustainability”—has taken root 
as a way to describe a new mode of living that places a greater emphasis on health 
and the environment (Pedersen 2006). Given this concept’s focus on lifestyles as 
the name itself suggests, we can infer that it is not underpinned by some doctrine 
of health and sustainability.
 The foregoing suggests that the process by which quality-of-life improvements 
rapidly took hold in Japanese society was accompanied by the transformation in 
underlying drives, moving from “activity” that reflected the existing value system 
to “habitus” where the consummatory lifestyle is commonplace. In that light, 
using social survey data gathered specifically to facilitate a comparison of environ-
mental conservation awareness and health maintenance awareness between two 
points in time, in this chapter I will consider the underlying sociological factors 
that define these two social attitudes. Particular attention will be directed toward 
an era change in how the social consciousness operates. Factors identified else-
where in this book—including status identification, authoritarian attitude, and 
general life satisfaction—can be seen as the fundamentals of social consciousness 
for how they give direction to those opinions and standards for behavior apparent 
on society’s surface. Here, I will seek to use data to substantively ascertain these 
dynamics.
The Influence of Social Consciousness on the QOL Orientation
One of the earliest analyses of the positions that environmental conservation 
awareness and health maintenance awareness were claiming in modern Japanese 
society was a quantitative study I conducted (Kikkawa 1994).4 Employing data 
from a nationwide survey conducted in 1992 and using people’s psychologi-
cal attitudes toward health and the environment as yardsticks, it focused on the 
authoritarian attitude (meaning authoritarian traditionalism) as a factor that has 
no small influence on this pair of social attitudes.
widespread pollution that accompanied Japan’s years of rapid economic develop-
ment, or the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union. The societal shock-
wave felt throughout Japan and around the world in the aftermath of the disaster 
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station provided a fresh reminder of how 
directly and how gravely such issues can affect us.
 As I briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, a turning point for health and environ-
mental concerns in Japan can be found in the early 1990s—just a short while after 
the 1985 date chosen for the purposes of this book as a comparative historical 
reference point. As the bubble economy finally burst, steady economic growth in 
both name and substance also became a thing of the past. It was around this time 
that the shift from simple (first) modernity to a new phase began to make itself 
felt among the general population. In 1993 Japan passed the Basic Environment 
Law, a statute that has formed the basis of this country’s environmental policy 
ever since. This was the spur for now-commonplace conservation terms like “envi-
ronmentally friendly” (kankyō ni yasashī), “recycling” (risaikuru), and “ecological” 
(eko) to enter the popular lexicon. When it came to health, too, these years marked 
a crossroads. Vague expressions such as “obesity” (himan) and “adult diseases” 
(seijinbyō) gave way to more specific medical terminology like “visceral fat” (naizō 
shibō), “metabolic syndrome” (metaborikku shōkōgun), and “lifestyle diseases” 
(seikatsushūkanbyō), stirring fresh interest in health issues.
 In this chapter, I will present a comparative analysis of survey data from 1992 
and 2010 to trace changes in the awareness of environmental conservation and 
health maintenance among Japanese throughout this period. As it is used below, 
the term “environmental conservation awareness” reflects the new attitude of 
assigning greater precedence on protecting the environment than convenience 
and comfort. “Health maintenance awareness,” meanwhile, indicates a dawning 
attitude that looking after one’s health is important, regardless of the necessary 
investment in terms of time and money. In light of their shared quest for improved 
quality of life, I will refer to these social attitudes as the QOL orientation.3
 In and of itself, a Japanese lifestyle that seeks to take care of the environment and 
preserve mental and physical well-being is hardly a new thing. When it comes to 
conservation, we can go back to the Meiji era to see anti-pollution movements and 
protests against national land development that originated with the environmen-
tal disaster at the Ashio Copper Mine in Tochigi Prefecture. In this, we can find the 
historical roots of citizen movements during the modern era that were predicated 
on the ideals (ideology) of anti-establishmentarianism and anti-industrialism. 
Meanwhile, if health maintenance awareness is defined as the orderly habits and 
avoidance of unhealthy eating implicit in phrases like “eat ‘til you’re eight-tenths 
full” (hara hachibunme) and “early to bed, early to rise” (hayane hayaoki), then 
such tendencies can be traced back to the Edo-period teachings of Kaibara Ekken 
(1630–1714), author of Yōjōkun (“The book of life-nourishing principles”), and 
to the emphasis given to such practices in Japan’s prewar “moral education.” In a 
testament to the history of environmental conservation and health awareness in 
the country, such ideals have persisted and are written into the fabric of modern 
Japan’s value system.
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(Seikatsu kankyō kenkyū kai) (Umino ed. 2007); a comparison with East Asia by 
Zheng Yuejun and colleagues (Zheng, Yoshino and Murakami 2006); and sur-
veys in the fields of social epidemiology and public health, examining inequality 
and the connections between social status and health (Kawakami, Kobayashi, and 
Hashimoto, eds. 2006; Kondō 2010).
 Such studies often focus on status identification and general life satisfaction 
(psychological well-being) as indicators of the social consciousness that dictates 
activities related to quality of life. Both factors involve recognition or evaluation 
of one’s own lifestyle. They are differentiated by the manner in which status iden-
tification rests upon a determination of one’s standing in relation to the whole of 
society, whereas general life satisfaction is generated solely by internal psychologi-
cal mechanisms and does not involve going through such a reference process.
 Taking into account the limitations of the data I will be using,5 I would here 
like to consider firstly authoritarian attitude, which reflected twentieth century 
value systems; and, secondly, general life satisfaction, which is an outlook based 
on self-fulfillment, as those aspects of social consciousness that influence QOL 
orientation.6
 As we have seen so far, the social significance of authoritarian attitude has 
diminished over the last 20 years or so. Meanwhile, the fact that the more posi-
tive  mental states (e.g., general life satisfaction and self-esteem) have the effect of 
actively steering daily life in a prosocial direction has been attracting much atten-
tion in recent years (Seligman 2002). The relationship here is easy to grasp. The 
more subjectively satisfied an individual is, the more likely they will be to aspire 
to a higher quality of life. If a person is not fulfilled in their daily life, then it will 
be more difficult for the one to find the mental energy to devote to environmental 
conservation and health maintenance.
 Let’s examine the social basis for general life satisfaction, which is often taken as 
an overall indicator of subjective well-being. Tables 8-1 through 8-4 present analy-
ses of determinants of general life satisfaction from 1985 to 2010, based again on 
the social consciousness studies-type regression model (SSM 1985, 1995, 2005 
surveys and the SSP-I 2010 Survey, using figures on respondents of both sexes 
from the 25–to–59 age group).These tables show firstly that the causal explana-
tory power of the social attribute variable when it comes to general life satisfaction 
lies in the 5–8% range regardless of when the survey was conducted. In other 
words, these social attitudes are less strongly rooted in social structure than might 
be imagined. Secondly, aside from the trend towards higher general life satisfac-
tion among women and slight differences in the relationship between satisfaction 
and age,7 the primary factor at any point in time behind raising one’s level of satis-
faction appears to be household income. This tendency is well known in the field 
of economics. Here, Figure 8-2 graphs trends in the adjusted coefficient of deter-
mination. In contrast to how status identification strengthened status-relatedness 
and authoritarian attitude weakened status-retatedness, general life satisfaction 
remains loosely tied to the social structure mainly based on economic determin-
ism. The reason is the factors that shape well-being are generally of a sort that does 
not change significantly regardless of era.
 As stated earlier, the authoritarian attitude had once been a key indicator that 
took in the central twentieth century theme of the conflict between conventional 
(traditional) values and modern, liberal ones. My research showed that the influ-
ence that this attitude originally had on political conservatism and traditional 
behavioral patterns had begun to weaken in the Japanese society of the early 1990s, 
when the threat of fascism had receded and the stage of rapid industrialization lay 
in the past. However, it also revealed that authoritarian attitude still had influence 
when it came to the newly emerged social phenomena of environmental conserva-
tion and health maintenance.
 The structure of that linkage is nonetheless rather complex. First, the partial cor-
relation when controlled for various social attributes reveals a significant positive 
relationship (r = .168) between environmental conservation and health mainte-
nance awareness. Yet, while the authoritarian attitude showed negative correlation 
with environmental conservation awareness (r = −.132), it had a positive relation-
ship (r = .159) when it came to the health maintenance one (Figure 8-1).
 It may be inferred from the negative relationship between authoritarian attitude 
and environmental conservation awareness that the latter has a tendency to reject 
authority or tradition; rather, it is driven by an independent, liberal civic minded-
ness (self-directedness). Meanwhile, the picture presented by the positive correla-
tion between authoritarian attitude and health maintenance awareness could lead 
us to conclude that this health maintenance awareness is driven by a stoicism that 
favors strict observance of a rigid order. These facts portray conditions peculiar to 
the end of the twentieth century, an era that differed from the one in which the 
authoritarian attitude provided the psychological basis for the rise of fascism.
 Subsequent surveys have continued to shed light on the significance accorded 
within Japanese society to environmental conservation and health awareness. 
These have included research into the mechanisms behind waste recycling activities 
conducted by the Umino Michio-led Working Group on Life and Environment 
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Figure 8-1    Relationship among Three Attitudes in 1992 (Kikkawa 1994)
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Table 8-2    Determinants of General Life Satisfaction in 1995
 
Correlation  Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .122 ** .223 .061 .107 **
Age (25–59) .039 .000 .003 .002
Education (years) −.013 −.013 .014 −.027
Household income (logged) .181 ** .359 .046 .205 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .002 .068 .090 .025
Self-employed (I + Vab) .045 .142 .098 .044
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.023 .131 .096 .043
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.034 .090 .097 .030
Agricultural (VIIab) .019 .269 .152 .048
Unemployed .056 * .198 .093 .074 *
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .056 ** Adj. R 2 .050 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1577
Table 8-3    Determinants of General Life Satisfaction in 2005
Correlation Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .098 ** .234 .045 .112 **
Age (25–59) −.057 ** −.009 .002 −.082 **
Education (years) .105 ** .019 .011 .038
Household income (logged) .249 ** .431 .035 .249 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .022 −.072 .062 −.027
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.057 ** −.192 .076 −.054 *
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.031 −.011 .074 −.003
Non-skilled Manual (IVc) −.083 ** −.122 .070 −.042
Agricultural (VIIab) .005 .019 .151 .002
Unemployed .017  −.041 .070 −.015
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .880 ** Adj. R 2 .084 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 2693
Table 8-4    Determinants of General Life Satisfaction in 2010
Correlation  Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .022 .096 .056 .047
Age (25–59) −.075 ** −.007 .003 −.068 **
Education (years) .140 ** .029 .014 .056 *
Household income (logged) .235 ** .250 .031 .213 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .012 −.151 .083 −.058
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.012 −.094 .101 −.027
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.032 −.148 .097 −.046
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.070 ** −.165 .091 −.058
Agricultural (VIIab) −.053 * −.445 .212 −.054 *
Unemployed −.027  −.105 .087 −.041
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .073 ** Adj. R 2 .067 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 1517
Table 8-1    Determinants of General Life Satisfaction in 1985
Correlation  Coefficient Coefficient (standardized)
r Sig. B S.D. β Sig.
Gender (male = 0, female = 1) .150 ** .346 .047 .169 **
Age (25–59) .046 .004 .002 .042
Education (years) .036 .011 .009 .030
Household income (logged) .151 ** .212 .031 .139 **
Upper white (I + II), (reference)
Lower white (III) .023 −.068 .065 −.026
Self-employed (I + Vab) −.011 −.027 .071 −.009
Skilled manual (V + VI) −.053 ** −.101 .070 −.036
Non-skilled manual (IVc) −.077 ** −.191 .068 −.074 **
Agricultural (VIIab) .044 .127 .093 .031
Unemployed .053 ** −.077 .077 −.028
Coefficient of determination (R 2)  .056 ** Adj. R 2 .053 **
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01    n = 2621
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to five to include “neither agree nor disagree.” The data provided by these two 
surveys offers insights into how environmental conservation awareness and health 
maintenance awareness among contemporary Japanese changed over an 18-year 
period. Below, I will use the social consciousness studies-type regression model to 
analyze as dependent variables the latent concepts of environmental and health 
maintenance awareness that were extracted and measured in 1992 and 2010 based 
on the foregoing questions.
 The four questions presented in Chapter 6 regarding authoritarian attitude—
the fundamental social consciousness that explains these two concepts—were 
asked in both of these surveys. Consequently, I will use those results as a scale for 
measuring these latent concepts (all of the response options were presented in the 
5-item agree-disagree format). As to general life satisfaction, I will use the ques-
tions asked using the 5-item format about whether the respondens were satisfied 
or dissatisfied with their all-round lifestyle.
 Gender, age, educational attainment, occupation and income were entered as 
independent variables in an OLS regression analysis. We used a binary variable for 
gender here where 1 represented male and 2 female, full years for age, and num-
ber of years of formal education for educational attainment. Occupation was cat-
egorized using five dummy variables relating to employment status and position 
within an organization: “manager or executive,” “regular employee,” “non-regular 
employee,” “self-employed,” and “unemployed,” with “management” used as the 
reference category. We used yearly household income for “income.”
Comparative Survey Data from 18 Years Later
The following analysis is based on two nationwide mail surveys conducted in 1992 
and 2010 by identical research organizations and designed to permit comparisons 
between different points of time (Table 8-5). My analysis here will focus on the 
26–60 age group in common to both surveys.
 The 1992 data are from the Second Monitor Survey, which I have already ana-
lyzed elsewhere (Kikkawa 1994). The poll was one of the first of its kind to include 
questions about environmental conservation and health maintenance. The ques-
tions were designed to present a trade-off against convenience and comfort when 
it comes to environmental conservation. Among the statements to which subjects 
were invited to respond were: “I don’t mind sacrificing convenience and comfort 
in order to conserve energy resources (Enerugī shigen hogo no tame nara benrisa ya 
kaitekisa o gisei ni shite mo kamawanai),” “I don’t mind sacrificing convenience and 
comfort to prevent global warming and the depletion of the ozone layer (Ondanka 
ya ozonsō hakai kara chikyū o mamoru tame nara benrisa ya kaitekisa o gisei ni shite 
mo kamawanai),” and “I don’t mind sacrificing convenience and comfort in order 
to conserve wildlife (Yasei dōbutsu o hogo suru tame nara benrisa ya kaitekisa o gisei 
ni shite mo kamawanai).” Statements on the subject of health maintenance aware-
ness were framed in terms of a trade-off with economic and temporal costs. They 
comprised “I don’t mind spending time and money to prevent obesity (Himan o 
bōshi suru tame nara okane ya jikan o kakete mo kamawanai),” “I don’t mind spend-
ing time and money to prevent aging (Rōka o fusegu tame nara okane ya jikan o 
kakete mo kamawanai),” “I don’t mind spending time and money to prevent or 
overcome adult diseases (Seijinbyō o fuseida ri kokuhuku shita ri suru tame nara 
okane ya jikan o kakete mo kamawanai),” and “I don’t mind spending time and 
money to maintain my current level of physical strength (Genzai no tairyoku o iji 
suru tame nara okane ya jikan o kakete mo kamawanai).” In all cases, there were four 
available answers: “agree,” “relatively agree,” “relatively disagree,” and “disagree.”
 The SSP-P Survey conducted in 2010 reused the same seven items, albeit 
slightly rephrased.8 The list of possible answers was however expanded from four 
Table 8-5    Data Descriptions
Title The Second Monitor Survey The SSP-P 2010 Survey
Survey period August in 1992 January and February in 2010
Sampling 
Second wave of the nationwide 
stratified random sampling survey 
(300 areas)
Area probability sampling from a 
nationwide master sample 
Designed 
sample 2,022 2,500
Valid cases 1,252 1,385
Response rate 61.90% 55.40%
Research 
method Mailing Mailing
Respondents Male and female aged 26 to 79 Male and female aged 26 to 60
Organization
Social Research Section in the 
Schools of Human Sciences, Osaka 
University (research representative: 
Naoi Atsushi)
Social Research Section in the 
Schools of Human Sciences, Osaka 
University (research representative: 
Kikkawa Tōru)
Figure 8-2    Trends in Status-Relatedness of General Life Satisfaction
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An Era Change in the Determinant Structure
To begin, We conducted OLS regression analyses on both environmental conser-
vation and health maintenance awareness as dependent variables. For independent 
variables, gender, age, years of formal education, employment status, and house-
hold income were entered for Model 1, while for Model 2 these variables were 
entered alongside authoritarian attitude and general life satisfaction. The data from 
both 1992 and 2010 were subjected to analyses using these models to consider the 
influence of authoritarian attitude and general life satisfaction on environmental 
conservation and health maintenance awareness, and how these relationships had 
changed over the 18-year period in question.
 Using Table 8-6, let us consider the factors that shape environmental conser-
vation awareness. In 1992, there were few factors that had a significant influ-
ence on environmental conservation awareness. Examining Model 1, the lone 
variable shown to exert a significant influence was education; the relationship 
that can be discerned is one which environmental conservation awareness rises 
the more years an individual spent in formal education. In Model 2, which 
Table 8-6    Deteminants of Environmental Conservation Awareness Table 8-7    Deteminants of  Health Maintenance Awareness
incorporated authoritarian attitude and general life satisfaction, the former was 
seen to have a significant negative effect while the latter had no effects of any sig-
nificance. Furthermore, the inclusion of these two variables resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in the value of coefficient of determination (R 2 = .026→.047). These 
results enabled me to corroborate the outcome of an earlier analysis I conducted 
(Kikkawa 1994), which indicated that anti-authoritarian attitudes (self-directed-
ness) in 1992 Japan had heightened environmental conservation awareness.
 Moving on to 2010, variables exerting a significant influence on environmental 
conservation awareness were once again found to be scarce. Examination of Model 
1 reveals the coefficient of determination to be low (R 2 = .017), and years of educa-
tion is once more shown to be the lone variable to have a significant positive effect. 
Model 2, however, presents an appearance entirely different from what we saw for 
1992. The authoritarian attitude no longer has the significant effect it did in 1992, 
while a significant effect for general life satisfaction has emerged. This clearly dem-
onstrates the relationship in 2010 whereby environmental conservation awareness 
increases under the effect of general life satisfaction. The prescriptive power of 
general life satisfaction is not nearly as large, however. Based on how small the 
 
1992 2010
model 1 model 2 model 1 model 2
r B B  r B B
(Constant) -1.317 ** -1.091 * −.937 ** −.600
Gender (ref. Men) .038 .133 .121 .000 .050 .028
Age −.018 .003 .007 −.001 .001 .002
Years of education .175 ** .078 ** .070 ** .136 ** .065 ** .060 **
Occupation (ref. 
manager or executive) .027 .041
Regular employee −.016 −.066 −.143 .013 −.164 −.138
Non-regular 
Employee −.015 −.119 −.187 −.010 −.190 −.154
Self employed −.012 −.045 −.118 −.029 −.239 −.212
Unemloyed .029 −.060 −.158 −.005 −.176 −.148
Household income .081 * .007 .003 .074 ** .012 .007
Authoritarianism −.162 ** −.155 ** .001 .019
Life satisfaction .056 .066 .121 ** .086 **
R 2 .026 ** .047 ** .017 ** .023 **
ΔR 2 .023 ** .007 **
N 726 1,246
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01
Note: One unit of household income is 1 million yen. Cited from Hazama, Hasizume and Kikkawa (2013).
 
 
1992 2010
model 1 model 2  model 1 model 2
r B B r B B
(Constant) .015 .167 -1.181 ** −.986 **
Gender (ref. Men) −.169 ** −.254 ** −.259 ** .015 .123  .109
Age .053 .006 .001 −.073 ** −.007 * −.006 *
Years of education .079 * .030 .039 * .213 ** .089 ** .087 **
Occupation (ref.  
manager or executive) .117 ** .048 *
Regular employee .052 −.327 −.196 .044 −.173 −.153
Non-regular 
Employee −.061 * −.371 −.236 −.013 −.244 −.221
Self employed −.001 −.314 −.188 −.034 −.240 −.220
Unemloyed −.085 * −.406 * −.266 −.040 −.287 −.268
Household income .087 ** .006 .008 .195 ** .043 ** .039 **
Authoritarianism .194 ** .188 **  .032 .054
Life Satisfaction .090 ** .071 .148 ** .063 *
R 2 .034 ** .070 ** .076 ** .081 **
ΔR 2 .039 ** .007 *
N 726 1,246
 *: p < .05, **: p < .01
Note: One unit of household income is 1 million yen. Cited from Hazama, Hasizume and Kikkawa (2013).
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increment in the coefficient of determination is from Model 1 to Model 2, it can-
not be said that the relationship between general life satisfaction and environmen-
tal conservation awareness is a strong one.
 Table 8-7 permits consideration of the factors shaping health maintenance 
awareness. In 1992, this attitude associates with numerous factors as zero-order 
correlations, but when the covariance among independent variables is controlled 
for the variables that remain significant decrease. The coefficient of determination 
may not be large in Model 1, but significant effects can be seen for gender and 
unemployment. The relationships that can be discerned here show health main-
tenance awareness to be higher among males than females, and among those in 
management or executive positions than the unemployed. However, the effects of 
occupation lost their significance in Model 2, which included authoritarian atti-
tude and general life satisfaction. In its place, a significant effect emerged with 
respect to years of education. Of the two newly added variables, although no sig-
nificant effect could be seen for general life satisfaction, authoritarian attitude 
showed a strong positive effect. Furthermore, the inclusion of these two variables 
brought a significant increase in the value of the coefficient of determination (R 2 = 
.070), reaffirming the strong prescriptive power of authoritarian attitude.
 What about 2010? In Model 1 (coefficient of determination: R 2 = .076) age, 
years of education, and household income each display significant effects. The 
younger a respondent, the longer their years of education, the greater their house-
hold income, and the greater their health maintenance awareness is. Turning next 
to Model 2, the effects of age, years of education, and household income declined 
somewhat compared to 1992, while of the two new variables, general life satisfac-
tion is shown to have a significant effect. Also, the significant effect that authori-
tarian attitude had in 1992 was gone in 2010. These results make it clear that a 
relationship had emerged in 2010 such that higher general life satisfaction leads to 
greater health maintenance awareness. That said, while the effectiveness of general 
life satisfaction may be significant in view of the increment in the coefficient of 
determination, it is still not an especially great one.
 Based on the foregoing OLS regression analysis, the influence that authoritarian 
attitude exerted in 1992 on both environmental conservation and health main-
tenance awareness had by 2010 been superseded by the influence of general life 
satisfaction. To ameliorate the problem of the insufficient magnitudes of deter-
mination produced by these OLS regression analyses, as well as to obtain a more 
accurate grasp of the change in the effect of authoritarian attitude and general life 
satisfaction between the two points in time surveyed, we compared parameters 
by carrying out a simultaneous analysis of the multi-group structural equation 
modeling (results not shown here). With this we statistically tested the differences 
in the values of various parameters between 1992 and 2010. That result confirmed 
the era change implied by the aforementioned OLS regression analysis. Figures 
8-3 and 8-4 summarize the causal structure that this study made clear.
 Both the environmental conservation and health maintenance awareness that 
were investigated as dependent variables are indicators of a quality-of-life orienta-
tion. Although the 1992 data present an unforeseen inversion structure in which 
authoritarian attitude hindered environmental conservation awareness while 
boosting health maintenance awareness, a causal structure could also be seen. 
Here, the quality-of-life orientation made its presence known in the form of the 
traditionalism–modernism axis on which were manifested the influences of vari-
ous social attributes. However the data for 2010 shows that the route mediated by 
this axis had lost its significance. In its place, general life satisfaction had come to 
exert a positive influence on both environmental conservation and health mainte-
nance awareness.
 These results can be interpreted as follows. In the 1990s, where quality of life 
was concerned, Japanese seem to have been influenced by traditionalism–mod-
ernism in the sense that an anti-establishment, anti-authoritarian attitude led to 
environmental conservation awareness while an attitude characterized by order 
and diligence led to concern for health maintenance. This framework has been lost 
in the present, however. It has been replaced by one in which individuals with a 
Figure 8-3    Causal Structure of the QOL in 1992 
Figure 8-4    Causal Structure of the QOL Orientation in 2010
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high degree of well-being (those generally satisfied) orient themselves even more 
strongly toward improving their quality of life. In other words, over an 18-year 
period the underlying social consciousness that dictates one’s quality-of-life orien-
tation changed from traditionalism–modernism to general life satisfaction (con-
summatory sufficiency).
From Modernity to Reflexive Modernity
Straying somewhat from the issue of quality-of-life orientation, a more general 
look at contemporary society suggests that these results can be seen to link with the 
transition towards individualization laid out in the theory of reflexive moderniza-
tion. Although the emergence of lifestyles that placed great emphasis on quality of 
life may have seemed to be a next-stage movement around the close of the twen-
tieth century, that in actual fact was not necessarily the case. It stands to reason 
that this was because the way in which quality-of-life orientation was adopted 
rested to some extent on the existing framework at the modern, twentieth century 
value cleavage implicit in the conflict between tradition (or conventionality) and 
modernity. But since then contemporary Japanese have gradually ceased to refer to 
the value system with which the whole of society is endowed as standard for daily 
behavior, as can be seen from the way in which authoritarian attitude lost its func-
tion in society (see Chapter 6). This change can be understood as an expression of 
the process in which individuals have “disembedded” (Giddens 1991) themselves 
from the predominant social structure.
 Under reflexive modernity, one change expected to proceed alongside the con-
traction in the influence of the values and norms of the whole society is an expan-
sion of the domain of the individual. This means that each of these individuals 
must separately recognize and evaluate the living circumstances they are con-
fronted with on their own responsibility; social activities thus become the accu-
mulation of these direct determinations made at the micro level (Bauman 2001; 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The trend revealed in this research of individu-
als more strongly committing themselves to improving their quality of life the 
more fulfilled they are in their own day-to-day lives can be interpreted as the exact 
embodiment of a society undergoing the process of individualization.
 By focusing on quality-of-life orientation—one of the key issues of the contem-
porary era—our study has successfully pinpointed a change in the eras: at the end 
of the twentieth century, the anomalous but nonetheless established frameworks 
of modern society became ineffective and gradually began to be replaced by the 
frameworks of reflexive modernity. What I hope will be of particular worth is the 
way in which, by introducing the intermediate term of general life satisfaction to 
this analysis, we have discerned the early stages of the process of individualization 
that form the backdrop for the waning of status-relatedness in social consciousness. 
However, it should be noted that the explanatory power for quality-of-life orienta-
tion based on individual consummatory fulfillment does not makes its presence 
felt as strongly as when that orientation was embedded in the conflict in values of 
modernity. Additionally, the trends revealed here relating to health maintenance 
awareness are not as definite as those regarding environmental conservation aware-
ness. For that reason, it will be necessary to carefully ascertain whether the influ-
ence of an individual’s fulfillment with life will continue to expand with respect to 
their quality-of-life orientation.
NOTES
1 Chapter 8 is based on the findings of a paper I published recently with two collabora-
tors. I have summarized and revised those findings on my own responsibility to adapt 
them to the context of this book, and added the results of those analyses I have person-
ally deemed necessary. Please see Hazama, Hashizume, and Kikkawa (2013) for a precise 
analysis of the results of that research. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to 
my two colleagues, who got ideas from my earlier research and successfully developed 
them further in the study using more refined techniques.
2 Other components that were also highlighted include residence, income, employ-
ment, community, education, governance, general life satisfaction, safety, and work-life 
balance.
3 There is a large body of work regarding environmental and health consciousness using 
a wide variety of measures in fields including social psychology, politics, social epidemi-
ology, and public health. However, for the purposes of this book the measures had to be 
ones in which the same concept was repeated in surveys taken at two different point in 
time, and moreover had to be ones that enabled us to observe the relationship between 
authoritarian attitude and general life satisfaction. Thus, only a limited number of mea-
sures allowed for analysis. As a result, I am limited to addressing only a subset of various 
issues of interest when it comes to health and the environment.
4 See Kikkawa (1998).
5 A comparison between two different points in time was not possible as status iden-
tification was not included in the Second Monitor Survey. I would like to examine the 
relationship between status identification and quality-of-life orientation in my future 
research.
6 In the fields of economics, social epidemiology, and public health, general life satisfac-
tion is itself seen as an index of subjective quality of life. Although its use as a dependent 
variable is not uncommon, like authoritarian attitude it is treated here as a fundamental 
social consciousness that mediates between the objective social structure and people’s 
everyday behavior.
7 The positive correlation in 1985 between general life satisfaction and age—where the 
older someone was the higher their general life satisfaction—had turned into a nega-
tive relationship after 2005. However, the connection between these two variables had 
always been extremely weak and was relatively unimportant compared to the degree of 
influence other determinants exerted on the degree of satisfaction.
8 For the SSP-P 2010 Survey, the expression “adult diseases” (seijinbyō) was revised to 
“lifestyle diseases” (seikatsushūkanbyō).
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EPILOGUE
Status Literacy, Consummatory, and Reflexivity
In this book, I have wrestled with the hard-to-grasp character of the social mental-
ity of contemporary Japan. At the end of Shōwa period, sociologists felt that they 
could get hints about the nature of social consciousness in hands. Getting a clue 
from them, I was able to reap information in bounteous quantities, even if it was 
hard to interpret. In this epilogue, I will borrow the resources that sociological 
theory provides for talking about reflexive modernization to create a single story of 
the social mentality of contemporary Japan.
The Described Shape of the Social Mentality
The analytical model I have used to evaluate status-relatedness in the social con-
sciousness is what I call the social consciousness studies-type regression model. 
I will begin here by reviewing the findings obtained in my applications of this 
model. In my discussion, I will try to avoid the language of survey data analysis 
and instead speak about this as a study of contemporary Japanese society.
The Mooring of Status Identity (The Quiet Transformation of Status Identification)
In 1985 when talk of a “mass middle class” was rife, aside from the self-evident 
causality that being economically affluent meant feeling a ready attachment to the 
upper strata, status identity (via five-level status identification) was not strongly 
linked to any stratification variables and remained disconnected from the social 
structure. However, over the next 25 years, educational attainment and occupa-
tional status steadily gained influence alongside economic power. Status identity 
came to be firmly, multiply, and clearly linked to social stratification. This relation-
ship has continued to strengthen down to the present. The improved literacy that 
Japanese now have when it comes to social strata and class itself constitutes the 
quiet transformation of status identification.
The Retirement of Traditionalism–Modernism
I used authoritarian conservatism and attitudes toward gender-role segregation as 
indices in this book to track what became of traditionalism–modernism, which 
formed a reference axis that had been a primary topic of debate in social conscious-
ness studies. I found that in 1980s Japanese society, the time (new-old) and class 
(upper-lower) axes overlapped. The pattern in which this was expressed was the 
higher someone’s stratification status, the more likely they could be characterized 
as “modern.” Traditionalism, meanwhile, persisted in the lower strata. This con-
firmed a construct had formed—the status-relatedness of traditionalism–modern-
ism—that was peculiar to the era.
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to take the place that traditionalism–modernism once held. For example, equity 
and prosocial nature from a logical standpoint appear to be crucial indicators of 
the state of contemporary society. However, unlike how the case had been for the 
now-enfeebled traditionalism–modernism axis, these are simply attitudes wafting 
up from the social structure and do not represent inclinations strongly held by any 
specific social class. Hence, they cannot be expected to operate in a sociologically 
useful way as a fundamental social consciousness (an “-ism”).
 Meanwhile, the younger generations, the university-educated, and women are 
gradually taking on board a frame of mind accepting diverse ways of thinking. The 
rules of the game that once made it possible for everyone to position themselves 
somewhere along the spectrum of a specific doctrine are themselves becoming less 
certain. A new movement in that consciousness that has been developing since 
the early 1990s, quality-of-life orientation, shows that the determinative factor 
is changing from traditionalism–modernism (authoritarian attitude) to personal, 
subjective fulfillment (general life satisfaction).
 Sociological theory about late modernity already predicted the emergence of 
this paradigm shift following the enfeeblement of the traditionalism–modernism 
axis that underpinned modern society. There is no alternative but to accept the 
arrival of the doctrineless age as a fact.
The Consummatory Shift
A more upbeat piece of information provides another handle for getting a grip 
on the social mentality of contemporary Japan. This is the fact that—regardless 
of what I pointed out in the preceding section—if you look directly at assertive-
ness about taking part in (i.e., frequency of ) social activities there is a clear gradi-
ent based on social status. Specifically, where someone is positioned in society (in 
terms of age, gender, education, or economic power) has considerable predictive 
power when it comes to social participation and cultural activities. In short, people 
are not acting randomly; their social orientations conform with their respective 
places in society.
 Changing focus to inequality, the ways that people perceive it reveals that they 
tend to pursue their self-interest directly: those in the privileged “majority” favor 
free competition, while those in the disadvantaged “minority” call for equality and 
fairness. The state of disillusioned inequality in status identification overlaps here. 
For that reason, people now determine how something will be to their personal 
benefit or detriment based on an examination of their own social status that is 
more dispassionate than ever.
 This situation is vastly different from that of 1985, when people—under the 
illusion that they and their “one hundred million compatriots” were all of the 
“middle”—acted with reference to the axial principle that something was either 
traditional (secure) or modern (new). It could also be said that this presents a true 
picture of the shift to the consummatory orientation—a sociological term that 
expresses fresh difficulties in trying to understand where contemporary society is 
heading.
 I have treated the consummatory shift as a growing tendency for individuals to 
 However, the causal relationship between the social structure and this aspect 
of social mentality rapidly weakened thereafter. While it still possible to measure 
someone’s place along the traditionalism–modernism axis, it has become difficult 
to conjecture which social strata have conservative values and which have modern 
ways of thinking.
 Traditionalism–modernism comprises the two “-isms” that together form a ref-
erence axis for the debate that figures in the very definition of modern society. For 
that reason, social consciousness studies in the 20th century regarded the axis to be 
its unshakable backbone. In 21st century Japanese society, however, it is no longer 
capable of playing that role.
Contrary Changes
 These two changes that occurred concurrently on first glance seem to be headed 
in contrary directions. Figure E-1 shows in simplified form the changing trends 
in the causal explanatory power of stratification factors on status identity and the 
traditionalism–modernism axis.
 If the formative effects of social class on social consciousness influence these two 
social attitudes in the same way, then both should be either rising or falling on the 
graph. However, the status-relatedness of status identity in fact has been increas-
ing while that of traditionalism–modernism has been dropping. This fact resists 
simple explanation, such as the change in eras social consciousness is experiencing 
is due to rising inequality  (the rising power of social status) or “the death of class” 
(the negating of the power of social status).
The Arrival of the Doctrineless Age
Two facts will help us get a grip on this tangled situation. First is the rather passive 
one that we have not been able to find a new fundamental social consciousness 
Figure E-1     Changing Trends of Causal Explanatory Power on Two Aspects 
of Social Consciousness
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community, and birth cohort. Naturally, any number of exceptions could be 
raised, but I ask the reader’s indulgence in accepting this as a simple overview. That 
was the “solid” situation embedded in modern society. 
 Today, however, we are constantly reconfirming and reevaluating matters on 
our own responsibility and actively constructing our self-identities as we are forced 
to deal directly with society in its entirety. The reason this condition is referred to 
as “reflexive modernity” and not simply “modernity” is because in it we are obliged 
to engage in the reflexive act of constantly rebuilding our own identities. Under 
this state of affairs, the individual gets re-embedded in society in a form different 
from that taken under previous conditions.
 “Individualization” refers to the disembedded individual having to confront 
society in its entirety as a single entity, unlike in the past when the risks and uncer-
tainties were coped with while stably affiliated with a group. Mikami refers to this 
situation where group identity is weakening and individual identity is becoming 
distinct as “the demise of the social” (shakaiteki na mono no shūen) (Mikami 2010).
 However, as I have understood it, the great isolation of the individual from 
society is not new. One of the issues that social consciousness studies has taken 
up from the beginning was how the citizens in a modern society manage to estab-
lish their own individuality within it given its considerable power. Mass society 
theory provided the background to this discussion. This 20th century proposi-
tion highlighted a state of affairs in which the homogenous, powerless citizen (i.e., 
individual) had lost the moorings that intermediate groups had provided and was 
left to cope with elite domination like—in Mannheim’s formulation—“a crab 
without its shell.” The “mass” in mass society theory provided a focal point for the 
debate over the ease with which citizens (individuals) could be mobilized to totali-
tarianism precisely because of their uniformity. When it comes to the relationship 
between a powerful society and powerless individuals, there does not seem to be 
any great difference here with the individualized person in reflexive modernization 
theory.
 Most, including Giddens himself, seem to understand the society of reflexive 
modernity—the individualized society—to be an evolved form of its mass prede-
cessor. However, it is important to clarify what made them different. Accordingly, 
I would like to supplement this discussion of changes to the relationship between 
the collective and individual consciousness across these eras.
 It was Durkheim who identified what he called the collective consciousness. 
The concept refers to how social consciousness exists as a social fact that has exter-
nalities and constraints (Durkheim 1895). It explains the standards that society as 
a whole holds expressed in terms of norms, morals, and what is socially desirable, 
as well as the influence these have on individuals. The collective consciousness 
takes what I have referred to as “-isms” (doctrines, ideologies, values) to be social 
facts, rather than general representations of individual consciousness accumulated 
through methodological individualism.
 This Durkheimian interpretation may be recast into the language of reflexive 
modernity as follows. In (first) modern society, there was a collective conscious-
ness—an “-ism”—in the “air” of society and society’s members were embedded 
consciously identify with their own social positions and yet still make snap deci-
sions about social orientations without the mediation of what some doctrine or 
principle deems socially desirable. This shift overlaps with habitus in the sense that 
where someone is situated in society manifests itself not through some doctrine 
but rather directly in their behavior.1
 As the foregoing suggests, the findings of this book can be summed up as the 
increasing clarity of status identity, the declining relevance of traditionalism–mod-
ernism, and the consummatory shift in social orientation. This in aggregate might 
best be understood as a phenotype of quantitative social consciousness studies run-
ning through the eras we have been acquainted with, as well as those catalogued by 
contemporary sociological theory.
Disembedding from the Collective Consciousness
Before moving on to a comprehensive discussion of contemporary Japanese soci-
ety, I want to review the theories that provided its framework. The notion of reflex-
ive modernity was already introduced in Chapter 3. This concept interprets (first) 
modern society as having contained vectors that were simple, steady, and could 
be understood by anybody. The present situation, however, is seen as one where 
modern society is transforming into its next state—one that is complex, uncon-
ventional, and difficult to understand at its edges where the system’s rationality has 
most thoroughly penetrated.
 Here, I wish to invoke this perception of society as having entered reflexive 
modernity to organize the findings from my survey data analysis. Reflexive mod-
ernization is a very influential theory in contemporary sociology, and my goal here 
is to see what evidence quantitative social consciousness studies can provide to 
increase its power.
 Reflexive modernization is spoken of in symbolic terms whose meaning is dif-
ficult to grasp. Nonetheless, these terms provide crucial reference points for under-
standing the currents of the era through which we are now traveling. Accordingly, 
we need to ascertain the meanings they contain so this discussion is not bogged 
down in superficial, armchair theorizing. Of the numerous difficult terms involved 
are three mutually-related concepts crucial for discussing the relationship between 
society and the individual: “disembedding,” “reflexivity (re-embedding),” and 
“individualization.”2
 “Disembedding” is the term that Giddens has most stressed in reflexive mod-
ernization theory. It refers to a social condition that develops in the modernization 
process whereby people become detached from their local context of intermediate 
groups and find themselves confronted by a limitless expanse of global time and 
space. Reflexivity refers to the situation of the contemporary individual who, in 
this moment, must constantly monitor the conditions they face, adjust their rela-
tionship with society, and construct their own identity (Giddens 1991). 
 In modern 20th century society, we acquired stable identities as individu-
als through affiliation with such intermediate groupings as social class, family, 
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as the micro-level subject who performs actions; and the collective consciousness 
(i.e., the social consciousness seen at the macro level). I have already spoken of 
the industrial, economic, and stratification system as comprising the structure of 
society—its hardware—and using analytical operations confirmed its existence 
through the effects that social attributes have on social consciousness. The part of 
the structure corresponding to society’s software is rendered here as a large oval. 
The processes shown are those of a macro social consciousness forming as the 
accumulation of individual consciousness, and of the collective consciousness as a 
social fact influencing individuals’ daily lives.
 As already discussed, the mass-middle-class ideology—the belief that Japanese 
society was a homogenous one with everyone collected around the middle strata—
during these years held a fixed place within the collective consciousness. Coupled 
with Nihonjinron, it exerted a gravitational pull on status identities of Japanese 
that tugging them toward society’s center. While the collective consciousness 
that drove this differed from the fascism of the prewar and wartime years, the fact 
remains that what people were mobilized into by its binding force was again the 
mass (citizens) of modern society.
 However, during this period there was no clearly defined correspondence 
relationship between the industrial, economic, and stratification system on the 
one hand and individual status identification on the other. Status identification 
(middle-class consciousness) of the day had seemingly just wafted into the air. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there was in fact no correspondence relationship between 
mass middle class as an ideology and high-speed economic growth as the actual 
condition of society; their contemporaneity was nothing more than a coincidence. 
 Accordingly, the true nature of the mass-middle-class phenomena that lasted 
in it. However, as reflexive modernization has proceeded, its existence began to be 
shaken and its constraints called into question. Individuals became disembedded 
from the collective consciousness into which they had until then been subsumed. 
They subsequently examined their own places in society and tried to build connec-
tions with it once again in a process called re-embedding. Reflexive modernity can 
be said to have arrived when this process can been confirmed as taking place.
 As the foregoing shows, the mass society conditions of (first) modernity and 
those of individualization under reflexive modernity can be easily distinguished if 
we think of the issue in terms of disembedding from the collective consciousness. 
Under the conditions of mass society, the powerless citizen (individual) is bound 
by and regularly refers to the collective consciousness (here, traditionalism–mod-
ernism) that hangs like a canopy in the airspace above macro society. They think 
about how conservative they are in their lifestyle, how “rightish” their values are, 
which doctrine provides the foundation for their daily activities, and so forth.
 Thus, the social orientations of the people could once be easily integrated into a 
single orientation that quite likely also had considerable power. The very existence 
of a collective consciousness capable of performing actual functions was indis-
pensable to elite domination of the masses. This quite simply was the contiguity 
between mass and totalitarian society that 20th century theorists feared. To repeat 
a point I made earlier, mass society theory was a product of the 20th century his-
torical fact of Nazism.
 In contrast, with individualization as posited by reflexive modernity, the indi-
viduals dispassionately survey their surroundings, constantly reaffirms their 
shifting social position, and make decisions based on the conditions they face. 
Moreover, in that moment the individual is no longer subject to the binding force 
of the collective consciousness and confronts the social system directly. In short, 
individuals are disembedded from the collective consciousness and re-embedded 
in the social system in the consummatory.
 Thus, the phenomena discovered in this book—increased literacy about social 
identity, the retirement of traditionalism–modernism, and the shift to the con-
summatory in social orientation—may all be poured into the mold of theories on 
the move from (first) modernity to reflexive modernity.
The Social Mentality of the 1980s
While the theory of reflexive modernity may be suitable for my discussion, it is not 
very accessible. Still, its pedigree shows it permits comparing different eras, posit-
ing that a new system has begun to operate that differs from that of (first) modern 
society. Accordingly, we can gain a more complete understanding of it by consider-
ing the contrast between social conditions of the past and those of contemporary 
society.
 Let’s reconsider the state of 1985 Japanese society as outlined in Chapter 3. 
Status identification during this era can be rendered graphically as shown in 
Figure E-2. There, I present the relationships among the industrial, economic, 
and stratification system(s) of Japanese society at the macro level; the individual 
Figure E-2    Status Identification in the 1980s
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that brief moment of 1985 is the fact that in both hardware and software terms 
the verticality of stratification status and the conflict over traditionalism and mod-
ernism were of the same pattern. Traditionalism quite simply has maintained its 
magnetic pull and is an important prerequisite of (first) modern society. As Talcott 
Parsons argued, the individual can remain stably embedded in modern society 
when a social system is forming rather than rupturing (Parsons 1951).3
 I may have gone to excessive lengths with my argument in my effort to improve 
its comprehensibility as social analysis. To be sure, I must say that it is not a fact 
confirmed by evidence, but rather a picture reconstructed using the fragments of 
the findings generated by data analysis. However, by supplementing my overall 
story in this way, I can find the outlines in 1985 Japanese society—my starting 
point—of those patterns that showed (first) modernity taking its final form.
The Social Mentality of Contemporary Japan
Whatever the case, those patterns have changed completely in the 2010s. First, 
when it comes to status identification (Figure E-4), we Japanese now take a wide-
angle view of where we are in the social structure. This permits more accurately 
identifying our places within the industrial, economic, and stratification system. 
Meanwhile, we no longer pay heed to an ideology that proclaims Japanese society 
to be homogenous and equal.
 Over the past 25 years, Japanese have disembedded from the condition of being 
embedded in the mass-middle-class society. Like it or not, we all are now being 
re-embedded in a mass-inequality society owing to our heightened literacy in 
ascertaining differences in our respective statuses (in other words, the stratifica-
tion structure). I described this in Chapter 5 as the arrival of a state of disillusioned 
inequality that came on the tails of a state of illusory lebeling.
 As to social orientation, I have spoken repeatedly in this book in terms of soci-
ologists having lost track of where the social mentality is, a state of affairs rendered 
in Figure E-5. The biggest change is the retirement of traditionalism–modernism, 
which had formed the core axis of reference for the Japanese social mentality in 
(first) modern society. The rules of the game in Japan up to the 1980s had been 
that a person would align themselves along the axis of this or some other doctrine 
or ideology and decide how to act in daily life on that basis. Someone who could 
not say precisely which doctrine they supported would be contemptuously dis-
missed for their lack of judgment as “non-political (nonpori)”. Incidents of this 
sort could be seen all the time—not just among intellectuals, but among average 
university students and working adults as well.
 Today’s Japanese, however, no longer subscribe to these past rules demanding 
that they look admiringly upon some ideology floating around and embed them-
selves somewhere along its spectrum. The social structure and the social conscious-
ness now lack contact with one another at both the macro and micro levels. Under 
these conditions, it is no longer well understood just who might be authoritar-
ian, prosocial, or have feelings of unfairness. The doctrinally committed (or those 
committed to an opposing doctrine) of today are ubiquitous in society but with 
until the 1980s cycled back and forth in the social consciousness between the 
micro and the macro (individual consciousness-collective consciousness); it had 
come into being with no connection to the actual state of social relationships 
(where social disparities actually did exist).
 Figure E-3 depicts the state of social orientations during this period. We see 
a robust effect there in that an individual’s social attributes defined their social 
attitudes. Specifically, a stratification-based gradient ran through traditional-
ism–modernism. In addition to differences in ways of thinking based on birth 
cohort, the higher someone’s stratification status in terms of education, occupa-
tional status, economic power, and related factors, the stronger their orientation to 
self-direction, modernity, and antiauthoritarian tendencies. Conversely, the lower 
someone’s status the greater their tendencies toward conformity, traditionalism, 
and conventionality.
 Furthermore, the form of social consciousness as an accumulation of individual 
consciousness was consistent with that of the conventionality-modernity dual-
ity present in the industrial, economic, and stratification system. This means the 
actual structure of society corresponded to the general image of the traditional-
ism–modernism divide. The older generations, the less educated, the hinterlands 
dwellers, and agricultural or manufacturing workers formed one conceptual set 
that evoked the conventional; the younger generations, the university graduates, 
the urban dwellers, and the white-collar workers in core sectors comprised another 
conceptual set characterized by its considerable modernity. Thanks to that clarity 
and consistency, Japanese were constantly looking with admiration at this core of 
the collective consciousness that floated in the air over their society. They could 
refer to it as an auxiliary line for understanding and adapting to a society in the 
middle of transfiguration.
 As the foregoing makes clear, what made conditions easy to understand during 
Figure E-3   Social Orientation in the 1980s
Industrial, economic, and
stratification system
Embedded
into ideology 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
iv
en
es
s
A
cc
um
ul
at
io
n
Societal mentality moored to the social
structure 
TraditionalismÐ
modernism as
collective consciousness
Epilogue162 Status Literacy, Consummatory, and Reflexivity 163
 In (first) modern society, the vectors of efficiency and development in indus-
try and economy combined with the axis of conflict between traditionalism and 
modernism to bind the social system together in a simple fashion. Now, however, 
we have been disembedded from the condition of being subsumed without really 
understanding it in a large system that had such consistency. Now we understand 
the industrial, economic, and stratification system, and are re-embedding in it 
directly. To sum this up simply so there will be no misunderstandings, literacy and 
the consummatory have combined to produce reflexivity.
 My data analysis in this book proves that reflexive modernity arrived in con-
temporary Japanese society between 1985 to 2010. It occurred in concert with the 
change of eras loosely defined by the end of the 20th century and start of the 21st, 
or in the Japanese context more specifically the transition from the Shōwa to the 
Heisei period.
The Frayed Influence of Social Attributes
Next to consider is what key exactly secures the connection between the social 
structure and the social mentality when we are re-embedded in contemporary soci-
ety. The social attributes that once comprised the points at which we were embed-
ded (age, occupation, family, community) are gradually losing the influence they 
once had as the disembedding process of reflexive modernization proceeds.
 However, when it comes to status identity (identification), the influence of 
social attributes is actually increasing amid these other transformations. Our focus 
should properly be on the increased literacy of subjective actors first and fore-
most—their improved knowledge of and ability to accurately interpret status. 
How these respective social attributes operate is not the issue. Accordingly, we 
should probe just how much the Japanese population’s literacy about issues of class 
and strata might further improve.
 Meanwhile, when it comes to social orientation the fact is, while education, 
occupation, birth cohort, economic power, and gender may be weakening, they 
still have a variety of influences. One of these is a point I emphasized early on 
based on an analysis of data from the 1980s—that Japanese adults demonstrate 
clear differences in social consciousness that are based on how much education 
they have (Kikkawa 1998). This structure still persists today, largely unchanged 
over a quarter century. Moreover, there is a sense in which educational attainment 
has won by default, so to speak, when it comes to being a determinant of social 
consciousness—a result of the weakened influence during those years of such fac-
tors as occupation and birth cohort.
 Another point to scrutinize is that the influence of birth cohort has become 
scattershot. Whether it works to someone’s advantage or disadvantage depends on 
the situation. There was a generation-based tendency in the 20th century as a relic 
of past social changes for the young to be more revolutionary and the middle-aged 
and older to be more conventional. This gradient in the social consciousness that 
Alex Inkeles sees as modernity (Inkeles 1983) and Ronald Inglehart refers to as the 
shift from materialism to post-materialism (Ingelehart 1990) in fact constituted a 
their potential latent and subsumed, waiting like some social media-instigated 
flash mob to emerge. Meanwhile, we engage in our daily activities based on social 
orientations corresponding to our places in the industrial, economic, and stratifi-
cation system, and without drawing on the power of some “-ism.” The shift to a 
consummatory orientation indicates how the individual connects with society in 
this fashion.
Figure E-5    Social Orientation in the 2010s
Figure E-4    Status Identification in the 2010s
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Disembedding from Occupation
Finally, I want to emphasize the relevance of studies of the social consciousness 
based on educational attainment. This is entwined with the question of what hap-
pened to the influence of occupational status, which scholars once went so far as to 
say was the only independent variable in social consciousness studies.
 In Japanese (first) modern society, there was little fluidity when it came to 
careers. People were stuck for a long time in unfavorable jobs, or remained for a 
long time in favorable ones. Accordingly, when someone who, for example, spent 
their days in the industrial sector was asked about their identity, they would answer 
that they were in administration at a building contractor, or ran a small retail shop, 
or were employed in such-and-such division at city hall, or were a section chief 
at this-and-that trading company. While there was diversity here in terms of job 
type, exact industry, position, and company name, all these could be described as 
forms of occupational identity. Someone’s job was the source of their ego, and as 
such they were embedded in industrial society.
 Even today, occupational status is frequently seen on the surface of society as a 
means by which someone earns their keep. Among the general public, it plays a 
leading role as an object of ascription and point of reference. Over the past quar-
ter century, however, the careers we pursue now see us making a whirlwind of 
changes throughout our lives to the companies we work at and the lines of work 
we are in. Under these conditions, it seems that—compared to the 1980s when 
people remained in a position based on the custom of lifetime employment—
today’s Japanese place less emphasis on occupational status as the source of their 
identities. This denormalization of employment is accompanied by a weakening 
of commitments to one’s job, with people now facing work with a lighter frame 
of mind. Plainly speaking, it would be difficult for an hourly-wage worker—a 
furītā (a Japanese coinage combining the English “freelancer” and the German 
“arbeiter”)—to define how they think about things and their patterns of behav-
ior based on an occupational identity and its associated attitudes given that the 
conditions under which they live mean they lack such a site of affiliation. The 
analytical results I presented in this book made it clear that the way occupational 
status works to form social consciousness is becoming less substantial as condi-
tions become increasingly remote from those assumed by 20th century Marxist 
class theory.
 And so, where is it that these individuals disembedded from occupational status 
are being re-embedded? To think about this, I will borrow the words of Giddens. 
In his discussion, Giddens uses the terms “symbolic token” and “expert system” 
to explain the substantive mechanisms of disembedding. These terms are quite 
abstract and at first sight may seem quite puzzling. Giddens explains:
Disembedding mechanisms are of two types, which I refer to as ‘symbolic 
tokens’ and ‘expert systems.’ Taken together, I refer to these as abstract systems. 
Symbolic tokens are media of exchange which have standard value, and thus 
are interchangeable across a plurality of contexts. The prime example, and most 
generational divide.
 In the Japanese case, however, more than 30 years has passed since the era of 
high-speed growth. With the generation that experienced only the subsequent 
age of the plateau gradually becoming the majority in the population, the once-
clear and simple gradient in the characteristics that defined that era is disappear-
ing. For that reason, generation-based theories of social consciousness today have 
shifted away from the hypotheses of modernity that were once self-evident. They 
are turning into a case-by-case affair, dependent on the social attitude being dealt 
with. This demands that the observer pay much closer attention than before to the 
details of a situation when discussing it.
 Furthermore, the traditionalism–modernism gradient based on birth cohort 
became less apparent. Concurrently, the overlap in education and cohort effects 
that was once evident—the younger someone was, the longer their years of formal 
education—was also becoming less obvious (Kikkawa 2006). To offer some figures 
for reference, the correlation for amount of formal education and age among both 
genders in the SSM 1985 Survey showed an overlap of 18.4% (r = −.429). In the 
SSP-I 2010 Survey, the overlap stood at 3.4% (r = −.185). The amount of covaria-
tion between the two variables has dropped to as little as one-fifth the earlier result. 
The influence of this transformation casting today—as in the example of prosocial 
nature—is to generate a heretofore unseen contrast in the social attitudes of an 
older generation of university graduates and a younger generation without such an 
education.
 As to gender, some slight movement is apparent from 1985 to 2010. It is faintly 
evident generally speaking that men tend to be embedded in market principles 
and the status order and calculate their own self-interest in a consummatory fash-
ion, while women tend to be accepting of diversity and abundantly partake in 
cultural activities. However, as I also noted in Chapter 7, nothing fairly definite 
can be said for the moment about whether to see this as re-embedding in gender 
without attempting more time-series analyses of the social consciousness of both 
men and women.
 Other factors such as family and the local community were never indispensable 
to defining the formation of social consciousness in Japanese society. Factors such 
as ethnicity and religions that are crucial in other societies likewise are known to 
have little (though not zero) influence in the Japanese case. Therefore, I believe 
there is little possibility that such factors have prescriptive power over social con-
sciousness in Japan. Rather, social capital and networks are what draw our atten-
tion as powerful sites for re-embedding in this area. While I could not address 
these factors in this book, we will need to pay close attention to their effects on the 
formation of social consciousness in the future.
 Based on the foregoing discussion, we can see that the interactive relationship 
between era-specific characteristics and status-relationship that in the 1980s over-
lapped to define social consciousness is now starting to fray. Put another way, the 
final aftereffects of high-speed economic growth are causing the overlaps in social 
attributes to come apart. It is this development that prevents us from coming up 
with a simple interpretation of the social mentality in contemporary Japan.
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Re-embedding into Education
Educational credentials were once thought of simply as a means for obtaining 
occupational status. During the Shōwa period for example, if someone (a man) 
could get a lifetime job—regardless of whether the position required at least a 
junior-high education or a university one—once they entered the work force nei-
ther they nor the people around them would refer back much to the name of their 
alma mater. The moment the individual obtained stable employment and was 
embedded in industrial society, the mediating role that the education attainment 
played for acquiring status was largely over.
 However, as I’ve noted, a change occurred over the two-plus decades of the 
Heisei period so far. The fluidity of employment has resulted in individuals need-
ing to rewrite their résumés countless times in their lives. Today, opportunities 
for job applicants to provide more information about their alma maters, degrees, 
and certifications have increased, serving as deciding factors that provide evidence 
of their capabilities. Such opportunities are becoming increasingly important. 
Under these conditions, the individual repeatedly makes use of their educational 
background after they’ve entered the work force. As a symbolic token indicative of 
their social status and life opportunities, that background becomes the objective of 
unending reflexive monitoring.
 There are still other values incidental to the name of someone’s undergraduate 
alma mater or the graduate degree they obtained that cannot be reduced to func-
tional ones, such as how it might relate to work or income. For example, for some-
one who has no plans to write up their résumé again (say a full-time housewife or 
retiree), their educational background is tantamount to deadwood or the residue 
from some substance that has lost its potency. Even so, contemporary Japanese do 
not speak in such blunt terms about their alma maters. On the other hand, some 
think about their educational background with heavy negative thoughts. They 
have lifelong complexes about their own poor attainments if they completed only 
compulsory education, or feel excessively inferior about not having a university 
degree. In sociology of education, this is called the effects of the symbolic value of 
credentials. The symbolic value of educational credentials to a large degree governs 
the state of one’s social consciousness; these credentials produce a gradient in the 
social mentality of adults. Given such broad implications, education is quite sim-
ply a symbolic token that provides a point for identity to re-embed in society.
 Education has been rooted in society from the start with the function of form-
ing academic knowledge and professional literacy. That being the case, it is dra-
matically easier to understand how expert systems, even more than money, provide 
the bedrock for order in global society—today’s advanced information society. In 
that light, if we substitute “educational attainments” for “expert system” in the 
above-cited passage from Giddens then his meaning becomes crystal clear.
 Based on this, it is evident that in contemporary Japanese society, now in the 
state of full-blown reflexive modernity, education as both symbolic token and expert 
system has become a point of re-embedding following the disembedding from 
occupational status.
pervasively important, is money. Although the larger forms of pre-modern 
social system have all developed monetary exchange in one form or another, 
money economy becomes vastly more sophisticated and abstract with the emer-
gence and maturation of modernity. Money brackets time (because it is a means 
of credit) and space (since standardised value allows transactions between a 
multiplicity of individuals who never physically meet one another). Expert sys-
tems bracket time and space through deploying modes of technical knowledge 
which have validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make use 
of them. Such systems penetrate virtually all aspects of social life in conditions 
of modernity—in respect of the food we eat, the medicines we take, the build-
ings we inhabit, the forms of transport we use and a multiplicity of other phe-
nomena. Expert systems are not confined to areas of technological expertise. 
They extend to social relations themselves and to the intimacies of the self. The 
doctor, counsellor and therapist are as central to the expert systems of moder-
nity as the scientist, technician or engineer (Giddens 1991: 18).
 While his meaning might be a bit difficult to grasp, we can understand him as 
saying that abstract systems provide yardsticks that are versatile and general for 
contemporary society, which is expanding and becoming increasingly complex. 
Money, Giddens suggests, might be one such yardstick. 
 Adapting this observation to the context of this book might lead one to believe 
that people are disembedding from occupational status and re-embedding in eco-
nomic power. Unlike occupational status, economic power—the outcome of indi-
vidual labor—is distributed continuously and changes incessantly. It is difficult 
at first glance to imagine that individuals might have their identity in this status 
and engage in their daily activities on its basis. However, it could make sense if 
the story were such that fluctuations in occupational status have Japanese keeping 
track of however many thousands or tens of thousands of yen they earn annually 
and see that as their connection to society rather than working “a job equivalent 
to section chief at a major company” or “as an automobile mechanic.” Giddens 
argues that money is turning into a fastener of sorts that ties us to society through 
acts of consumption. This is because it comprises one corner of the economic and 
financial system that has gone beyond time and space to achieve universality.
 Until now, economic status has been the object of a certain amount of atten-
tion of everyone from economists to the general public, and spoken of in terms of 
wealth or poverty. I have taken the logarithmic value of annual household income 
nearly throughout the whole of this book to be an indicator of economic power. 
Its influence on the social consciousness is a fact and growing increasingly certain. 
In this sense, the fact of our re-embedding into economic power and hence the 
economic system can be seen as one correct facet of the current realities.
 However, I certainly do not believe that the social mentality of the Japanese 
people in the years ahead will be decided solely by blunt economic determinism. 
This is because in contemporary Japanese society, there is one thing that is an even 
better fit for the role of receptor of re-embedding as symbolic token and shaper of 
the social order as expert system. This, it almost goes without saying, is education.
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 Why, then, has the importance of educational credentials above all as a determi-
nant for social consciousness manifested itself in contemporary Japanese society? 
To explain this precisely here I would need to double the length of this book, 
but fortunately I have already written about the mechanism involved elsewhere. 
In short, I explain that this is because contemporary Japan has reached the stage 
of a mature credentialist society (Kikkawa 2006) and become a society of educa-
tional disparity completely dissimilar from any other one (ibid. 2009). However, 
given the magnitude of importance that this linchpin of education has assumed, 
continued and further expansion of this research stream may well yield new and 
important insights as to the nature of the social mentality in the 21st century and 
beyond.
Concluding Remarks
The broad trends I have examined from 1985 to the present denote changes in the 
social environment that we could not simply alter on our own. Just as we cannot 
avoid the cold spells, powerful storms, or scorching heat that pressure patterns 
inevitably produce, we have no choice but to make do and accept these trends 
that develop through the ages. All we can do is provide as many people as possible 
accurate information about the risks and benefits that may be present in Japanese 
society today so that they can deal with them appropriately.
 The biggest risk factor given this history is that it is no longer clear if someone 
can create potent currents in social orientation by directing their appeals to one or 
another social class. Presently, it is extremely difficult to control Japanese society 
at will. In fact, for most of the past decade Japan’s political leaders have tried to 
define certain political flashpoints as the single issues of essential focus, whether 
it be reforms to the postal system, the issue of U.S. military bases on Okinawa, 
or nuclear energy policy. Even when they have momentarily been able to ride the 
winds blowing through the times, they no longer seem capable of winning stable 
support by aligning themselves with some doctrine deeply rooted in the social 
structure.
 Put another way, however, this also means there is no fear either of Japanese 
being mobilized by some simple, powerful force, because they no longer have a 
social mentality that is easily aroused like that of 20th century mass society. The 
fact that each member of contemporary Japanese society is a constituent subject 
of democracy capable of monitoring current conditions without illusion is our 
current society’s greatest strength. At the very least, based on the trends that social 
survey data show, there are no apparent omens that the foreboding form of one of 
the “-isms” that wreaked havoc in the 20th century is drawing new breath.
 I believe the greatest driving forces these conditions have produced, over the 
quarter century I have taken the measure of in this book, are the facts that we 
Japanese are now more literate about the systems and state of our society, and 
that many of us can now understand and accept that conditions are relative. 
Perhaps this change can best be expressed by saying that we have become more 
self-directed.
 Behind the gentle but still tremendous advances that contemporary Japanese 
have made in this direction lies the fact that the level of the education (of adults) 
we used to grasp the key to the social mentality grew by an enormous degree. We 
have gone from the situation seen at the end of the Shōwa period (1985) where 
only 13% of the population were university graduates and more than half had 
been educated under the prewar schooling system, to one in which there is a 50-50 
split between people who did and did not graduate from a university. That shift 
put Japan on the road to being one of the world’s leading higher education societ-
ies. On this point, too, we cannot overlook the influence of the educational attain-
ments (the public education system), which now govern social mentality.
 The citizens (individuals) of the Heisei period have become somewhat more 
sophisticated than the citizens (mass) of the Shōwa. For that reason, they are cau-
tious but they are also autonomous; for better or worse, their movements are hard 
to forecast precisely. This means that, at a glance, they may seem to be apathetic, 
to be becoming more conservative, or even to be fickle. But the reality is not that 
simple. That in and of itself is what is so hard to comprehend about the social men-
tality of contemporary Japan.
NOTES
1 Intrapsychological processes of this sort are in a black box when it comes to survey 
data analysis research. Accordingly, the consummatory shift for the moment remains a 
speculatively-derived tentative proposition.
2 When it comes to the reflexive modern society, the issues that are debated range 
broadly and include globalization, increased risk, intimacy, and gender. Here, however, I 
have focused my thinking on the relationship between the individual and society.
3 While I have had traditionalism–modernism in mind in this book, the hierarchical 
differences in culture—high-class culture for the upper strata and mass culture for the 
lower—are integrated into the social system and function in the same way.
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Afterword
Many readers may be familiar with the Hollywood movie Back to the Future. In it, 
Michael J. Fox played a high school senior named Marty who was able to travel 
through time and space using a time machine made out of a modified DeLorean (a 
once-hailed American brand) sports car. It was a hit in the late 1980s, and spawned 
two sequels.
 Marty’s voyage through time began on a certain day in 1985. The period to 
which he traveled in the first movie was 30 years before to 1955 when his parents 
were adolescents. In Back to the Future II, which came out in 1989, Marty trav-
eled 30 years into the future. These movies have become objects of especially deep 
contemplation for me, who is of the same generation as Marty. What I noticed was 
that the future to which Marty traveled corresponds roughly to the present when I 
am writing this.
 Using this hit movie series as a point of reference may be a bit of an awkward 
fit, but the story I’ve told in this book is one in which we’ve traveled from the near 
future of this second movie back to 1985 and then returned. In university lectures 
around that time, my sociology professors looked back at postwar Japanese society 
from the vantage point of the 1980s. They spoke in terms of Nihonjinron and the 
mass-middle-class theory, topics that have also come up in this book. They were 
looking at exactly the same time period from the same standpoint as the first BTF 
movie. If that is the case, then perhaps the story I am telling in place of Shōwa-era 
sociologists should properly be labeled “Social Consciousness Studies Part II” for 
how it takes up the same central theme but with the era on which it is focused 
moved forward to the next generation. The time machine that we used here might 
therefore be thought of as the vehicle of survey data analysis. That kind of thinking 
gave me the idea for this book.
 There is an American couple who are old friends of mine. Both scholars, they 
have visited Japan numerous times since the 1970s and observed its changing 
face. On one of their more recent visits, this couple happened to mention that 
“Japanese have become nicer.” I’m not sure what modern rationalists who experi-
enced the full bloom of youth in the 1950s and eventually developed an attraction 
for Eastern culture felt was “nicer.” However, as someone who actually experienced 
the same period in his own life, I certainly get a palpable sense that the social 
mentality of today’s Japanese is of a higher quality than it was before. While I must 
offer my regrets to the Japanese of the Shōwa period to whom I owe so much, I do 
not want to go back to the society of those times.
 Since the start of the 21st century, Japanese sociologists have spoken of obstruc-
tiveness and of concerns about the future when it comes to the social structure. Of 
course, we must not be unreflective or irreverent about the mountain of issues that 
face us. Yet, there indeed is also an aspect to the state of the Japanese soul that has 
become “nicer.” This is so whether we are speaking from personal feeling or quan-
titative fact.
 It is with these sorts of considerations that I have tried here to give future 
172
generations an accurate sense of what the trends of these eras were really like, 
beneath all the talk that tends to be negative. Essentially, I consider the very fact 
that most Japanese can serenely share a theory about their times that is anything 
but simple, and is spoken of in terms of complex and intricate tendencies and in 
a partially positive (or partially negative) way, to be a sign of how much Japanese 
society has grown.
 This book turned out as well as it did thanks to the efforts of Shikama Yūsuke 
in Yuhikaku Publishing. I offer him my deepest thanks for the pithy and rapierlike 
stimulation he provided when I tended to fall behind, as well as for the aptness of 
his ideas. I would also like to thank my students and the other younger folk around 
me for encouraging me to see things in new ways. I hope that with this book I have 
offered them something in return.
Toru Kikkawa 
Spring 2014
173
Works Cited
Adler, Nancy E., Elissa S. Epel, Grace Castellazzo, and Jeannette R. Ickovics. 2000. 
“Relationship of Subjective and Objective Social Status with Psychological 
and Physiological Functioning: Preliminary Data in Healthy White Women.” 
Health Psychology 19(6): 586–592.
Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt 
Sanford. 1950. The Authoritarian Personality. New York:  Harper & Brothers.
Aoki Tamotsu. 1990. Nihon bunka ron no henyō: Sengo Nihon no bunka to aidentiti 
[The transformation in ‘theories of Japanese culture’: Post-war Japanese culture 
and identity]. Tokyo: Chūōkōron shinsha.
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2001. The Individualized Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Beck, Ulrich, and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2002. Individualization. London: 
Sage Publications.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. La distinction. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
Cabinet Office of Japan. 2014. Kokumin seikatsu ni kansuru yoron chōsa [Public 
Opinion Survey Concerning People’s Lifestyles], <http://www8.cao.go.jp/sur-
vey/index-ko.htm>, last accessed 01/15/2014.
Doi Takeo. 1971. Amae no kōzō [The anatomy of dependence]. Tokyo: Kōbundō 
Publishers.
Durkheim, Émile. 1895. Les règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France.
Erikson, Robert, and John H. Goldthorpe. 1992. The Constant Flux: A Study of 
Class Mobility in Industrial Societies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eysenck, Hans J. 1954. The Psychology of Politics. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Fromm, Erich. 1941. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston.
—. 1980. Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches. 
München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
—. 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hamada Hiroshi. 2012. “Senkei ketsugō moderu wa kagakuteki setsumei tari-
uruka: Kaisō kizoku ishiki kenkyū ni okeru keiryō to sūri no yūgō” [Can a lin-
ear combination model be scientific explanation?: Integration of mathematical 
sociology and empirical social research in class identification study]. Riron to 
hōhō [Sociological theory and methods] 27 (2): 259–276.
Hamaguchi Eshun. 1977 (reprint 1988). Nihon-“rashisa” no saihakken 
[Rediscovering Japanese-ness]. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
Hara Junsuke. 1988. “Kaisō ishiki kenkyū no kadai to hōhō” [Issues and methods 
in strata consciousness research]. In 1985﻿-nen shakai kaisō to shakai idō zenkoku 
chōsa hōkokusho 2: Kaisō ishiki no dōtai [Report on the SSM 1985 Survey 2: 
Trends of strata consciousness]. SSM 1985 Survey Management Committee: 
174 Works Cited 175
—. 2010b. “Chū Ishiki no Hōwa to Senzai Suru Henka: Sengo Nihon 
no kaisō kizoku ishiki ni kansuru nōto (2)” [Saturation and latent changes of 
the “middle” status identification: Note on status identification in postwar 
Japan (2)], ibid. 157: 1–22.
—. 2011. “Chūryū ishiki to Nihon shakai: Kaisō kizoku ishiki no jidai 
henka to sono imi” [Middle-class consciousness and Japanese society: The tem-
poral change of stratus identification and its meaning]. In Nihon no shakai kaisō 
to sono mekanizumu. Tokyo: Hakutō shobō: 151–184.
—. 2012. “Sō-chūryū to fubyōdō o meguru gensetsu: Sengo Nihon ni 
okeru kaisō kizoku ishiki ni kansuru nōto (3)” [Discourses on the “mass mid-
dle class” and inequality: Note on status identification in postwar Japan (3)]. 
Tōhoku Gakuin Daigaku Kyōyō Gakubu ronshū 161: 67–90.
Kawakami Norito, Hashimoto Hideki and Kobayashi Yasuki, eds. 2006. Shakai 
kakusa to kenkō: Shakai ekigaku kara no apurōchi [Health and social disparity: A 
social epidemiology approach]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Kido Kōtarō. 1970. Shakai ishiki no kōzō [Structure of social consciousness]. 
Shinyōsha.
Kido Kōtarō and Sugi Masataka. 1954. “Shakai ishiki no kōzō” [The structure of 
social consciousness]. Shakaigaku hyōron [Japanese sociological review] 4 (1-2): 
74–100.
Kikkawa Tōru. 1994. “Gendai shakai ni okeru ken`i-shugiteki taido shakudo no 
yūyōsei” [Relevance of the authoritarian attitude scale in contemporary society: 
As an analytical perspective of the “conservationist” and “health conscious” atti-
tudes]. Soshioroji 39 (2): 125–137.
—. 1998. Kaisō kyōiku to shakai ishiki no keisei: Shakai ishiki ron no jikai 
[Stratification, education, and formation of social consciousness: The magnetic 
field in social consciousness studies], Kyoto: Minerva shobō.
—. 1999. “Chū ishiki no shizuka na henyō” [Changes of the deter-
minant of class identification in Japan. Shakaigaku hyōron 50(2): 216–230 
(English translation: Kikkawa Tōru, 2000,”Changes of the Determinant of 
Class Identification in Japan,” International Journal of Sociology, 30-2: 34–51.).
—. 2000. “Taishū kyōiku shakai no naka no kaisōishiki” [Strata con-
sciousness in mass education society]. Nihon no kaisō shisutemu 3: Sengo Nihon 
no kyōiku shakai [Stratification system in Japan 3: Educational credentials in 
the postwar stratification system]. Ed. Konodō Hiroyuki, Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press: 175–195.
—. 2001. Gakurekishakai no rōkaru torakku: Chihō kara daigaku shin-
gaku [Local tracking system in an educational credentials society: College 
advancement from rural areas]. Kyoto: Sekai shisōsha.
—. 2003. “Keiryōteki monogurafu to sūri-keiryō shakaigaku no 
kyori” [Distance between numerical monograph and mathematical sociology]. 
Shakaigaku hyōron 53 (4): 485–498.
—. 2006. Gakureki to kakusa fubyōdō [Education and social inequal-
ity: Contemporary educational credentialism in Japan]. Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press.
1–18.
Hayashi Chikio. 1988. Nihonjin no kokoro o hakaru [Measuring the mentality of 
the Japanese]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Publications.
Hayashi Yūsuke and Satō Yoshimichi. 2011. “Ryūdō-ka suru rōdō shijō to 
fubyōdō: Hi-seiki koyō o meguru shokugyō kyaria no bunseki” [A fluid labor 
market and inequality: An analysis of occupational careers related to non-
regular employment]. In Nihon no shakai kaisō to sono mekanizumu: Fubyōdō 
o toinaosu [Japanese social stratification and its mechanisms: Reconsidering 
inequality], eds. Seiyama Kazuo, et. al. Tokyo: Hakutō shobō: 35–60.
Hazama Hiroshi. 1971. Nihonteki keiei: Shūdan-shugi no kōzai [Japanese-style 
business management: The merits and demerits of collectivism]. Tokyo: Nikkei 
Publishing.
Hazama Ryotarō, Hashizume Yuto, and Kikkawa Tōru. 2013. “Kankyō hogo 
ishiki, kenkō-iji ishiki no kitei yōin no jidai henka” [Changes in the determi-
nants of environmentalism and healthism]. Shakai to chōsa [Advances in social 
research] 11: 70–84.
Hidaka Rokurō. 1960. Gendai ideorogī [Contemporary ideology]. Tokyo: Keisō 
shobō.
Hout, Michael. 2008. “How Class Works: Objective and Subjective Aspects of 
Class since the 1970s.” In Social Class: How Does It Work?, eds. Annette Lareau 
and Dalton Conley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: 25–89.
Imada Takatoshi. 1987. Modan no datsu-kōchiku: Sangyō shakai no yukue 
[Deconstructing the modern: The future of industrialized society]. Tokyo: 
Chūōkōron shinsha.
—. 1989. Shakai kaisō to seiji [Social stratification and politics]. Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press.
Inaba Keishin. 2008. Omoiyari kakusa ga Nihon o dame ni suru: Sasaeau shakai o 
tsukuru yattsu no apurōchi [Disparities in altruism that diminish Japan: Eight 
approaches to establish a corporative society]. Tokyo: NHK Books.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Inkeles, Alex. 1983. Exploring Individual Modernity. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Ishida Hiroshi and Miwa Satoshi. 2011. “Shakai idō no sūsei to hikaku” [A 
description and comparison of trends in social mobility]. In Gendai no kaisō 
shakai 2: Kaisō to idō no kōzō [Contemporary stratified society: The structure of 
stratification and mobility], eds. Ishida Hiroshi, Kondo Hiroyuki., and Nakao 
Keiko. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 3–20.
Kaibara Ekiken. 2005. Yōjōkun. Translated by Matsuda Michio. Tokyo: 
Chūōkōron shinsha.
Kanbayashi Hiroshi. 2010a. “Kōdo keizai seichōki no kaisō kizoku ishiki: Sengo 
Nihon ni okeru kaisō ishiki ni kansuru nōto (1)” [Status identification in the 
era of high-speed growth: Note on social identification in postwar Japan (1)]. 
Tōhoku Gakuin Daigaku Kyōyō Gakubu ronshū [Tohoku Gakuin University 
Faculty of Liberal Arts review] 156: 25–54.
176 Works Cited 177
Kitayama Shinobu. 1998. Jiko to kanjō: Bunka shinrigaku ni yoru toi kake [The 
self and emotion: An inquiry based on cultural psychology]. Tokyo: Kyōritsu 
shuppan.
Kobayashi Daisuke. 2008. “Kaisō kizoku ishiki ni tsuite no kiso bunseki: Jiten 
hikaku no tame no chūiten [A basic analysis of status identification: Points of 
attention for time comparisons]. In 2005﻿-nen SSM Nihon chōsa no kiso bun-
seki: Kōzō, sūsei, hōhō: 2005﻿-nen SSM chōsa shirīzu 1 [Basic analysis of the SSM 
2005 Survey: Structure, trend and method], eds. Miwa Satoshi and Kobayashi 
Daisuke. SSM 2005 Survey Management Committee: 111–126.
Kohn, Melvin L. 1969. Class and Conformity: A Study in Values. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Kohn, Melvin L. and Carmi Schooler, with the collaboration of Joanne Miller, et 
al. 1983. Work and Personality: An Inquiry into the Impact of Social Stratification. 
New York: Ablex.
Kondō Katsunori. 2010. Kenkō kakusa shakai o ikinuku [Surviving a society of 
health inequaities]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Publications.
Kōsaka Kenji. 2000. Shakaigaku ni okeru fōmaru seorī: Kaisō imēji ni kan suru FK 
moderu (Formal theory in sociology: The FK model for images of stratification]. 
Tokyo: Harvest-sha.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: 
Doubleday and Co.
Mamada Takao. 1990. “Kaisō kizoku ishiki: Keizai seichō, byōdōka to ‘chū’ 
ishiki” [Status identification: Economic growth, equalization and middle-class 
consciousness]. In Gendai Nihon no kaisō kōzō 2: Kaisō ishiki no dōtai [The 
stratification structure of contemporary Japan: The transformation of strata 
consciousness], ed. Hara Junsuke. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 23–45.
Manabe Kazufumi. 2004. “Tsū-bunka hikaku chōsa oyobi kokusai hikaku 
chōsa no hōhōronteki kadai: Chōsa no dōkasei no mondai o chūshin ni” 
[Methodological problems in cross-cultural and international comparative sur-
veys: Focusing on equivalence].” Hōgaku kenkyū [Keio University journal of 
law, politics and sociology] 77 (1): 504–538.
Marx, Karl. 1859. Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. München: Franz Duncker.
Mikami Takeshi. 2010. Shakai no shikō: Risuku to kanshi to kojinka [Thought in 
society: Risk, surveillance and individualization]. Tokyo: Gakubunsha.
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau website. 
Jinkōkōsei http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/kouhou/useful/u01_z24.
htm, last accessed 01/15/2014.
Misumi Kazuto. 1990. “Kaikyū kizoku ishiki” [Class identification]. In Gendai 
Nihon no kaikyū kōzō 2: Kaisō ishiki no dōtai: 71–95.
Mita Munesuke. 1965. Gendai Nihonjin no seishin kōzō [The structure of the con-
temporary Japanese mentality]. Tokyo: Kōbundō.
—. 1968. “Shakai ishikiron” [Social consciousness studies]. Shakaigaku 
kenkyū nyūmon [A primer on sociological study], eds. Watanuki Jōji and 
—. 2008. “Kaikyū-kaisō ishiki no keiryō shakaigaku” [Quantitative 
sociology of class-strata consciousness]. Kōza shakaigaku 13 Kaisō [Sociology 
of social stratification: Sociology in Japan 13], eds. Atsushi Naoi and Fujita 
Hidenori. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 77–108.
—. 2009. Gakureki bundan shakai [Society of educational disparity]. 
Tokyo: Chikuma shobō.
—. 2011. “Kaisō ishiki no genzai to yukue” [The current state of strata 
consciousness and the future]. Gendai no kaisō shakai 3: Ryūdōka no naka no 
shakai ishiki [Values and attitudes in a time of destabilization: Contemporary 
stratified society 3], eds. Saitō Yuriko and Misumi Kazuto. Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press: 63–78.
—. 2012. “Sōchūryū no yoron to seron” [Public opinion and social sen-
timent of mass middle class]. Mita shakaigaku [Mita journal of sociology] 17: 
13–27.
—. 2013. “Yutaka na shakai no kakusa to fubyōdō” [The economic gap 
and inequality in an affluent society]. Do! soshiorojī, kaiteiban [Do! sociology, 
revised edition], eds. Tomoeda Toshio and Yamada Mamoru. Tokyo: Yuhikaku 
Publishing, 125–148.
—, ed. 2007. Kaisōka suru shakai ishiki: Shokugyō to pāsonariti no keiryō 
shakaigaku [Stratifying social consciousness: A quantitative study of work and 
personality]. Tokyo: Keisō shobō.
—, ed. 2009. Shokugyō to kazoku to pāsonariti ni tsuite no dōitsu paneru 
chōki tsuiseki chōsa [Long-term follow-up panel survey on occupation, family, 
and personality]. Kagaku kenkyūhi hojokin kenkyū (KAKENHI) hōkokusho 
[Grant-in-aid for scientific research report].
—, ed. 2012. Chōki tsuiseki chōsa de miru Nihonjin no ishiki henyō 
[Transformation of attitudes in Japan: Based on a long-term follow up survey]. 
Kyoto: Minerva shobō.
— and Fujihara Sho. 2012. “Class Awareness in Japan and the U.S.: 
Expansion and Stability.” Riron to hōhō 27(2): 205–224.
— and Takayasu Nakamura. 2012. Gakureki, kyōsō, jinsei: 10-dai no 
ima shitte oku beki koto [Education, competition and life: Relevant tips for teen-
agers]. Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center.
— and Makoto Todoroki. 1996. “Gakkō kyōiku to sengo Nihon no 
shakai ishiki no minshuka” [School education and democratization of social 
consciousness in postwar Japan]. Kyōiku shakaigaku kenkyū [Journal of edu-
cational sociology] 58: 87–101. (English translation: Kikkawa Tōru and 
Makoto Todoroki, 1998, “School Education and Democratization of Social 
Consciousness in Postwar Japan,” International Journal of Sociology 28-1: 
92–108.).
Kim Myungsoo. 2012. “Shakai ishiki” [Social consciousness]. In Gendai shakaigaku 
jiden [Encyclopedia of contemporary sociology], eds. Ōsawa Masachi, Yoshimi 
Shunya, and Washida Kiyokazu. Tokyo: Kōbundō: 562–563.
Kishimoto Shigenobu. 1978. Chūryū no gensō [The illusion of “middle class”]. 
Tokyo: Kōdansha.
178 Works Cited 179
tsuite” [On the interactions between scientific knowledge and the knowledge 
of daily life]. In Kagakuka suru nichijō no shakaigaku [The sociology of making 
daily life scientific], ed. Nishiyama Tetsuo. Kyoto: Sekai shisōsha: 13–52.
Oda Teruya and Kōji Abe. 2000. “Fukōheikan wa dono yō ni shōjiru no ka: Seisei 
mekanizumu no kaimei” [How a sense of unfairness is generated: An explica-
tion of the mechanism at work]. In Nihon no kaisō shisutemu 2: Kōheikan to seiji 
ishiki [The stratification system in Japan 2: Sense of fairness and political con-
sciousness], ed. Umino Michio. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 103–125.
Odaka Kunio. 1967. “Yasuda Saburō-kun ni kotaeru” [A reply to Yasuda Saburō], 
Shakaigaku hyōron, 18 (2): 109–113.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2013. “OECD 
Better Life Index” <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/how-s-life-
2013_9789264201392-en>, last accessed 02/15/2016.
Oguma Eiji. 1998. Nihonjin no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen shoku-
minchi shihai kara fukki undō made [The boundaries of the Japanese people: 
Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan and Korea from colonial rule to reversion movements]. 
Tokyo: Shinyōsha.
Ojima Fumiaki, ed. 2001. Gendai kōkōsei no keiryō shakaigaku [A quantitative 
sociology of today’s high school students]. Kyoto: Minerva shobō.
Ōtake Fumio. 2010. Kyōsō to kōheikan: Shijiō keizai no hontō no meritto 
[Competition and the sense of equity: The true merits of a market economy]. 
Tokyo: Chūōkōron shinsha.
Ōtsuka Hisao. 1949 (reprint 1968). Kindaika no ningenteki kiso [The human 
foundations of modernization]. Tokyo: Chikuma shobō.
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: Free Press.
Pedersen, Peter David. 2006. Rohasu ni kurasu [Living a LOHAS life]. Tokyo: 
Business-Sha.
Putnam, Robert D. 2001. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Rokeach, Milton. 1960. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Saitō Yuriko. 2011. “Yori yoi shakai o meguru toi: Shakai kaisō to kōkyōsei, seigi” 
[Questions about a better society: Social stratification, publicness and justice]. 
In Nihon no shakai kaisō to sono mekanizumu: 225–254.
Saitō Yuriko and Ōtsuki Shigemi. 2011. “Fukōheikan no kōzō: Kakusa kakudai 
to kaisōsei” [Structure of the sense of unfairness: Stratification and expanding 
social disparity]. In Gendai no kaisō Shakai 3: 219–232.
Sandel, Michael J. 2009. Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux.
Satō Kenji. 2011. Shakai chōsa shi no riterashī: Hōhō o yomu shakaigakuteki 
sōzōryoku [Understanding the history of social research: Sociological imagina-
tion to examine methodology]. Tokyo: Shinyōsha.
Satō Toshiki. 2000. Fubyōdō shakai Nihon [Japan as an unequal society]. Tokyo: 
Chūōkōron shinsha.
—. 2009. “Kaisō kizoku no imiron: Jiseiteki kindai ni okeru kaisō 
ishiki” [The semantics of status identification: Social psychology in reflective 
Matsubara Haruo. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 189–220.
—. 1976. “Gendai shakai no shakai ishiki” [Social consciousness in 
contemporary society]. In Shakaigaku kōza: Shakai ishikiron [Sociology lecture 
12: The theory of social consciousness], ed. Mita Munesuke. Tokyo: University 
of Tokyo Press: 1–26.
—. 1979. Gendai shakai no shakai ishiki [Social consciousness in con-
temporary society]. Tokyo: Kōbundō.
— (as Maki Yūsuke). 1981. Jikan no hikaku shakaigaku [A comparative 
sociology of time]. Iwanami shoten.
—. 1993. “Shakai ishiki” [Social consciousness]. In Shin-shakaigaku 
jiden [New encyclopedia of sociology], eds. Morioka Kiyomi, Shiobara 
Tsutomu, and Honma Yasuhei. Tokyo: Yuihikaku Publishing: 592–594.
Miura Atsushi. 2005. Karyū shakai: Arata na shakai shūdan no shutsugen [Lower-
class society: The emergence of a new social category]. Tokyo: Kōbunsha.
Miyajima Takashi. 1983. Gendai shakai ishikiron [Contemporary social conscious-
ness studies]. Tokyo: Nippon hyōronsha.
Mori Naoto. 2008. “Sōchūryū no shisō to wa nan datta no ka: Chū ishiki no 
genten o saguru” [What was the ideology behind the mass middle class soci-
ety? Uncovering the origins of the middle consciousness]. In Shisō chizu 2 
[Map of philosophy 2], eds. Azuma Hiroki and Kitada Akihiro. Tokyo: NHK 
Publishing: 233–270.
Murakami Yasusuke. 1984. Shin chūkan taishū no jidai [The age of new mass mid-
dle class]. Tokyo: Chūōkōron shinsha.
Murakami Yasusuke, Kumon Shunpei and Satō Seizaburō. 1979. Bunmei to shite 
no ie shakai [The ie society as a pattern of civilization]. Tokyo: Chūōkōron 
shinsha.
Nakane Chie. 1967. Tate shakai no ningen kankei: Tan’itsu shakai no riron. [The 
human relationship in the society of vertical order: A theory of the homoge-
neous society], Tokyo: Kōdansha. (English translation: Nakane Chie, 1973, 
Japanese Society: a Practical Guide to Understanding the Japanese Mindset and 
Culture, North Clarendon: Tuttle Publishing).
Naoi Atsushi. 1987. “Shigoto to ningen no sōgō kankei” [The interaction between 
work and human beings]. In Hataraku koto no imi—Meaning of Working Life: 
MOW no kokusai hikaku kenkyū [What it means to work (Meaning of work-
ing life): An international comparative study on the meaning of working], ed. 
Misumi Jūji. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishing: 103–144.
Naoi Michiko. 1979. “Kaisō ishiki to kaikyū ishiki” [Stratum identification and 
class identification]. In Nihon no kasō kōzō [Social stratification in Japan), ed. 
Tominaga Ken’ichi. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 365–388.
—. 1988. “Shokugyō kaisō to ken’i-shugiteki kachi ishiki” 
[Occupational status and authoritarian value consciousness]. In 1985﻿-nen 
shakai kaisō to shakai idō zenkoku chōsa hōkokusho 2: 225–242. 
—, ed. 1989. Kaji no shakaigaku [The sociology of housework]. Tokyo: 
Saiensu-sha.
Nishiyama Tetsuo. 2013. “Gendai ni okeru kagaku-chi to nichijō-chi no kōryū ni 
180 Works Cited 181
—. 2000. “Han-ken’i-shugiteki taido no takamari wa nani o motarasu 
no ka” [What does the rise in the anti-authoritarian attitude imply?]. In Nihon 
no kaisō shisutemu 2: 195–216.
—. 2008. “Ken’i-shugiteki taido to shakai kaisō: Bunpu to sen-
kei kankei no jiten hikaku” [Authoritarian attitude and social stratification: 
Temporal comparison of distribution and linear relationship]. In 2005﻿-nen 
SSM chōsa shirīzu 8: Kaisō ishiki no genzai [SSM 2005 Survey report series 8: 
The current state of strata consciousness], ed. Todoroki Makoto. SSM 2005 
Survey Management Committee: 227–247.
—. 2011. “Kaisō ishiki no bunseki wakugumi: Kachi ishiki o chūshin 
to shite” [The analytical frame of strata consciousness: Focusing on values]. In 
Gendai no kaisō shakai 3: 79–91.
Tōkei sūri kenkyūjo [Institute of Statistical Mathematics]. 2013. Nihonjin no 
kokuminsei chōsa [The study of Japanese national character], <http://www.ism.
ac.jp/kokuminsei/table/index.htm>, last accessed 01/15/2014.
Tomoeda Toshio. 2010. “Datsu-umekomi” [Disembedding]. In Shakaigaku jiten 
[Encyclopedia of sociology], ed. Nihon Shakaigakkai Shakaigaku Jiden Kankō 
Iinkai [Japanese Sociological Society Shakaigaku jiten publication committee]. 
Tokyo: Maruzen: 208–209.
—. 2013. “Shakaigaku no hōhō: Shakai o kagaku suru” [The methods 
of sociology: Applying science to society]. In Do! soshiorojī, kaiteiban: 1–21.
Tomono Norio. 2006. Kōdō keizaigaku: Keizai wa kanjō de ugoite iru [Behavioral 
economics: Economy is driven by emotion. Tokyo: Kōbunsha.
Umino Michio. 2000. “Yutakasa no tsuikyū kara kōhei shakai no kikyū e: Kaisō 
ishiki no kōzō to henyo” [From chasing affluence to seeking justice: The struc-
ture of and changing trends in strata consciousness]. In Nihon no kaisō shisutemu 
2: 3–36.
—, ed. 2007. Ningen kōdō to seisaku: Haikibutsu o meguru sūri-keiryō 
shakaigaku [Human behavior and politics: Mathematical sociology environ-
mental problems]. Kagaku kenkyūhi hojokin kenkyū (KAKENHI) hōkokusho 
[Grant-in-aid for scientific research report].
Umino Michio and Saitō Yuriko. 1990. “Kōheikan to manzokukan” [Equity and 
satisfaction]. In Gendai Nihon no kaikyū kōzō 2: 97–124.
Watanuki Jōji. 1986. “Shakai kōzō to kachi tairitsu” [Social structure and value 
conflicts]. In Nihonjin no senkyo kōdō [Japanese election behavior], eds. 
Watanuki Jōji et al. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press: 17–37.
Yamada Mamoru. 2010. “Saikiteki kindaika” [Reflexive modernization]. In 
Shakaigaku jiten: 210–211.
—. 2013. “Kojinka suru shakai to shinmitusei no wana” 
[Individualization and the intimacy trap]. In Do! soshiorojī, kaiteiban: 25–50.
Yamamono Shichihei. 1983. “Kūki” no kenkyū [Essays on “atmosphere”]. Tokyo: 
Bungeishunju.
Yamazaki Masakazu. 1984. Yawarakai kojin-shugi no tanjō: Shōhi shakai no big-
aku [The birth of soft individualism: Aesthetics in a consumer society]. Tokyo: 
Chūōkōron shinsha.
stratified societies]. Shakaigaku hyōron 59 (4): 734–751.
Seiyama Kazuo. 1990. “Chū-ishiki no imi” [Middle class identification in post-
war Japan]. Riron to hōhō 5 (2): 51–71.
—. 2004. Shakai chōsahō nyūmon [Introduction to social research]. 
Yuhikaku Publishing.
Seligman, Martin E. P. 2002. Authentic Happiness: Using the New Positive Psychology 
to Realize Your Potential for Lasting Fulfillment. New York: Free Press.
Shiobara Tsutomu. 1994. Tenkan suru Nihon shakai [Japanese society in transi-
tion]. Tokyo: Shinyōsha.
SSM 1975 Survey Management Committee. 1976. 1975﻿-nen SSM chōsa 
kōdo bukku [The codebook for the SSM 1975 Survey]. SSM 1975 Survey 
Management Committee.
SSM Torendo Bunseki Kenkyūkai [SSM trends analysis study group]. 1983. 
1995﻿-nen SSM chōsa: 1980-1981-nendo sai-kōdingu kōdobukku [The SSM 
1995 Survey: The codebook for re-coding the 1980 and 1981 studies]. SSM 
torendo bunseki kenkyūkai.
SSP Purojekuto [SSP project]. 2013. SSP-W2013 1st: Kōdobukku oyobi kiso 
shūkeihyō [SSP-W2013 1st: Codebook and basic report]. SSP Purojekuto 
website, <http://ssp.hus.osaka-u.ac.jp/pdf/SSP-W20131st.pdf>, last accessed 
01/15/2014.
Sudo Naoki. 2009. Kaisō ishiki no dainamikusu: Naze, sore wa genjitsu kara zureru 
no ka [The dynamics of status identification]. Keisō shobō.
—. 2010. Nihonjin no kaisōishiki [Status identification in Japan]. 
Tokyo: Kōdansha.
Sugino Isamu. 2012. “Ryō to shitsu no kyōtsū no junkyo mondai” [Shared stan-
dards of quantitative and qualitative studies]. In Shakaigaku o tou: Kihan, riron, 
jisshō no kinchō kankei [Inquiring sociology: The tense relationship among 
model, theory, and evidence], eds. Yonemura Chiyo and Sudo Naoki. Tokyo: 
Keisō shobō: 124–157.
Tachibanaki Toshiaki. 1998. Nihon no keizai kakusa: Shotoku to shisan kara kan-
gaeru [Economic discrepancies in Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten.
Tanioka Ken. 2012. “SSP-I 2010 ni miru kakusa shakai no kaisō kizoku ishiki” 
[Status identification in an inequality society: Based on an analysis of SSP-I 
2010 data]. Tōkei sūri kenkyūsho kyōdō kenkyū ripōto [Joint study report of the 
Institute of Statistical Mathematics) 287: 145–157.
Tarōmaru Hiroshi, Sakaguchi Yūsuke, and Miyata Naoko. 2009. “Soshioroji 
to Shakaigaku hyōron ni miru shakaigaku no hōhō no torendo 1952–2008” 
[Trends in sociology methods as seen in Soshioroji and Shakaikagaku hyōron, 
1952–2008). Tarōmaru Hiroshi website, <http://tarohmaru.web.fc2.com/doc-
uments/journal.pdf>, last accessed 01/15/2014.
Todoroki Makoto. 1998. “Ken’i-shugiteki taido to gendai no shakai kaisō” 
[Authoritarian attitude and contemporary social stratification]. In 1995﻿-nen 
SSM chōsa shirīzu 6: Gendai Nihon no kaisō ishiki [SSM 1995 Survey report 
series 6: Strata consciousness in contemporary Japan], ed. Mamada Takao. SSM 
1995 Survey Management Committee. 65–87.
182
Yasuda Saburō. 1973. Gendai Nihon no kaikyū ishiki [Class consciousness in con-
temporary Japan]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku Publishng.
Yoda Takanori. 2010. Kōdō keizaigaku: Kanjō ni yureru keizai shinri [Behavioral 
economics: Economic mood driven by emotion]. Tokyo: Chūōkōron shinsha.
Yoneda Yukihiro. 2007. “Sangyo shakai ni okeru pāsonariti keisei” [Personality 
development in industrial society]. In Kaisōka suru shakai ishiki: Shokugyō to 
pāsonariti no keiryō shakaigaku: 49–76.
Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko. 2005. 1985﻿-nen [1985]. Tokyo: Shinchosha Publishing.
Zheng Yuejun, Yoshino Ryōzō, and Murakami Masakatsu. 2006. “Higashi Ajia 
shokoku no hitobito no shizenkan, kankyōkan no bunseki: Kankyō ishiki 
keisei ni eikyō o ataeru yōin no chūshutsu” [An analysis on the attitudes toward 
nature and environment in East Asia: Main factors in the formation of environ-
mental consciousness]. Kōdō keiryo-gaku [Japanese journal of behaviormetrics] 
33(1): 55–68.
183
Index
SUBJECT INDEX
A     
Altruism     122
Analytical monograph     36–39
“The angels’ share”     39–41, 85, 93
Authoritarianism (Authoritarian attitude, 
Authoritarian conservatism)     15, 27, 
98–109, 113–116, 139–151, 
153–155
The Authoritarian Personality     99
B     
Baby boomers (Japanese), see Dankai no sedai
Behavioral economics     4–6
Better Life Index     137
Bourgeoisie     69
“Bubble” (economy) years     48, 86, 138
C
Class identity     70
Collective consciousness     17, 156–160
Consummatory     130–132, 149–150, 
155–162
Contemporary social consciousness studies     
13–21
Contextualism     58
Conventional (Conventionality)     12–13, 30, 
97–98, 103, 150, 156, 160
Cultural activities     126–134
Cultural consumption activities     126–131, 
155
Cultural psychology     22
Cultural reproduction     125
Culture     8
— sociology of     16–23
— status-relatedness of     126
D     
Dankai no sedai     56
Disembedding     156–167
Diversity, acceptance of     123–125, 131–135
Doctrine (see also “-ism”)     8–9, 122–132, 
154–163
E     
Education     10–12, 37–38, 49, 83–89, 
103–104, 110–114, 130–134, 164, 
169
— re-embedding in     167–168
Education society     12, 168–169
Elections, frequency of voting in     127–130
Emotions and feelings     9–10
Environmental conservation awareness     
138–151
Equity     41, 117–120
Ethos     8–9
“Exotic Japan”     57–59, 62
Experience and frequency of foreign travel     
129–131
Expert system     165–167
F     
Face-to-face interview     32–34, 40, 72, 80, 
102–103, 107
Faith in percentages     33
“Farewell to the Mass Middle Class”     66
Fascism     98–99
Five-level status identification     65–72, 81–85
Fubyodō shakai Nihon     66, 79
G     
Gender-role segregation, attitudes toward     
109–115
General life satisfaction     139–150
General Social Survey (GSS)     42, 70, 79–80, 
88
H     
Habitus     8, 17, 125–126
“Hardware”     13, 25, 27, 41, 87, 101, 126, 
159, 161
Health maintenance awareness     138–151
High modernity     51
I     
Ideology     8–9, 159–161
Illusory leveling, state of     91, 161
Individuality     7–9
184 185Index
Individualization     150–158
“Inside-outside role” attitude     109–111
Interested party     33, 122, 132
“-ism” (see also “doctrine”)     8–9, 123–125
J     
Japanese National Character Survey     33, 35, 
60, 79
Justice     118–119
K
Kohn-Schooler study     100
L     
Library visits, frequency of     126–130
Life of the People Survey     33, 65–66, 76–77
Lifestyle of health and sustainability, see 
LOHAS 
“Literacy”     xiv, 91, 158–167
LOHAS     139
Lower-class society     69, 78
M     
Marxist class theory     13–14, 69, 165
Mass inequality     83–92, 161
Mass middle class     xiii, 19–22, 30–32, 
61–62, 65–80, 81–83, 87–93, 
159–161
Mass society theory     13, 17, 62, 157–158
“Master-subordinate role” attitude     109–112
Mathematical sociology     22
Mechanism of Escape     7, 99
Meritocracy     113, 133
Methodological individualism     17–18, 158
Middle-class consciousness     66–67, 76–77, 
159
Modern (modrnization)     12–13, 52, 58–61, 
97
Modernism, see Traditionalism–modernism 
Modernity     xii, 97–98, 138, 150, 156–158
“Museums visit”     126–130
N
Naive realist reflection assertion     80, 93
National Survey of Social Stratification and 
Social Mobility, see SSM Survey 
Neoliberal perception of inequality     121–122
New middle mass     89
Nihonjinron     22, 57–62, 159, 171
O
“One hundred million-strong mass middle 
class”     62
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
analysis     36–39
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)     137
Orientation     8, 31
P
Personal interest, see Interested party 
Population pyramid     55–56
Positive reevaluations of the uniqueness of 
Japan’s culture     57–59
Postwar social consciousness studies     12–13, 
20–21
Premium goods, frequency of purchase of      
128–131
Prosocial nature     122–123
Psychologization     xi
Public opinion statistics     32–36
Q     
Quality of life orientation (QOL orientation)     
138–149
Quantitative social consciousness studies     
3–6, 10–23, 25–43
Quiet transformation of status identification     
37, 86–88, 93, 153
R     
Re-embedding     20, 156–158, 163–167
Reflexive modernity     xii–xiii, 6, 31, 50–51, 
98, 150, 156–158
Response distribution     31, 35, 42, 67, 75–80
S     
Second Monitor Survey     xvi, 144–145
Self-direction     41, 100–102, 113, 115, 140, 
147, 160, 168
Show cards     72–73
Social attitude (s)     8–11, 15, 19, 26–27
Social capital     126, 164
Social character     8–9
Social consciousness studies     v, xi–xv, 3–23
Social consciousness studies-type regression 
model     37–41
Social epidemiology and public health     6
Social fact     17–18, 157–159
Social mentality     xi–xiii 
Social psychology     4–9
Social structure     25
Sociological imagination     28
“Software”     xi, 27, 101, 126, 159, 161
SSM Survey     xvi, 16, 19, 48, 52, 65–80, 
102–103, 107, 115, 119
SSP-I 2010 Survey     xvi, 32, 48, 67, 83, 109, 
120
SSP-P 2010 Survey     6, 107, 144–145
SSP Project     iii, xvi, 48, 63
SSP-W 2013-1st     xvi, 74
State of disillusioned inequality     92, 155, 161
Status identification     30–31
Status-relatedness     14–15
Stratification and Social Psychology Project, see 
SSP Project 
Stratification consciousness studies     18–21
Stratification, Education, and the Formation of 
Social Consciousness     iii, 10–12
Structural equation modeling     38, 148
Subjective well-being     138–149
Subjectivity     8
Symbolic token     165–167
T     
Theory of Japanese uniqueness, see Nihonjinron 
Traditionalism, see Conventionality
Traditionalism–modernism     xvi, 30–31, 
60–61, 97–115, 153–164
U     
Unfairness, feelings of, see Equity     
V     
Value judgment     9, 119
Value orientation     8–9, 33
Volunteer and NPO     129–130
W     
Work and Personality     100–103, 106, 113, 
115
186
NAME INDEX     
Adorno, Theodor           10, 99
Aoki Tamotsu     57–63
Bauman, Zygmunt     50, 150
Beck, Ulrich     50, 150
Bourdieu, Pierre     8, 16, 125–126
Durkheim, Émile     7, 16–17, 157
Fromm, Erich     7, 98–99
Giddens, Anthony     50, 98, 150, 156–157, 
165–168
Hamaguchi Eshun     58–59, 63
Hayashi Chikio     52, 60
Hidaka Rokurō     12–13, 15, 22
Hout, Michael     80
Imada Takatoshi     52, 82
Inglehart, Ronald     163
Inkeles, Alex     163
Kanbayashi Hiroshi     72, 76, 79, 86–87, 90
Kido Kotarō     15–16, 20, 22, 27, 37, 99
Kishimoto Shigenobu     82
Kitayama Shinobu          22
Kohn, Melvin     41, 100–101, 115
Mannheim, Karl     8, 157
Marx, Karl     11, 14, 19, 27, 101, 135
Merton, Robert     7
Mikami Takeshi     51, 157
Mills, C. Wright     28
Mita Munesuke     xv, 12–23
Miura Atsushi     78
Miyajima Takashi     13–22
Mori Naoto     71, 78, 92
Murakami Yasusuke     57, 89
Naoi Atsushi     100, 102, 145
Naoi Michiko     80, 92–93, 106
Nishiyama Tetsuo     xii
Odaka Kunio     18, 21, 23, 69, 72
Oguma Eiji     63
Ōtsuka Hisao     12
Parsons, Talcott     161
Sandel, Michael     119
Satō Kenji     16, 23
Satō Toshiki     66, 72, 79–80, 91
Schooler, Carmi     41, 100–101, 115
Seiyama Kazuo     23, 41, 80, 93
Sudo Naoki     77, 79–80, 86, 90, 93
Todoroki Makoto     100, 104, 106, 113–116
Tominaga Ken’ichi     23, 79
Tomoeda Toshio     51–52
Watanuki Jōji     61
Weber, Max     7–8, 97
Yamada Mamoru     51
Yasuda Saburō     8, 16, 18, 21, 23, 66, 69
Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko     52

